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ABSTRACT 
 
GREAT POWER, ARMS, AND ALLIANCES 
Keith L. Carter 
Michael C. Horowitz 
After a low point in the early 2000s, the global arms trade is experiencing a 
resurgence.  Powerful states such as the United States, Russia, France, Germany, and 
China account for the vast majority of the total exported arms but trading weapons 
technology seems inherently risky.  It increases the proliferation rate of technology and 
creates vulnerability if a trading partner defects from an alliance.  Given the risk, why do 
great powers trade their weapons?  The results show a positive linear relationship 
between great power competition and the volume of arms trade globally.  Positive 
relationships were also found for alliances, domestic regime similarity between importing 
and exporting states, and for when the importing state is involved in an active conflict.  
This dissertation looks at the international arms trade using a mixed methodological 
approach.  Quantitatively, a time series multivariate regression model using country year 
dyads between the major exporting states and all of the other states in the international 
system is developed to look at how great power competition, alliances, political regimes, 
and conflict affect the arms trade.  The quantitative analysis is supported with two 
qualitative case studies that employ process tracing to provide more detail about how the 
international arms trade is related to great power competition, alliance formation, 
domestic political regime similarity, and conflict.  In the first case study, the end of the 
Cold War is used to show how the decline of the Soviet Union created new arms trade 
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and alliance opportunities for NATO.  The second case study looks at the iterative Arab-
Israeli War to see how domestic political regimes and conflict affect the arms trade when 
two great powers compete via proxy in a regional conflict.  The levels of great power 
competition are currently increasing as China continues to mature into a dominant 
regional power and Russia pursues a grand strategy of agitating against western 
institutions.  Based on the conclusions of this study, this suggests that the level of arms 
traded in the international system will continue to increase as great powers seek to add to 
and solidify their alliance spheres of influence by increasing access to their arms. 
  
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................... II 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. III 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................... VII 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... IX 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 
Theory: ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 
Discussion of Hypotheses .............................................................................................................................. 7 
Summary of Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................. 20 
Outline of Dissertation ................................................................................................................................ 21 
CHAPTER 2: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 23 
Introduction: ................................................................................................................................................ 23 
Research Design: ......................................................................................................................................... 23 
Measuring Arm Trade: ............................................................................................................................... 25 
Independent Variables ................................................................................................................................ 30 
Missing Data ................................................................................................................................................ 36 
Results .......................................................................................................................................................... 39 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................................... 50 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 52 
CHAPTER 3:  THE END OF THE COLD WAR, ARMS TRADE, AND ALLIANCE 
REORIENTATION IN EASTERN EUROPE .......................................................................... 54 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 54 
Case Selection .............................................................................................................................................. 57 
Poland ........................................................................................................................................................... 64 
vi 
 
NATO Expansion and Arms Trade in the Rest of Eastern Europe ........................................................ 85 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 94 
CHAPTER 4: ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT ............................................................................ 97 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 97 
Case Selection ............................................................................................................................................ 100 
Background ................................................................................................................................................ 101 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................................... 110 
Israel-France and the Suez Crisis ............................................................................................................ 121 
The June 1967 Six Day War ..................................................................................................................... 127 
The War of Attrition (1967-1970) and The Yom Kippur War (1973) .................................................. 133 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 141 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 145 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 145 
Summary of Findings ................................................................................................................................ 145 
Contribution to the Discipline .................................................................................................................. 152 
Policy Implications .................................................................................................................................... 161 
Limitations and Future Research ............................................................................................................ 170 
Final Remarks ........................................................................................................................................... 172 
APPENDIX A: CODE BOOK ................................................................................................. 174 
APPENDIX B: LIST OF IMPORTING STATES ................................................................ 175 
APPENDIX C: ALTERNATIVE REGRESSION MODELS ................................................ 177 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 183 
 
 
vii
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Showing both Major Powers as derived from averaged CINC scores from 1950-
2007 and by GDP in 2014, and the top 10 countries involved in exporting and importing 
armaments from 2011-2015 
Table 2: Showing Missing Data by Variable  
Table 3: Main Effects Model with Imputation 1950-2007 
 
Table 4: Regression Model Showing Exporter Effects with Imputation 1950-2007 
 
Table 5:  Regression Model Showing Regional Effects with Imputation 1950-2007 
 
Table 6: Showing the Total Number of Trades Between the Major Powers and Eastern 
European Countries from 1947-2015 
 
Table 7: Showing GDP Billion U.S. Dollars 
 
Table 8: Showing Defense Expenditure for NATO members as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Table 9: Showing Poland’s Arms Trade Between the Reunification of Germany and the 
NATO study on Enlargement. 
 
Table 10:  Showing the Change in Trade Volume (TIV) as a result of the End of the Cold 
War and as a Function of Alliance Shift 
 
Table 11: Showing Arms Trade Patterns to Poland before and after their NATO 
accession.  
Table 12: Showing Change in Trade as a Result of Alliance Membership 
Table 13: Showing the Change in Trade Volume (TIV) as a result of the End of the Cold 
War and as a Function of Alliance Shift 
 
Table 14: Showing Trade Patterns by Armament Category in the First Wave of NATO 
Expansion. 
 
Table 15: Showing Trade Patterns by Armament Category in the Second Wave of NATO 
Expansion 
 
Table 16: Showing Trade Patterns by Armament Category in the Third Wave of NATO 
Expansion. 
 
viii 
 
Table 17: Showing Trade Patterns by Armament Category for Eastern European States 
not in NATO. 
 
Table 18: Showing the trade across the Middle East Region from 1955 to 1978. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Showing the Total Volume of International Arms Trade in TIV from 1950-2007 
 
Figure 2: Showing the Proportion of Material Power the United States Held Within the 
Great Power Dyad 
 
Figure 3: Showing U.S. and Russia’s Total TIV per year to Poland. 
 
Figure 4: Showing Armament Trade to Israel from the U.S. and France from 1954 to 
1976.   
 
Figure 4:  Showing Armament Trade to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq from the U.S.S.R. from 
1954 to 1976.   
 
Figure 5:  Showing Armament Trade Between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt, Syria, and Iraq 
and the U.S. and Israel from 1954 to 1980.   
 
Figure 6:  Showing Arms Trade by Type between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt and the U.S. 
and Israel from 1967 to 1974. 
 
 
 
 
 
1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Globally, the arms trade is flourishing.  Major powers, such as the United States, 
Russia, France, Germany, and China, together captured 75% of the total arms exported 
from 2014 to 2018.  The U.S. alone accounts for 36% of the total global arms trade, and 
there has been a steady global increase since the early 2000s.1  Although the recent 
increases in the volume of the international arms trade have not yet matched its peak 
from the 1980s, the 23% rise since the low point in the early 2000s suggests an increased 
demand for weapons systems.  It is remains unclear exactly why the volume of the arms 
trade varies.  Given the size and relative power of the states that are involved, it is clear 
that the international arms trade is a component of a states’ grand strategy, and confers 
some benefit to exporters.  It is also obvious that states would not want their weapons to 
proliferate unchecked throughout the international system—potentially falling into 
competitors’ hands and eroding their advantage.  Presumably, there are multiple factors 
that affect a state’s decision to sell weapons, but what is the relationship between great 
power competition, alliances, and the arms trade?  Why do powerful states sell their 
weapons? 
Since the industrial revolution, weapons have become increasingly specialized.  
As the rate of technological change increased, militaries sought to maintain their 
advantage by possessing the most advanced weapons available.  Driven by the security 
                                                 
1 Pieter D. Wezeman et al., "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018,"  SIPRI 
Fact Sheet (2019), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-
03/fs_1903_at_2018.pdf. 
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dilemma, states were “compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast 
proportions.”2  In spite of security competition though, states frequently form alliances 
and trade armaments, and there is a clear relationship between a state’s level of economic 
and military power and the exportation of arms.  Structural arguments suggest that one 
reason states would trade arms is to balance against other competing states.  In this 
account, the number of great powers in the international system is front and center 
because of its effects on the types of balancing behavior.  States could therefore trade 
arms to alter existing military balances and to signal alliance commitments.  Additionally, 
because hegemonic states play a role commensurate to their power in stabilizing the 
international system, arms trades could serve as tool for major powers to extended their 
power by establishing hierarchical security spheres.3   
Powerful states sell their weapons to extend their security spheres of influence.  
The contest to extend alliance networks varies depending on the level of great power 
competition occurring between hegemonic rivals.  As the level of great power 
competition increases, the relative stakes of losing position magnify lowering barriers to 
arms trade, increasing supply, and generating demand.  Often these competitions occur in 
a regional context where multiple great powers are competing for influence and 
establishing proxy subsidiaries.  Other considerations, such as the existence of an 
alliance, the degree of regime similarity, or the importing states involvement in an active 
                                                 
2 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farwell Address," news release, 1961, 
http://eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/farewell_address/196
1_01_17_Press_Release.pdf. 
3 David A. Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World 
Politics," International Security 32, no. 1 (2007). 
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conflict increase the volume of arms traded.  Gaining a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between great power competition, alliances, and the arms trade has important 
implications.  In terms of scholarship, unpacking the interrelated nature of great power 
competition, arms, and alliances expands current accounts of state balancing behavior 
and alliance formation.  Additionally, as the international system enters a new period of 
increased great power competition, there are some important implications for how the 
sale of arms can be used as a tool of statecraft for extending security spheres and building 
resilient partnerships.   
Theory: 
 
In this dissertation, I will argue that the central variable affecting the volume of 
arms traded internationally is the amount of great power competition occurring in the 
state system.  Great power competition plays a central role in structural arguments 
defining alliance formations and balancing behaviors.  Because of the anarchic state of 
the international system and the disparate power relationships between states, 
competition and the threat of violence necessitates that states must attend to their security 
through some combination of organizing, equipping, and manning a military.  However, 
states vary in the distribution of resources and industrial capability to produce military 
equipment.  States that adopted the modern system of force employment, an approach to 
industrialized warfare that emerged out of the trench stalemate of the First World War, 
gained a decisive advantage militarily over states that have not or could not adopt this 
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approach to warfare.4  Because the adoption of the modern system requires the industrial 
tools of war as a necessary condition, states are pressured to obtain modern armaments.  
Importantly, the modern system avoids charges of technological determinism by 
stipulating that while the industrialized tools of war are a necessary condition, they are 
not sufficient to adopt the modern system.5  Nevertheless, arms become a critical 
component of state security considerations.   
The industrial revolution generally, and the industrialization of war making 
materials specifically, had broad implications for the international distribution of power.  
States that mastered industrialized production were able to mass produce arms, move 
armies at an unprecedented scale, exploit metallurgical advancements in shipbuilding and 
gun construction, and eventually take to the skies.  One example of the relationship 
between industrialization and military power is evident in the relative power America 
gained during the Second World War.  In this war, America was able utilize its natural 
and material resources, convert its existing manufacturing industry, adopt mass 
production techniques in airplane and ship construction, and as a result, was both 
militarily and materially central to the allied victory in WWII.6  As industrialization 
became crucial to war, states’ relationships with the military-industrial complex changed.  
                                                 
4 Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 28-30. 
5 Ibid., 28-51. 
6 R. J. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 1st American ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 
191-98. 
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The privatization of the armament industry had three important consequences for 
the development of an international arms trade.  First, because privatization increased 
industrial competition—as firms competed to gain market share—the pace of 
technological development was accelerated.  Second, privatized firms needed to be 
profitable to maintain themselves organizationally.7  Profitability can be increased by 
foreign sales because it expands the market, and by increasing the number of weapons 
systems sold, the cost per system is reduced through economies of scale.  However, 
foreign sales have the potential to alter the balance of power in a direction unfavorable to 
a state’s preferences, increasing the probability of protectionist trade policies for war 
making technology.  Third, because rapid technological changes could potentially shift 
balances of power, and the lack of information regarding an adversary’s capabilities, 
states had to increase their spending and accelerate their equipment acquisition strategy.   
The naval arms race between Britain and Germany prior to the First World War 
highlights some of the key features of the transformation of states’ relationships with the 
armament industry.  The multipolarity that existed in the international system at the time 
increased the military interdependence of the great powers in the international system and 
promoted external balancing.8  Great power balancing behavior played out interactively 
with the industrialization of armament manufacture.  In Britain, just before the turn of the 
19th Century, tension was mounting between state controlled armament firms such as 
                                                 
7 William Hardy McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society 
since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 263. 
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Series in 
Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), 164-69. 
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Woolwich and private firms such as Armstrong and Vickers. 9  Furthermore, Britain was 
not alone in the privatization of armament manufacture similar developments were 
happening in Germany and to a lesser degree in France.10  In this early period of 
industrialization, “[n]ational loyalty obstructed profitable dealing with potential 
enemies.”11  Nevertheless, some cross-border but intra-industry agreements were 
maintained between British and German firms even after the outbreak of hostilities in 
July 1914.12  During this same period, in part driven by the increased pace of 
technological advancement, the Royal Navy’s spending increased threefold—easily 
exceeding the rate of economic growth in Great Britain at the time.13  Thus, states that 
privatize their military-industrial complex face a dilemma.  One the one hand, 
privatization is potentially advantageous for state security because it engenders market 
competition.  On the other hand, due to the costs of research, development, and 
production it is unlikely that defense firms could recoup their investment solely through 
intra-national sales.  Likewise states that were late to industrialize were at an obvious 
disadvantage and faced a choice between developing their own military-industrial 
complexes, procuring high end technology from an early adopter, or a blended strategy of 
doing a bit of both.  In part the tension inherent in these problems is resolved when states 
                                                 
9 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000, 
271. 
10 Ibid., 262-306. 
11 Ibid., 292. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Jon Sumida, "The Royal Navy and Technological Change, 1815-1945," in Men, 
Machines & War, ed. Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson (Waterloo, Ont., Canada: 
Wilfried Laurier University Press, 1988), 83. 
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engage in the exportation and importation of military weapons.  Desiring to maintain a 
robust military-industrial complex, states are likely to export military technology within 
their security spheres of influence to achieve economies of scale.  Similarly, developing 
states or states with lower military-industrial capacity are likely to want to import 
weapons to attend to their security needs without having to outlay the capital required to 
produce arms internally.  Given the possible role that foreign weapons sales play in 
alliance building, alliance maintenance, and as a tool of state balancing behavior, it is 
possible that the political calculus of arms trading changes based on the distribution of 
power within the international system.   
Discussion of Hypotheses 
 
H1: Great power competition will create increased volume in armament trade 
across the international system. 
Whether thinking about the role of power in either polar or hierarchical terms, a 
state’s arms trade decision making is fundamentally affected by the distribution of power 
across the international system.  As the relative positions of states rise and fall, the 
changes in the distribution of power influences the behavior of the great powers within 
the system.  Extending influence through the exportation of arms is a way that great 
powers can externally balance against perceived threats.  Theoretically, the 
characterization of whether the international system is as underpinned by a condition of 
anarchy or hierarchy informs a central difference between arguments highlighting the 
role of polar powers versus the influence of states vis-à-vis one another.  Starting from 
anarchy, polarity arguments highlight interstate competition between polar powers and 
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generate observable implications for arms trading as balancing.  Balancing arguments 
focus on the number and competition between polar powers existing at a given time 
within the international system, whereas hierarchical arguments focus on the degree of 
influence states have as a result of their position relative to other states.  In a multipolar 
system, the external balancing nature of alliances and the profusion of other great powers 
creates the most security uncertainty because there is both a fear of alliance defection and 
an environment marked by great power competition.   
In a bipolar system security uncertainties are reduced because, though the threat is 
high, the rival is known.  A bipolar system also changes the character of balancing from 
external (through alliances) to internal.14  Alliances are still important, but they are 
managed differently, and the two competing great powers are better able to advance their 
interests within their alliance networks because defection no longer has the same 
implications for the overall international balance of power.15  Following the Second 
World War, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the prevailing great 
powers in a bipolar international system.  Both established security spheres and engaged 
in military-industrial competition.  The bipolarity of the international system, and the 
resulting pattern of alliance formation affected the patterns of trade liberalization.  Joanne 
Gowa developed a model showing that because the risk of alliance withdrawal is lower in 
a bipolar international system, free trade is more likely to occur and it is specifically more 
                                                 
14 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 168. 
15 Ibid., 169. 
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likely to occur within the alliance network.16  Is it possible that this is also true for arms 
trades?  Two features of bipolar international systems favor arms trade: 1. alliance 
stability and 2. more predictable great power competition.   
Unipolar international systems may go further than bipolarity in reducing the 
uncertainty of the international security environment because the sole great power enjoys 
an “unequivocal hierarchy of power.”17  In unipolarity there is presumably little concern 
for alliance withdrawal for the remaining great power, but there is also a relative lack of 
great power competition.  Unipolarity does not however, imply peace.  Indeed, as noted 
by Nuno Monterio, unipolarity “while eliminating great-power competition, makes room 
for significant conflict.”18  During periods of unipolarity, the machinations of minor 
powers and regional hegemons are less problematic to the reigning great power because 
as the sole great power alliance opportunities with a competing great power are absent.  
The role of hegemonic powers in stabilizing the international system helps explain in part 
why the United States, as the leading hegemonic power, is less able to recoup the peace 
dividend during periods of low great power rivalry.  Indeed, as Caverley and Kapstein 
highlight, the United States’ has lost global market share in weapons trade since the end 
of the Cold War because the relatively expensive and sophisticated weapons the U.S. 
uses to maintain the stability of the system and to project power internationally are at 
                                                 
16 Joanne S. Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 52-53. 
17 Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 18, no. 4 (Spring, 1988). 
18 Nuno P. Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5. 
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odds with the types of equipment optimal for the lower-scale conflicts.19  It also seems 
plausible that the stability of a system maintained through the extended security sphere of 
a dominant hegemonic state incentivizes free-riding.  For example, spending within 
NATO is heavily borne by the United States, with many states failing to meet the modest 
2006 NATO guideline of 2% of GDP.  “The combined wealth of the non-US Allies, 
measured in GDP, exceeds that of the United States. However, non-US Allies together 
spend less than half of what the United States spends on defence.”20  Moreover, the 
imbalances within NATO are not strictly monetary; much of the military capability of 
NATO resides in the assets and forces of the United States.   
Polarity accounts of the international system, while offering insight into the 
expected behaviors of the polar powers, do not fully capture the levels of competition 
between the polar powers at any given time.  During the bipolar period of the Cold War, 
for example, the level of competition changed although the number of polar powers in the 
system remained the same.  Similarly, during the post-Cold War period the level of 
competition was not fixed.  As Russia’s collapse became more widely understood, and as 
China economically, technologically, and militarily grew the level of competition in the 
state system changed.  Because great power competition is a constant pressure that can 
change in magnitude whether or not there is a corresponding change in the number of 
great powers, this variable’s impact on arms trade can be examined.  For example, during 
                                                 
19 Jonathan D. Caverley and Ethan B. Kapstein, "Disruptive Innovation and the Global 
Arms Trade," (2015), 31-32. (Unpublished) 
20 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm?selectedLocale=en 
(accessed 7 Dec 2015) 
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the middle of the Cold War when the levels of competition between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union were at their height versus the end of the Cold War when competition was 
waning.   
In summary, great power competition creates demand for military equipment 
across the international system.  The increases to arms trade result from increased great 
power competition for three reasons.  First, because of the effect of great power 
competition on arms racing there is an increased rate of equipment change, which 
generates demand for new equipment and creates a surplus of older equipment.  Second, 
in periods of increased competition, great powers will look to both bolster the capabilities 
of their existing allies, and seek new alliances by providing access to their arms.  Finally, 
in periods of low great power competition there will be increased free-riding, which will 
reduce the expenditure on arms within the hegemonic state’s security sphere.  
H2: Trade will be highest between major powers and mid-range powers. 
The number of great powers competing at a given time in the international system 
plays a central role in structural arguments, however, structural arguments can be 
problematic when describing relationships between lesser powers and for times when 
great power competition is reduced.  As an alternative, arguments characterizing power 
relationship oriented around hierarchy maintain the central role of great powers, and 
account for the behavior of lesser powers.  In both accounts, the behavior of great powers 
is important, but hierarchical arguments offer a better way to account for the behavior of 
regional and lesser powers.  Great powers operate within the system by providing 
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hegemonic leadership and resources to stabilize the system and preserve the status quo.21  
Although Kindleberger’s arguments are tailored to economic leadership and stability, 
they are easily extended to security.  Hegemonic powers, through their position within 
the hierarchy of interstate power, are able to exercise political authority over other 
states.22  Although the authority of a powerful state over a less powerful state is not 
absolute, this account portends that in return for their stabilizing efforts, hegemonic 
powers create obligations within their economic and security spheres.23  Armament trade 
is a tool through which states can create obligations.  This implies that in general, greater 
relative power increases arms exportation.  While more powerful states are expected to 
trade more, the power of the importing states is also important.  Importing states must 
have enough capacity to afford and utilize the traded weaponry.  Thus, the expected 
relationship is non-linear.  When the difference in power is low, such as between two 
major powers, the volume of arms trade is expected to be low.  Alternatively, when the 
difference is high, trade would also be low because of the different military requirements 
between developing developed and developing countries.24  Trade is expected to be 
highest in conditions where there is a discrepancy in power favoring the exporting nation, 
but when this discrepancy is not too high.   
                                                 
21 Charles Poor Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, History of the 
World Economy in the Twentieth Century, (Berkeley,: University of California Press, 
1973), 28. 
22 Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World 
Politics," 50. 
23 Ibid., 51. 
24 For now, this discussion is putting aside other reasons why trade may be low 
between the developed and the developing world, such as human rights issues and 
regime instability. 
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H3:  Alliances increase weapons trade 
The pressures of great power competition are closely related to state behaviors 
centered on alliance building to balance power into security spheres of interest.  But, 
while great power competition exerts pressure across the international system to seek 
alliances, and as theorized above to increase the exportation of arms, the two behaviors 
need to be disaggregated.  Great powers trade arms to both existing allies and non-allies 
indicating they there is a more nuanced relationship between great power competition, 
arms, and allies.  There are a variety of causal pathways that explain the hypothesized 
relationship between alliances and arms trading.   
First, trading within an alliance makes practical sense to increase the likelihood of 
campaign success within an alliance from an interoperability stand point.  Having 
common equipment across an alliance is an effective way to reduce the friction of 
multinational campaigning because it simplifies the supply chain for replacement parts, 
fuel, and ammunition while assisting commanders in understanding the capabilities of 
allied forces.  Following a similar logic, arms trade between allies is a way for great 
powers to increase the military capacity of its allies—making them capable of responding 
to security situations without necessarily involving them.  Second, arms trade can serve 
as a way of signaling commitment.  Arms trades of major weapons systems link 
countries’ military-industrial complexes together in ways that make alliance defection 
difficult.  Thus, great powers may use arms trade as a way of signaling their commitment 
to their existing or potential allies.  For example, in the context of great power 
competition, the negotiation of a trade deal between a great power to a beleaguered ally 
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or a potential ally would be an especially strong signal of support.  Arms trade can also 
serve as a signal of commitment in situations between competing great powers.  For 
example, during alliance formation arms trades could precede an alliance to serve as a 
strong demonstration to form an alliance.  Pre-alliance trade along these lines could serve 
as a signal to other great powers of great power intentions to expand its security sphere of 
influence, and it also could function as a signal of the subordinate power within alliance 
about their preferred alliance partnerships.   
In addition to structural arguments concerning the relationship between power, 
competition, and balancing there are a variety of economic reasons for states to trade 
weapons within alliances.  For one, modern weapons research and development is costly 
and it requires an increasingly specialized industrial capacity.  States seeking to gain or 
maintain a technologically sophisticated military face a choice between either developing 
their own armament-specific industrial capacity, or seeking to procure weapons from a 
state that already has an established armament industry, or a combination of the two.  
Given the economic and security dominance of major powers and their fully established 
military-industrial complexes, they are desirable trading partners.  Moreover, great 
powers are incentivized to seek arms trade agreements because the costs of research, 
development, and production can be potentially defrayed by achieving economies of 
scale through foreign sales.   
Seeking to buy weapons from a great power, however, can be problematic for less 
powerful states.  The types of weapons great powers pursue are useful for the types of 
conflict they anticipate participating in––namely large-scale operations and engagements 
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in near-peer or peer-to-peer combat.  The types of weapons smaller states need may be 
qualitatively different because their ultimate use in security operations such as securing 
borders or quelling internal unrest is different.25  This creates a supply and demand 
mismatch whereby great powers are supplying high-end weapons in a market that desires 
less sophisticated arms.  To counter this loss in market share, great powers can globalize 
their weapons production to provided domestic economic benefits to their partners, or 
establish minimum spending goals for alliance members, such as in NATO.  
Additionally, by disaggregating and selling individual components of a sophisticated 
system great powers can potentially recoup some of their expenditure.  Stephen Brooks 
argues that part of the enduring peace following the Second World War can be explained 
as a function of the globalization of Multi-National Corporations, which has spread the 
production of major weapons systems across many countries.26  Brooks contends that one 
of the drivers of globalized inter-alliance weapons production is the narrowing of the 
distinction between military and civilian technology.27  Certainly it is true that dual-use 
technology has contributed to the trend of multi-national weapons production through the 
interconnected network of MNCs, but does this explanation fully explain state behavior?   
In the starkest terms, Brooks is contending that states have essentially been forced 
into multi-national production as a result of global market forces.  But clearly there are 
also choices being made concerning who is allowed to purchase and or manufacture high-
                                                 
25 Caverley and Kapstein, "Disruptive Innovation and the Global Arms Trade," 31-32. 
26 Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, 
and the Changing Calculus of Conflict, Princeton Studies in International History and 
Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
27 Ibid., 84-85. 
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end military technology.  One instance of this is observed in Lockheed Martin’s F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter program.  The F-35 is a fifth-generation multi-role fighter aircraft that 
employs advanced computer aided targeting and navigation with stealth technology—it is 
touted to be widely superior to any existing fighter aircraft.  If the claims of its 
superiority are founded, then the F35 represents a technology that could favorably tilt the 
outcomes of military engagements towards states that have fielded the F-35.  In spite of 
the potential erosion of the security assurances that come from being the sole user, the 
U.S. has engendered the diffusion of the F-35 by design.  In this case, Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States are all simultaneously involved in producing and fielding this aircraft while Israel, 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea are purchasing it through the Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) program.28  The pattern of trade and production in the case of the F-35 is 
unsurprisingly distributed within the United States’ long-standing allies.  In other words, 
given the potential of the F-35 to shift the balance of air power, the distribution of trade is 
narrowly confined to the staunchest of allies.  So, it seems that while Brooks is right to 
point toward a larger pattern of globalization generally to explain the role of MNCs in the 
production of weapons, it is also possible that globalized production offers a strategy to 
the hegemonic power to offset the tendency toward free-riding.  Specifically, by 
distributing the production of weapons systems within an alliance network, a hegemonic 
power can create domestic economic benefits to an alliance nation for its continued 
military spending.  Indeed, to gain the strategic benefit of influence in its allies’ military 
                                                 
28 https://www.f35.com/global (accessed 7 Dec 2015) 
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endeavors, the United States is even willing to subsidize foreign sales.29  Additionally, 
the initial sale, while valuable, potentially only represents a small fraction of the total 
value of the trade.  The average life span of a military end-item such as a tank, airplane, 
or ship is measured in decades.  And, during the life span there will be a steady demand 
for parts, services, and upgrades.  Choosing to enter into a trading agreement represents a 
long-term financial and military commitment for both the importing and exporting 
country thus hedging against tendencies towards free-riding in a relatively secure 
international environment.  
H4: Arms trade from major powers to subordinate powers will increase when the 
subordinate power is involved in a conflict 
Arms trade can also serve as a demonstration of resolve.  In this scenario, as local 
threats emerge against allied partners major powers can reassure lesser powers of their 
commitment by selling, lending, or giving them arms.  Of course, practical reasons for 
inter-alliance trade must also inform a state’s acquisition strategy.  Within alliances there 
is an obvious tangible benefit to having common equipment in that it ensures 
interoperability when working together as a coalition.  Similarly, by distributing common 
equipment across an alliance, the U.S. may be able create incentives for coalition 
partnership in military actions.  Under this logic, the costs of participation are lowered for 
alliance countries when the U.S. subsidizes their involvement by providing maintenance 
and operating costs the supply of parts, fuel, and weapons to a common set of equipment.  
                                                 
29 Jonathan D. Caverley and Ethan B. Kapstein, "Power or Profit? The United States 
and the International Arms Trade," 26. 
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By using arms trade subsidization, the United States can lower its domestic political 
barriers for military action by expanding alliance participation thus lowering its own 
forces involvement.  To gain political authority within their security spheres major 
powers are likely to increase their exports to subordinate members experiencing conflicts 
or participating as an alliance member in a security conflict of the major power. 
H5: Nuclear powers will have higher volume of weapons trade. 
Nuclear weapons can dramatically alter balances of power and yield a 
disproportionate increase in the amount of power they confer.30  It is therefore unlikely 
that they would be traded.  However, while it may be the case that states will not directly 
trade nuclear weapons it remains to be determined whether there is a difference in the 
patterns of arms trade to nuclear powers.  Solidifying alliances—through increased arms 
trade—with other nuclear powers should be a primary concern since the defection of a 
nuclear ally has the largest implications for the balance of power.  Alternatively, states 
that have developed the technological sophistication necessary to produce nuclear 
weapons may already have the internal capability to provision their own arms.  
Problematically though, the specialized capability required to produce nuclear weapons 
does not necessarily imply a robust military-industrial complex.  Furthermore, while the 
deterrent capacity of nuclear weapons in undeniable, the normative injunctions against 
their use makes them unsuited to project conventional military power in the majority of 
conflicts states find themselves involved in.  Thus, India, which has possessed nuclear 
                                                 
30 Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics, 14-15. 
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weapons since the 1970s, is simultaneously both a nuclear power and the leading 
armament importer from 2011-2015.31  Given the degree that nuclear weapons polarize 
alliances it is likely that trade to nuclear countries will be more confined within security 
spheres of influence.  Thus, it is reasonable that developing nuclear weapons will 
simultaneously increase the volume of armament trade, and reduce the number of trading 
partners.  
H6: Regime congruity will increase arms trade. 
Regime congruity and democratization follow a similar theoretical logic, thus they are 
discussed together below. 
H7: Democratization precedes arms trade from democratic regimes. 
As discussed above, major powers potentially use weapons trading as a way to 
increase their authority and create obligations throughout their security spheres of 
influence.  This does not imply that major powers will trade to everyone.  On the 
contrary, since there is competition between powers for a share of the arms market—and 
for the influence it provides—it is likely that major powers will trade with regimes that 
they are sympathetic to.  Additionally, access to weapons from democratic states will 
follow democratization.  Establishing democratic institutions, market-based economies, 
and increased concern for human rights will increase access to weapons from democratic 
major powers.  For example in the U.S., as Blanton demonstrates, the level of 
                                                 
31 Aude Fleurant et al., "Sipri Fact Sheet,"  Trends in International Arms Transfers, 
2015 (2016). 
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consideration for human rights is important in the United States’ decision to initiate 
weapons trade with another country—though after the initial decision is made human 
rights do not impact the quantity or the quality of the weapons traded.32  Major powers 
that are not fully included in the democratic sphere, such as Russia and China, will fill the 
gap by providing weapons for autocratic regimes.  Thus we would expect, that in general, 
weapons trade would be increased between states with similar regime types.  
Summary of Hypotheses  
 
H1:  Great power competition will create increased volume in armament trade 
across the international system. 
H2:  Trade will be highest between major powers and mid-range powers. 
H3:  Alliances will increase arms trade. 
H4:  Arms trade from major powers to subordinate powers will increase when the 
subordinate power is involved in a conflict 
H5:  Nuclear powers will have higher volume of weapons trade. 
H6:  Regime congruity will increase arms trade. 
H7:  Democratization precedes arms trade from democratic regimes. 
                                                 
32 Shannon Lindsey Blanton, "Promoting Human Rights and Democracy in the 
Developing World: U.S. Rhetoric Versus U.S. Arms Exports," American Journal of 
Political Science 44, no. 1 (2000): 129. 
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Outline of Dissertation 
 
 The remainder of this dissertation employs a mixed methods approach to 
investigate the above hypotheses.  Methodologically, Chapter 2 uses the volume of arms 
trade across the international system as the dependent variable in a time series 
multivariate regression using country year dyads between major powers as exporters with 
all the other states in the system as importers.  Models are estimated to look at the data 
using different combinations of independent variables, different combinations of 
exporting states, and for regional effects.  Informed with the results from the quantitative 
analysis, Chapter 3 looks qualitatively at the end of the Cold War to further explore the 
relationship between great power, arms, and alliances.  This time period was selected 
because it captures a period where the relative power of the United States vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union was rapidly changing.  Looking at the processes through which the United 
States was able to use its position as the dominant power to expand it security sphere of 
influence into Eastern Europe through alliances and arms trade offers a unique historical 
perspective into the relationship between these variables.  To further understand the 
relationship, Chapter 4 focuses in on the United States and the Soviet Unions’ regional 
competition in the iterative wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors during the height 
of the Cold War.  Focusing in on this historic period offers a chance to explore great 
power behavior during a time of increased global competition and also illuminates the 
domestic political calculations of the importing state as they seek to garner weapons 
contracts to facilitate their local security affairs.  Finally, the concluding chapter will 
focus on identifying the major findings of the study and contextualize their import for the 
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political science literature, assess the current arms trade situation in light of these findings 
and offer some policy recommendations, and indicated future areas of study in this 
research agenda.  
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CHAPTER 2: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Introduction: 
 
 In this chapter, three empirical models are presented to test select theoretical 
hypotheses from the previous chapter.  The first model looks at data in the aggregate to 
determine how factors such as great power competition, domestic political regimes, 
regime similarity, alliances, war, and nuclear capability affect the volume of arms trade.  
A second series of models is presented to further refine the results of the first.  In the 
second series, the sample is split by exporting states to determine what differences exist 
between the great powers in their arms trading behavior, and whether there are 
differences in the arms trading behavior of great powers, major powers, and mid-range or 
developing powers.  A final series of models is estimated by splitting the sample 
regionally.  
Research Design: 
 
This chapter will present analysis derived from a base dataset of armament trade 
in a times-series format.  The baseline unit of analysis will be country year dyads 
between major powers as exporters with all the other states in the system as importers.  
Determining which states constitute major powers was accomplished by using the 
Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) dataset v4.0.33  Using this data, 
                                                 
33 David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, 
Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Peace, War and Numbers, ed. 
Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); David J. Singer, "Reconstructing the 
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observations prior to 1950 were dropped to more accurately capture the political and 
structural conditions of the post war international order.  Additionally, the data for 
Unified Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany were combined to more 
accurately capture the political continuity of the pre and post-Cold War time period—
data for the German Democratic Republic was retained as separate entity from 1950-
1990.  Next, an average CINC score was generated by country over the time period from 
1950-2007.   
As an alternative approach, the Major Power list was cross checked against averaged 
CINC scores against GPD as reported by the World Bank.  Both measures, shown in 
Table 1 below, produced the same list of the ten most powerful states—although the 
ordering was different between measures.  Finally, to assess the activity level of these 
states in the international arms trade they were further cross-referenced against the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) lists of the top importing and 
exporting nations from 2011-2015.34  Between these countries the full possible range of 
major power participation in the international arms trade is represented.  Five of the ten 
major powers are in the top ten for exportation, one (India) is the only major power in the 
top ten for importation, the U.S.A. and China are in the top ten for both categories, while 
Brazil and Japan are on neither top ten list.  The importing states includes the ten 
                                                 
Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilites of States 1816-1985," 
International Interactions 14 (1987). 
34 Fleurant et al., "Sipri Fact Sheet". 
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exporting states listed above and all the other states in the international system for the 
years that they existed over the duration of the analysis.35   
Rank Average CINC 
1950-2007 
GDP (2014) 
US Dollars 
Top Exporting 
(% of total) 
Top Importing 
(% of total) 
1 USA:   
0.1766 
USA:  
$17,419,000  
USA 
%33 
IND 
%14 
2 RUS:  
0.13548 
CHN:  
$10,354,832  
RUS 
%25 
SAU 
%7.0 
3 CHN:  
0.12227 
JPN:  
$4,601,461 
CHN 
%5.9 
CHN 
%4.7 
4 IND:  
0.05601 
GER:  
$3,868,291  
FRN 
%5.6 
UAE 
%4.6 
5 JPN:  
0.04859 
UK: $ 
$2,988,893  
GER 
%4.7 
AUL 
%3.6 
6 GER:  
0.03242 
FRN:  
$2,829,192  
UK 
%4.5 
TUR 
%3.4 
7 UK:  
0.03131 
BRA:  
$2,416,636  
SPN 
%3.5 
PAK 
%3.3 
8 FRN:  
0.02501 
ITA:  
$2,141,161  
ITA 
%2.7 
DRV 
%2.9 
9 BRA:  
0.02059 
IND:  
$2,048,517 
UKR 
%2.6 
USA 
%2.9 
10 ITA:  
0.01946 
RUS:  
$1,860,598 
NTH 
%2.0 
ROK 
%2.6 
Table 1: Showing both Major Powers as derived from averaged CINC scores from 
1950-2007 and by GDP in 2014, and the top 10 countries involved in exporting and 
importing armaments from 2011-201536 
Measuring Arm Trade: 
 
Information on the dependent variable was obtained using the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) database on international arms 
                                                 
35 A complete list of importing states can be found in Appendix B. 
36 Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 
Power War, 1820-1965." Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on 
Material Capabilites of States 1816-1985." World Bank The, "GDP Ranking,"  
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table. Fleurant et al., "Sipri 
Fact Sheet". 
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transfers.37  This dataset captures information on international arms trade and is collected 
by SIPRI from a variety of source records that includes open source reporting, industry 
reports, and governmental / United Nations publications.38  SIPRI’s arms transfer 
database is ideal for quantitatively studying the international arms trade for a variety of 
reasons.  First, it is an established dataset that is updated annually by a professional 
research team.  Second, it is publicly available, which enhances research replicability.  
And finally, their use of multiple primary sources increases the reliability of the data.  
However, there may be some reason for concern, because some SIPRI data relies on open 
source reporting, that the information on the arms trades for democratic regimes will be 
both more complete and more accurate.  This is attenuated to some degree because of the 
variety of sources SIPRI uses, and given the large sample size is likely to only marginally 
affect the results. 
SIPRI reports a variety of information for each trade including information about 
the type of equipment being traded, and whether the equipment is new or used. Since this 
study is primarily concerned with understanding interstate arms trading behavior, 
information regarding the quantity and the value of the arms traded is the dependent 
variable.  SIPRI’s Trade Indicator Value (TIV) provides such a measure.  TIVs 
                                                 
37 Siemon Wezeman, "Arms Transfers Database," Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/tiv/index.php 
(Accessed Oct 5, 2016) 
38 "Arms Transfers Database, Sources and Methods," Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-
methods#TIV-tables. (Accessed Oct 5, 2016) 
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standardize the values of like items of equipment making cross-country comparisons of 
military resource import and export possible.  Importantly, TIVs  
represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of 
the transfer.  Weapons for which a production cost is not known are 
compared with core weapons based on: size and performance characteristics 
(weight, speed, range and payload); type of electronics, loading or 
unloading arrangements, engine, tracks or wheels, armament and materials; 
and the year in which the weapon was produced.39 
 
Thus, the TIV is not a measure of the financial value of the transfer and cannot be used in 
comparisons to other monetary measures such as GDP and military expenditure.40  Using 
U.S. weapons to look at the range of values shows that a single anti-tank missile, the BGM-
71 TOW, is valued at a TIV of 0.1 while a frigate is valued at a TIV of 300.  SIPRI further 
parses TIVs to account for the trade of used equipment and for equipment that is used but 
overhauled prior to trade at 0.40 and 0.66 of the original TIV respectively.41   
The SIPRI data also includes both an order date for the year the deal for the trade 
was reached, and a delivery year to represent when the equipment was delivered.  
Because production times can be significant for major military end items such as aircraft 
and ships, this can result in situations where an order is placed in one year and received in 
different years.  For example, in 1964 the United Kingdom ordered 52 F-4 Phantoms 
from the United States.  Of these 52, 28 F-4 Phantoms were delivered in 1967, 20 in 
1968, and four in 1969.  In the models that follow, the year variable reflects the order 
                                                 
39 Ibid. (Accessed Oct 5, 2016) 
40 Ibid. (Accessed Oct 5, 2016) 
41 Ibid. (Accessed Oct 5, 2016) 
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date because it presumably offers a greater indication of the demand for military 
equipment. 
In the original SIPRI data, each armament trade between the exporting country 
and the importing country is treated as an independent observation.  Thus, in the original 
SIPRI data, there can be multiple observations between exporting country A and 
importing country B in year X.  Since the unit of observation in this study is the total 
volume of armament trade between country A and B in a given year X, the original data 
was collapsed to sum both the Trade Indicator Values (TIV) and the total number of 
equipment pieces traded from country A to country B in year X.  For example, the 
original data reports four trades from the United States to Portugal in 1952.  These trades 
consisted of 15 T-33A training aircraft with a TIV of 37.5, three used S-55 helicopters 
with a TIV of 1.44 (had the S-55s been new instead of used the TIV for this deal would 
have been 3.6), one R-33 reconnaissance aircraft with a TIV of 1.95, and 85 M-47 tanks 
with a TIV of 89.25.  After collapsing the data to one entry for arms trade between the 
United States and Portugal in 1952, the values reported now reflect the sums for both TIV 
and the number of equipment—in this example, 130.14 and 104 respectively.  For the 
purposes of understanding the effects of competition, regime, alliance patterns, and war 
on the international arms trade, aggregating the data allows the observation of the macro 
factors in play.  While collapsing the data to one observation per country dyad year is 
necessary to analyze the data using time series cross-sectional regression, it is 
accompanied by a corresponding loss of information regarding the type of equipment 
being traded.  Thus, there is a tradeoff between observing the macro determinants of the 
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arms trade and information about the types of equipment traded.  This chapter deals with 
the former, while subsequent chapters will recover some of the latter.   
Both the TIV and the total raw numbers of equipment being traded are suitable as 
measures of the volume of the international arms trade, however TIVs provide a slightly 
more complete measure.  While the total numbers of the pieces of equipment delivered 
accounts for the volume of trade, TIV also takes into account information about the 
volume of trade, the condition of the equipment being traded, and the value of the 
equipment as compared to similar items based on known production costs for weapons of 
that category.  Thus, for the quantitative analysis that follows, the primary dependent is 
TIVs.  Figure 1 shows a simple graph showing the total volume of the international arms 
trade in TIV per year from 1950-2007. 
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Figure 1: Showing the Total Volume of International Arms Trade in TIV from 
1950-200742 
Independent Variables 
 
The central question in this study is: how does the distribution of state power 
affects arms trade behavior?  Accordingly, the first set of independent variables measure 
the distribution of power between great powers, and the distribution of relative power 
within an export-import dyad.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that the total volume of arms trade 
will be higher in periods of increased great power competition.  Testing this hypothesis 
                                                 
42 This graph also indicates that there is an obvious outlier in 1978 where the total 
TIV was ≈ 65,000, which is approximately 20,000 more than the next highest year 
(1980).  This outlier resulted from a heightening of Cold War competition in both 
the Middle East and Asia.  In 1978 Japan’s TIV was ≈ 15,000 (imported from the U.S. 
and comprised largely of the then recently developed F-15C Eagle fighter aircraft 
and the P3-C Orion anti-submarine surveillance aircraft.  And, in the Middle East 
Russia’s arms exports to Syria, Libya, and Iraq totaled ≈ 12,000 TIV in 1978.  
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requires a measure of great power competition.  The Correlates of War (COW) project 
provides a useful starting point to measure of state power based on material capabilities 
in the National Material Capabilities (v4.0) (NMC) data set.43  Using Composite Index of 
National Capability (CINC) scores, which include measures of military spending and 
personnel strength, energy use, iron and steel manufacture, and both urban and total 
population, as a measure of material power is an established indicator of state capacity.  
Creating a directed balance of power variable between the United States and its 
great power competitor (either Russia or China) is possible by creating a directed dyad 
where the numerator is the value of the United States’ CINC score and the denominator is 
the sum of the CINC scores of the United States and either Russia or China depending on 
the year of the analysis.  The resulting variable, (labeled U.S. Power in the following 
statistical analysis), is a measure of the proportion of power the United States had within 
the dyad in a given year.  Using CINC data from NMC (v4.0) this creates a variable that 
ranges from 0.417 to 0.649 with a mean of 0.510.  In the years where the value exceeds 
0.5 the United States held more material power than its great power competitor.  While 
this measure is inherently an incomplete account of competition, it does capture both the 
positionality and magnitude of great power material power differences.   
As shown in Figure 2 below the United States emerged from the Second World 
War with a significant material power advantage.  Over the course of the Cold War, the 
                                                 
43 Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 
Power War, 1820-1965."; Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on 
Material Capabilites of States 1816-1985." 
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Soviet Union rose and surpassed the United States, but was ultimately unable to sustain 
its position.  In this analysis, based on the collapse of the Soviet Union at the conclusion 
of the Cold War, China’s CINC score replaces Russia’s starting in 1992.  This variable 
offers a way to test what the effects are of great power material disparity (a feature of 
great power competition) on the overall volume of the international arms trade.  
 
Figure 2: Showing the Proportion of Material Power the United States Held Within the 
Great Power Dyad. 
 
A related, but different way to look at competition through the distribution of 
power within the international system is to look at the effects of polarity.  A dummy 
variable, “unipolarity” is included and is coded 1 starting in 1991.  This variable is in 
some sense a cruder measure of the distribution of power between great power actors, but 
it offers a way to look at how the international arms trade was affected by the United 
States’ positionality after the Cold War ended.  Another strength of including this 
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variable is that it allows limited inferences about the role of U.S. power that are not solely 
based on material measures.   
In addition to analyzing the effect of great power material capability disparity, it 
is also necessary to look at the power of both the exporters and importers.  Analyzing the 
relationship between exporter and importer power is useful for looking at how material 
balances affect the volume of arms trade.  Hypothesis 2 predicts a non-linear relationship 
between importing countries material capacity and the volume of arms trade.  Mid-sized 
countries (as measured by material power) presumably import more weapons then either 
small countries who on average need less weapons or large countries who have a more 
robust internal military-industrial capacity.  Importing states’ CINC scores and their 
square provide a measure to test this hypothesis.  These variables are labeled Importer 
CINC and Importer CINC2 in the following model.44    
While using material capabilities as a measure of power competition has the 
advantages of being well established and measurable, there are some reasons to be 
cautious going forward.  First, using a material measure is inherently reductionist.  It 
necessarily ignores the ways that power is used in interstate competition and alternative 
conceptions of power such as agenda setting and soft power.45  Second, material 
                                                 
44 Since the exporting states in this model were selected based partly on their CINC 
scores, a complementary variable of exporting state CINC is included as a control 
variable, but must be interpreted within the limitations of the exporting states 
selected for inclusion. 
45 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political 
Science Review 56, no. 4 (1962). Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead : The Changing Nature 
of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). 
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capability and the ability to mobilize materials for production or war are related but 
different.  Materially rich countries that cannot convert their resources effectively are not 
necessarily competitively advantaged.  Third, the inclusion of total population may be 
skewing this measure especially after 1992 when it reflects the material differences 
between the United States and China.  These caveats must be considered when 
interpreting results. 
In addition to competition between great powers and the material position of 
trading partners, other factors that presumably influence international arms trade are 
included in the main effects model.  To test the effects of alliances (Hypothesis 3), an 
alliance dummy variable is included that is coded 1 if the exporting state and importing 
state were in any of the alliance types as specified in the Correlates of War Alliance Data 
Set (v4.1) (mutual defense, neutrality pacts, non-aggression pacts, and entente) during the 
observation year.46  To test domestic political regime effects, variables are also included 
for both the exporting state and importing states (Exporter Regime and Importer Regime) 
using Polity2 scores from the Polity IV Project.47  Hypothesis 6 contends that trade will 
be increased when both members of the dyad have similar domestic regimes.  The 
variable Similar Regimes is a dummy variable measuring export and import state regime 
congruity.  This variable is coded 1 if the exporting and importing states are either both 
                                                 
46 Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648-2008, 2 vols., Correlates of 
War Series (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009). 
47 Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Thrid Wave with 
Polity III Data," Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 4 (1995). 
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democracies or both autocracies.48  This coding decision purposely excludes instances of 
regime similarity where both the exporting state and the importing state are anocracies 
because anocratic preferences are difficult to determine and less consistent than 
democracies and autocracies.  Information about the nature of exporting and importing 
state alliances and domestic political regimes are useful for understanding what types of 
interstate relations between members of a trade dyad predict a greater volume of trade.  
Other variables about the types of conditions that might affect the demand and supply of 
weapons are needed to consider alternative reasons for arms trading behavior.   
The most obvious event that increases the demand for weapons is the outbreak of 
war.  Hypothesis 4 predicts that war increases the demand for new and replacement 
weapons.  To further parse the effects of war on the demand for weapons, a series of 
variables about whether the importing and exporting states were involved in interstate or 
intrastate wars were merged into the weapons trading data from the Correlates of War 
(COW v4.0) datasets.49  A total of four dummy variables were created from the COW 
data and are coded 1 if either the importing or exporting state is involved in an interstate 
or intrastate war in the year of the observation.  Finally, to test hypothesis 5—whether 
nuclear powers trade more arms—a nuclear dummy variable was included for both 
                                                 
48 The cutoff scores for autocratic (less than or equal to -6) and democratic (greater 
than or equal to 6) regimes were based on recommendations found on the Polity 
Projects Website at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html 
49 Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816 - 2007 
(Washington DC: QC Press, 2010).  
 
36 
 
exporting and importing states, and a second dummy variable was created if both states in 
the dyad have nuclear weapons.  
Missing Data 
 
Using data from multiple existing datasets is useful because they are familiar in 
the field and to some degree, through their widespread use, vetted for accuracy.  A 
downside to this approach is that data missing from each of the originating datasets is 
retained in the final merged data.  Data on the dependent variable was available through 
SIPRI through 2015; therefore, much of the missing data results from the observation in 
the original datasets ending prior to 2015.  Specifically, the end dates for the data used in 
the construction of the database in this study are: NMC (v4.0) data ends in 2007,50 
Alliance (v4.1) in 2012, COW Inter-state War (v4.0) in 2003, COW Intra-state War 
(v4.1) in 2007, and Polity IV in 2015.  The truncation of the CINC from NMC data in 
2007 is especially problematic because CINC values are used to create a set of variables, 
such as the U.S. proportion of power vs. great power rivals, Exporter CINC, Importer 
CINC, and Importer CINC2.  While the data from Polity IV extends the entire duration of 
the study, it is missing observations for some of the importing countries.51  Furthermore, 
                                                 
50 For exporting states CINC information for Japan starts in 1952, in Germany in 
1955, and for all other in 1950 
51 The following countries are absent from POLITY IV: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas Barbados, Belize, Brunei, Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, Grenada, 
Iceland, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, 
Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, St Kitts 
and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuvalu, Zanzibar 
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the states that are missing from Polity IV are generally smaller states that do not import 
weapons, which introduces bias in the resulting statistically analysis.  Table 2 shows how 
many observations are missing for each of the variables.   
Variable Missing Complete 
Unique 
Values 
Min Max 
U.S. Power vs. GP Rival 15,419 83,203 58 .4171928 .6485161 
Exporter CINC 15,858 82,764 >500 .0107741 .3194995 
Importer CINC 15,410 83,212 >500 0 .3194995 
Importer CINC2 15,410 83,212 >500 0 .1020799 
Importer Regime 10,562 88,060 21 -10 10 
Similar Regime 10,562 88,060 2 0 1 
Alliance 5,795 92,827 2 0 1 
Ex. Interstate War 24,562 74,060 2 0 1 
Im. Interstate War 24,904 73,718 2 0 1 
Ex. Intrastate War 17,139 81,483 2 0 1 
Im. Intrastate War 17,251 81,371 2 0 1 
Table 2: Showing Missing Data by Variable  
In spite of missing values within the observations, 68% of the data is complete.  
Using listwise deletion, and thus artificially restricting the data, could potentially 
introduce selection bias.52  Alternatively, using an ad hoc strategy to fill in the missing 
values, such as holding them at their last known value, may underestimate the standard 
errors in the model.53  Imputation allows the information that is available to inform the 
statistical analysis while preventing ad hoc biases from entering in the model.  The data 
in this study was imputed using multivariate normal (MVN) regression through an 
iterative Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm.54  One of the strengths of this 
                                                 
52 Gary King et al., "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative 
Algorithm for Multiple Imputation," American Journal of Political Science 95, no. 1 
(2001): 49. 
53 Ibid. 
54 J. L. Schafer, Analysis of Incomplete Multivariate Data (Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & 
Hall/CRC, 1997). 
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method is that it works with arbitrary patterns of missing data.  Although some of the 
missing data in this dataset is categorical, the returned variables from MVN are 
continuous.  Counterintuitively, these values—some of which fall outside of the range of 
what is observed in the non-imputed data—are better left as is.  Paul Alison goes as far as 
to say that “[l]inear imputation with rounding should never be used.  It’s usually inferior 
and never superior to linear imputation without rounding.”55  Similarly, transformed 
variables that result from the algebraic manipulation of other variables in the data set 
were transformed prior to imputation.  This implies that the missing values of the 
transformed variables are subsequently imputed.  Although this produces values for these 
transformed variables that are inconsistent within the imputed data, the transform-then-
impute strategy generates more accurate regression estimates than the alternative strategy 
of imputing then transforming.56  In this data, because the preponderance of the 
missingness results from the originating datasets stopping before 2015, the pattern of the 
missing values generally increases toward the end of the time period under analysis—
especially after 2007.  As the pattern of missingness increases toward the end of the data 
there is a corresponding decrease in the ability of accurate imputation.  To counter this, 
and to generate more precision in the subsequent regression models, the missing data was 
imputed 100 times.57  Furthermore, the main models presented in this chapter will 
                                                 
55 Paul D. Allison, "Imputation of Catgorical Variables with Proc Mi," in 30th Meeting 
of SAS Users Group International (Philadelphia, PA 2005), 7. 
56 Paul T. von Hippel, "How to Impute Interactions, Squares, and Other Transformed 
Variables," Sociological Methodology 39 (2009): 266-67. 
57 Todd E. Bodner, "What Improves with Increased Missing Data Imputations?," 
Structural Equation Modeling 15 (2008). 
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encompass the years where the bulk of the data is complete (1950-2007), though fully 
imputed models (1950-2015) and models estimated by case wise deletion are presented in 
Appendix C for comparison.   
Results 
 
 The results were estimated using ordinarily least squares (OLS) regression with 
fixed effects for panel data.  In the first specification, the independent variables 
pertaining to the power of the importing and exporting state, the power dynamics 
between great powers, and the relative power differences between exporting and 
importing states were included.  The second set of models incorporates additional 
variables pertaining to the domestic political regimes of the exporting and importing 
states, whether they are politically similar in terms of their regimes, and whether they are 
both strong democracies.  A final model expands the control variables to include war 
effects and nuclear capability.  All models use fixed effects and Huber-White robust 
standard errors.58   
                                                 
58 The determination to use fixed effect was derived based on the results of 
comparing the fixed effects models with random effects models using a Hausman 
Test. 
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Main Effects Model with Imputation 1950-2007. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
U.S. Power vs. GP Rival -45.69** -40.65* -39.27* -39.76** 
 (22.86) (21.75) (21.62) (20.25) 
Unipolarity -6.162*** -4.790** -4.297** -4.322** 
 (1.695) (1.897) (1.921) (2.107) 
Exporter CINC 123.0 97.05 88.98 92.67 
 (88.25) (87.66) (87.19) (88.49) 
Importer CINC 1,137 477.4** 491.8** 479.6** 
 (781.7) (219.9) (218.4) (208.2) 
Importer CINC2 -2,220    
 (2,758)    
Exporter Regime  -0.391 -0.381 -0.385 
  (0.409) (0.405) (0.407) 
Importer Regime  -0.470** -0.464** -0.448** 
  (0.211) (0.206) (0.203) 
Similar Regimes  11.36*** 10.10*** 10.06*** 
  (3.665) (3.529) (3.497) 
Alliance   65.88*** 65.84*** 
   (22.33) (22.45) 
Exporter Interstate War   -2.848 -3.164 
   (2.794) (2.779) 
Importer Interstate War   20.41** 20.81** 
   (8.981) (8.895) 
Exporter Intrastate War   0.623 0.770 
   (2.238) (2.264) 
Importer Intrastate War   3.504 3.392 
   (3.279) (3.119) 
Exporter Nuclear    -2.167 
    (4.814) 
Importer Nuclear    11.59 
    (22.46) 
Nuclear Dyad    -0.530 
    (49.39) 
Constant 29.12** 29.21** 20.64* 21.51* 
 (12.83) (12.65) (12.49) (12.10) 
     
Observations 83,148 83,148 83,148 83,148 
Number of panel 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3: Main Effects Model with Imputation 1950-2007 
 
 The series of variables pertaining to the relationship between material power and 
armament trade tell an interesting story.  Looking at power differentials directionally, 
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where the United States’ proportion of material power is measured vis-à-vis its great 
power competitor, shows that as the United States’ share of the power rises, there is a 
substantial (-39.76 in Model 3B) and marginally statistically significant decrease in arms 
sales across the international system.  This result holds under all four of the models 
shown in Table 3.  Some examples of the types of military resources that a Trade 
Indicator Value (TIV) of 40 represents are 40 U.S. RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 
10 U.S. M-1A1 Abrams Tanks, or 3 U.S. AH-64D Apache Attack Helicopters.  
Furthermore, the similarly signed—though less substantial—coefficient on the variable 
unipolarity provides corroborating evidence that when one great power (in this case the 
United States) outstripped its great power rivals, arms trade throughout the international 
system was suppressed.   
There is some subtle difference between what these two variables are measuring.  
First, unipolarity is a dummy variable that is coded 1 starting in 1991; thus, this variable 
ultimately demarcates the post-Cold War period.  There are obviously a lot of other 
things going on in the post-Cold War time frame other than a U.S. preponderance of 
power and international influence that possibly affected the international arms trade.  
Increasing globalization and economic interdependence, NATO expansion into the 
former Soviet sphere, the rise of and increased Western efforts against non-state terrorist 
actors are some examples.  Second, the unipolar period as defined in this dataset does not 
necessarily correlate to a U.S. preponderance of material power.  This is good for 
analytical purposes because it implies that the collinearity between these two variables is 
low, and it is good for theoretical purposes because it expands the ways power is 
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accounted for in the model.  During the period from 1991 to 2007, the U.S. was only 
materially superior (using the metrics that inform CINC scores and recorded in the NMC 
v(4.0) dataset to its great power competitor (China) from 1992-1995.  Undoubtedly part 
of what is driving China’s position is the inclusion of total population and urban 
population in CINC score generation.  China’s rapid economic growth and urbanization 
certainly increased its material position at the end of the Cold War, but to what degree 
did this enable China to advance its position in the international community.  This 
highlights one of the weaknesses of using material power, as measured in CINC as a 
measure of competition.  Namely, it is a narrow measure.  Other measures of power that 
affect competition, such as agenda setting and soft power, are completely absent—though 
probably informed by—strictly materialist accounts of power.59  The United States was 
uniquely positioned at the end of the Cold War to take advantage of its agenda-setting 
powers in the institutions it had created following the Second World War.  Interpreting 
both U.S. Power and unipolarity together, as imperfect but different ways to measure the 
role that U.S. power plays on the international arms trade, supports a conclusion that 
increased U.S. power suppresses arms trade.  Increases in Exporter CINC are correlated 
with a large and positive impact on arms trade, but fails to achieve accepted level of 
statistical certainty.   
Model 1 directly looks for a non-linear relationship between Importer CINC and 
arms trade.  The coefficients on Importer CINC and Importer CINC2 are signed 
                                                 
59 Bachrach and Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power." Nye, Bound to Lead : The 
Changing Nature of American Power. 
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appropriately for a non-linear effect, but conclusions about this relationship are not 
justifiable given the magnitude of the standard errors.  The lack of statistical significance 
on both the coefficient of Importer CINC and Importer CINC2 suggest that this 
hypothesized relationship is not present.  In the subsequent models, where the squared 
term is eliminated suggest that there is a positive linear relationship between Importer 
CINC and arms trade.  
 Model 2 Incorporates information about domestic political regimes and suggests 
that while the domestic political regime of the importing state matters, the regime of the 
exporting state does not.  Specifically, a one-unit increase in the political regime is 
associated with a -0.47 decrease in TIV.  Since the variable Importer Regime ranges from 
-10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic), moving from the autocratic end of 
the range to the democratic end of the range would be equivalent to a -9.4 decrease in 
TIV.  More importantly this suggest that ceteris paribus democracies are less likely to 
import weapons than autocracies.  As expected, there is a positive effect on armament 
trade between exporting and importing states that are governed by similar domestic 
regimes.   
 Adding the set of variables concerning alliances and war into the model shows 
that while alliances strongly predict increases in arms trade, the effects of war are more 
mixed.  Alliances have a large substantive effect on the volume of arms trade between an 
exporting and importing state.  Holding other things equal, an alliance increases the TIV 
of armament trade by 65.88.  TIVs in this range are equivalent to 150 Russian T-54 
Tanks, 110 U.S. AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, or 6 French 
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Mirage-3E Fighter Aircraft.  The effects of interstate war are dependent on whether the 
state is exporting or importing weapons.  For exporting states there is a small negative 
and not a statistical finding that the effects of being involved in an interstate war decrease 
weapons trade.  This makes intuitive sense considering that involvement in a war would 
likely increase domestic demand and therefore limit export availability.  For importing 
states, there is evidence that being involved in an interstate war increases the TIV by 
20.41 (in Model 3)—involvement in war would intuitively seems likely to increase 
demand for weapons import.  Neither the exporting or importing state show an effect on 
trade based on their involvement in an intra-state war.  Possession of nuclear weapons in 
Model 4 proves to be insignificant in all specifications—providing firm footing to reject 
the hypothesis that nuclear powers will have a higher volume of arms trade.  Modeling 
select variables with different combinations of exporting states, shown in Table 4 below, 
provides more information about great power arms trade behavior.   
In this model different combinations of exporters are considered to further 
determine what difference there are in great power arms trading behavior.  The 
coefficients in this model must be interpreted cautiously as they are derived using 
different sample sizes, which directly impacts statistical power.  Rather than focusing on 
the exact numbers and statistical significance in each variable, this model is better 
interpreted as showing differences between different combinations of exporting powers.  
The role U.S. power preponderancy plays in suppressing arms trade is consistently 
negative across all specifications.  The magnitude of the effect, however, varies 
dramatically between Western powers and Russia and China.  Increases in U.S. power 
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massively suppressed their competing great powers’ weapons exportation.  The rest of 
the major powers, (France, Germany, U.K., and Italy), also indicate a negative 
relationship between U.S. Power and weapons exportation.  Thus, rather quixotically, 
U.S. power suppresses exportation from both allies and competitors. 
Exporter Effects With Imputation 1950-2007 
 
 All No U.S. U.S. Only Russia 
Only 
China 
Only 
France, 
Germany, 
U.K., and 
Italy 
U.S., 
Russia, 
China, 
France, 
Germany, 
U.K., and 
Italy 
Japan, 
India, and 
Brazil 
         
U.S. Power -39.27* -33.29 -43.57 -179.3 -37.85** -42.14*** -55.66* -0.787 
 (21.62) (21.65) (107.6) (180.0) (18.87) (11.09) (31.69) (1.243) 
Unipolarity -4.297** -1.986 -29.03** 40.65* 1.634 -2.052 -4.467 -0.257 
 (1.921) (1.462) (13.53) (23.65) (1.841) (1.447) (2.755) (0.172) 
Exporter CINC 88.98 184.3**  269.3 -77.34** 297.9** 36.04 16.99 
 (87.19) (82.55)  (307.5) (38.66) (120.4) (111.3) (15.26) 
Importer CINC 491.8** 387.2* 1,951 2,451 37.88 374.3 762.7** -27.27 
 (218.4) (217.3) (1,792) (2,522) (37.43) (353.3) (328.8) (22.87) 
Exporter Regime -0.381 -0.173  -2.637 2.408 -0.246 -1.592 -0.0126 
 (0.405) (0.172)  (2.174) (1.907) (0.591) (1.469) (0.0174) 
Importer Regime -0.464** -0.514** -0.178 -0.660 -0.0293 -0.0358 -0.553** -0.00709 
 (0.206) (0.200) (1.101) (1.185) (0.0846) (0.134) (0.266) (0.00638) 
Similar Regimes 10.10*** 9.414*** 18.85 28.22* 1.359 1.485 12.18*** 0.0844 
 (3.529) (3.581) (12.56) (14.83) (1.308) (1.549) (4.460) (0.149) 
Alliance 65.88*** 62.61*** 79.12 205.4*** -3.227 11.11* 73.76*** 0.200 
 (22.33) (22.14) (76.41) (69.16) (6.803) (6.181) (25.02) (0.179) 
Ex. Interstate War -2.848 -0.497 -4.757 -16.37 -4.613** 2.860 -2.310 -0.00267 
 (2.794) (1.805) (10.05) (25.85) (2.118) (1.967) (3.403) (0.0724) 
Im. Interstate War 20.41** 24.76*** -18.45 177.9*** 27.43* 0.110 28.77** 0.283 
 (8.981) (9.273) (31.40) (66.70) (15.44) (4.641) (12.69) (0.510) 
Ex. Intrastate War 0.623 1.738 0.410 4.264 1.088 2.774* 1.349 -0.0112 
 (2.238) (1.592) (6.666) (6.822) (2.998) (1.495) (2.680) (0.0638) 
Im. Intrastate War 3.504 2.618 11.42 31.16 -0.435 -4.356 4.997 -0.225 
 (3.279) (3.181) (16.08) (24.84) (3.850) (3.317) (4.673) (0.276) 
Constant 20.64* 7.817 59.82 39.39 49.80** 21.95** 40.57* 0.205 
 (12.49) (10.53) (58.64) (73.02) (22.63) (8.940) (21.52) (1.013) 
         
Observations 83,148 74,819 8,329 8,329 8,329 33,321 58,308 24,840 
Number of panel 1,950 1,755 195 195 195 780 1,365 585 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 4: Regression Model Showing Exporter Effects with Imputation 1950-2007 
In the case of Russia, the end of the Cold War and the resulting expansion of U.S. 
weapons exportation into the former Soviet security sphere likely plays a role in 
explaining the magnitude of this finding.  On the allied side, the role of U.S. security 
assurances likely suppressed defense sectors among its allies.  The developing or mid-
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range powers in the model, (Japan, India, and Brazil), are signed similarly, but at 
miniscule levels.   
Looking at exporter effects further refines how the effects of unipolarity in the 
main model should be interpreted.  The large negative coefficient of unipolarity in the 
U.S. only model and in the France, Germany, U.K., and Italy model is likely driving the 
finding of unipolarity in the main effects model.  Interestingly though, Russia appears to 
have increased its weapons trade in the unipolar era.  The differences in behavior 
between these states may reflect their post-Cold War positionality.  Arms trade, through 
its potential to alter security capabilities, has the potential to upset status quo 
arrangements.  The U.S., its allies, and Russia are likely at cross-purposes in regards to 
the status quo.  Russia’s increased arms trade behavior as a result of unipolarity may 
reflect balancing through a broad engagement in arms trade to increases its alliance 
reassurances.  The positive and substantial effect of alliances across model specifications 
is supportive an account of arms trade as balancing.60  Furthermore, the outsized effect, 
shown in the Russia only model, of alliances is potentially indicative of increased 
external balancing in response to relative losses vis-à-vis the United States.  Regime 
similarity also shows varying effects across different specifications of exporting states.  
Both the U.S. only and the Russia only model have much larger coefficients than any of 
the other combinations.  This finding is mutually reinforcing with the finding on 
                                                 
60 The one specification where the effect of alliance is negative is in the China only 
model.   
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alliances, but more narrowly highlights a potential role of the arms trade in building 
security coalitions between competing great powers.  
In addition to alliance and regime similarity effects, Russia and China appear to 
be playing a primary role behind the finding in the main model, that arms trade increases 
as a result of the importing state being involved in an interstate war.  In contrast, the U.S. 
shows a negative relationship between arms trade and importing state involvement in 
interstate warfare.  This divergence is possibly indicative of status quo reinforcing or 
status quo impugning grand strategy.  
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A third series of models, shown below in Table 5, looks at the regional variation 
in arms trade.  One of the most interesting findings in this model is that, unlike all of the  
 Regional Effects Model with Imputation 1950-2007. 
 
 All Africa Asia Europe Middle East N/S America 
       
U.S. Power -39.27* -23.37*** -38.59 62.33** -210.7* -42.60*** 
 (21.62) (8.747) (84.07) (25.67) (107.9) (13.79) 
Unipolarity -4.297** -0.273 -4.451 -12.64** -10.32 -4.029* 
 (1.921) (0.634) (5.750) (5.353) (7.169) (2.375) 
Exporter CINC 88.98 65.17** -301.0 614.9*** -221.8 74.81 
 (87.19) (28.47) (193.3) (221.0) (356.9) (48.47) 
Importer CINC 491.8** -1,604 1,212 50.87 3,524 331.3 
 (218.4) (2,059) (878.1) (131.5) (3,969) (362.2) 
Exporter Regime -0.381 -0.0145 0.0428 -0.398 -3.135** 0.360 
 (0.405) (0.0634) (1.088) (1.293) (1.480) (0.310) 
Importer Regime -0.464** -0.0646* 0.234 -0.966 -1.835 -0.253** 
 (0.206) (0.0363) (0.337) (0.701) (1.155) (0.113) 
Similar Regimes 10.10*** 2.371* 4.037 25.26*** 51.52** 2.007 
 (3.529) (1.281) (8.238) (9.433) (24.13) (2.048) 
Alliance 65.88*** 52.55* 48.10 51.44*** 267.4** 3.989 
 (22.33) (28.94) (36.49) (14.21) (131.3) (2.980) 
Exporter Interstate War -2.848 0.812 -8.762 -5.739 -3.732 2.826 
 (2.794) (0.916) (6.837) (4.284) (16.80) (3.079) 
Importer Interstate War 20.41** 7.024 22.46 7.222 37.06 14.47 
 (8.981) (6.235) (18.67) (9.931) (25.60) (11.32) 
Exporter Intrastate War 0.623 1.158 4.393 0.450 -8.763 0.580 
 (2.238) (0.847) (6.965) (3.351) (10.99) (1.656) 
Importer Intrastate War 3.504 1.010 -1.244 -2.185 11.71 -4.338 
 (3.279) (1.763) (6.404) (6.043) (15.47) (7.888) 
Constant 20.64* 8.909*** 50.35 -61.54** 136.1*** 19.22*** 
 (12.49) (3.308) (40.67) (29.26) (50.79) (4.988) 
       
Observations 83,148 20,424 16,866 18,907 9,901 17,050 
Number of panel 1,950 480 437 485 200 348 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5:  Regression Model Showing Regional Effects with Imputation 1950-2007 
previous specification, the coefficient on U.S. Power is positive in the European region.  
This indicates that, unlike the rest of the world where increases to U.S. Power has 
suppressed the arms trade, in Europe there was an opposite effect.  Given the central role 
the European region played during the great power competition that defined the Cold 
War, this finding is strongly supportive of an account that increased great power 
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competition increases the volume of arms trade.  The negative coefficient on Unipolarity 
in the European region model further suggests that as competition decreased in the post-
Cold War era, there was a corresponding decrease in the volume of arms trade.  The 
findings for Alliances and Regime similarity also appear to be robust to regional 
variation, though there are differences in the magnitude of the effect.  Regional effects 
are most pronounced in the Middle East where the effects of U.S. Power, Similar 
Regimes, and Alliances are markedly higher than the other regions.   
 In summary, the findings from these three series of models allows for the 
rejection of some of the initial hypotheses while providing clarity on others.  Among the 
rejected hypotheses, the main effects model shows that the nonlinear relationship 
between importing state power and arms trade postulated in hypothesis 2 is unlikely.  In 
the first model, neither the coefficient on Importer CINC or Importer CINC2 was 
significant; furthermore, dropping the squared term raised the level of significance on 
Importer CINC to statistically accepted level in subsequent models.  This suggests that 
there is a measurable positive relationship between importing states material power and 
the volume of weapons traded.  Nuclear power, tested in model 4, also failed to exert a 
measurable effect on arms trade in all specifications allowing a rejection of the 
hypothesis that nuclear powers will have a higher volume of arms trade.  The findings on 
the effects of war are mixed.   
The main effects model in the third specification tested four conditions that 
looked at whether the state was an importer or exporter, and whether the type of war was 
an interstate or intrastate war.  Of the four conditions, the only specification that seemed 
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to exert a measurable effect was when looking at importers involved in interstate wars.  
This finding, however, was further clarified when looking at sub-samples of the exporting 
states in the second series of models.  Russia and China appear to be primarily 
responsible for this finding—with Russia doing the bulk of the work.  The U.S. only 
specification, in contrast to Russia and China, shows a negative effect on arms trade 
when the importer is in an interstate war.  The findings imply that there is support for 
hypothesis 4, which stipulates an increase in arms trade when a subordinate member of a 
great power’s security sphere of influence is involved in a conflict with the caveat that 
the conflict is an interstate war, and that the exporting state be either Russia or China.   
Exporter domestic political regimes do not seem to matter much, though there is a 
slight effect for importer regime.  More importantly though, regime similarity exerts a 
positive, statistically noticeable, and substantive effect in the main effects model—
supporting the hypothesis that regime congruity will increase arms trade.  This finding, 
however, is further clarified in the exporter effects models.  Both Russia and the U.S. 
only specifications show a markedly higher value on the coefficient for regime similarity 
than any of the other exporting state specifications.  This may indirectly indicate that 
regime similarity is more important to great powers than to other exporters. 
Discussion 
 
The main findings from the results section are broadly consistent with various 
theories in the international relations literature.  Throughout the Cold War the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union competed against one another for a larger share of international 
hegemony.  Kindleberger noted in his analysis of the depression, that the world economy 
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requires the stabilizing effort of an international hegemon.61  The U.S. used its dominant 
material and strategic position following the Second World War to establish international 
institutions to secure its vision of a liberal international world order in both economic and 
security endeavors.  Since the proliferation of weapons has the potential to shift the status 
quo by redistributing military capacity, it is possible, and consistent with the empirical 
evidence, that the U.S. was able to use its military-industrial position to suppress the arms 
trade.  The overall reduction in arms trade as U.S. power increased could be the result of 
internally balancing military capacity under bipolarity.62  In the regional models, the 
positive relationship between increased U.S. power and arms trade in Europe is consistent 
with centrality of that region during the Cold War, and supports accounts of arms trading 
as a tool of competition.  There is also evidence that, as expected based on the decreased 
uncertainty of bipolarity, there are stark differences in the arms trade behavior between 
great powers and the remainder of the countries in the sample.  Specifically, for the U.S. 
and Russia the effect of being in an alliance or having a similar domestic political regime 
significantly increases the number of weapons traded.  Given the different behavior of the 
U.S. and Russia, it seems theoretically plausible that arms trade can serve as a tool in the 
establishment and maintenance of security hierarchies.  Given the differences in great 
power arms trade behavior, this finding also potentially expands Lake’s indicators of 
security hierarchy beyond the extraterritorial deployment of military forces and 
                                                 
61 Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, 28. 
62 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 168. 
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independent alliances.63  Arms access may potentially allow great powers to reap some of 
the hierarchical benefits without the political risk for the subordinate state of basing 
foreign troops.  In other words, arms may serve as a foot in the door tactic for security 
hierarchy expansion.  
The differences in behavior under unipolarity are also consistent with U.S. 
preferences to preserve the status quo order and for rival powers to challenge it.64  Trade 
behavior overall is decreased in the unipolar period but that finding reflects the weight of 
U.S. in the model.  Both Russia and China have increased trade under unipolarity.65  
Arms trade may serve as a concrete tactic for near peer competitors desiring to change 
the international system and further operationalizes Gilpin’s account offering an 
observable behavior of rising power’s expansion.66   
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented a series of three empirical models showing how 
common variables in international relations affect the pattern of conventional weapons 
trade.  Of the various findings, three stand out.  First, increases to U.S. power vis-à-vis its 
peer and near peer competitors suppresses arms trade.  Second, there is variation between 
the preferences of the U.S. and its near peer-competitors as evidenced by the difference 
                                                 
63 Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World 
Politics," 62-63. 
64 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
65 The effect in the China only specification is small and not statistically significant, 
however, because of the data limitations this model likely underestimates China.    
66 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 10. 
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between the U.S. and Russia / China under unipolarity and through arms support to 
importer states involved in an interstate war.  Third, alliances and similar domestic 
regimes appears to influence great power states more than major powers or developing 
powers in influencing the volume of arms traded.   
The empirical results also allow a rejection of three of the initial hypotheses.  
First, there is no evidence of a non-linear relationship in support of the hypothesis that 
trade will be higher to mid-range powers.  Rather there is strong findings of a positive 
linear relationship between material power as represented by CINC and arms trading 
volume, but mid-range powers do not outstrip major powers in their importation.  
Second, nuclear capability does not have a noticeable effect on the volume of arms 
traded.  Third there is no effect on trade for when the exporting state is involved in a war.  
Although there was a significant effect for regime similarity the hypothesis regarding 
whether democratization precedes arms trades is not fully tested.  The significance of 
regime similarity is a necessary condition toward determining whether this hypothesis 
will ultimately hold but is insufficient to determine the process. 
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CHAPTER 3:  The End of the Cold War, Arms Trade, and Alliance 
Reorientation in Eastern Europe  
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War changed the power dynamics of the international system.  
Competition between peers was replaced by a hegemonic United States.  This change in 
the structure of the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity had significant 
implications for arms trading behavior.  Though the power imbalance started prior to the 
symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the rather sudden collapse of the Soviet Union 
was nevertheless surprising. Over the course of ten years, from 1989 to 1999, many states 
in the former Soviet sphere of influence realigned with the West and were incorporated 
into NATO.  Given the role that competition, alliances, and regime similarity play in the 
arms trade behavior of great powers, an in-depth look at the effects on arms trade as a 
result of this reorientation of the international system is warranted.  Through alliances, 
great powers can balance against each other to prevent any one state’s pursuit of power.67  
Problematically for scholars studying the role of alliances empirically, there is relatively 
little variation in alliance formations or shifts after the Second World War.  
Compounding this problem is the relatively few instances of great power shifts in the 
historic record.  Indeed, during the time period from 1945-1989, there is only one shift in 
the structure of the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity at the end of the 
Cold War.  Evaluating claims regarding the effect of great power competition, alliances, 
                                                 
67 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
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and regime similarity on arms trade behavior with a strictly quantitative approach does 
not yield enough data to draw strong conclusions.   
The opportunity for shifts in great power alliance networks are necessarily tied to 
the rise and fall of great powers; therefore, the number of great powers in the system at 
any given time defines and constrains alliance opportunities.68  Shifts in the composition 
of great powers in the international system and thus shifts in the underlying alliance 
networks they engender are relatively rare because great powers, through their prominent 
role in maintaining the status quo in the existing international order, are fairly resilient.  
Nevertheless, power does wax and wane.  New powers emerge and challenge the existing 
order, and older powers seek to preserve their position.  The results of the quantitative 
analysis showed that alliances were the strongest predictor of arms trade in both the U.S. 
only and Russia only models in the previous chapter.  The end of the Cold War provides 
a specific case for a more in-depth look at the role alliances play and for some of the 
other hypotheses supported in the previous quantitative work.  In this chapter, I will look 
at how the great power reorientation of the U.S. and Russia in Eastern Europe at the end 
of the Cold War changed the patterns of arms trade by opening new alliance 
opportunities, and increasing political and economic regime congruity.  Specifically, in 
this case three of the initial hypotheses will be evaluated.  First, this case offers a more 
nuanced evaluation of the role of great power competition on the arms trade.  Second, the 
effects of security alliances and economic partnership can be disaggregated allowing a 
different look at the effects of regime similarity.  Third, as it pertains to the U.S. and the 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
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other western allies this chapter provides information about the role democratization 
plays in setting the conditions for new arms trade partnerships.   
In this qualitative chapter, two of the main hypotheses in this study that found 
support in the earlier quantitative chapter can be compared to determine their casual 
effect on the arms trade.  Specifically, this chapter expands upon the earlier work by 
directly investigating the difference in arms trade as a function of great power 
competition and the effects of alliance.  Since there is some endogeneity between great 
power competition and alliance formations looking, at an in-depth analysis of when these 
variables exert their effect will further support the hypotheses in this study.  The primary 
hypothesis in this study is that increasing great power competition increases the overall 
level of the arms trade in the international system.  This hypothesis is expected to exert 
its effect because it is theorized that great powers will be more likely to trade weapons 
when competition between them is heightened so that they can extend their security 
spheres of influence vis-à-vis their great power rival.  In this chapter, which looks at 
Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, there is a reduction of great power 
competition as Russia’s power noticeably waned.  Consequently, at the conclusion of the 
Cold War, it is expected that the overall arms trade will decline.  Here the decline in the 
arms trade is postulated to occur most visibly across the states that comprised the Soviet 
Union’s former security sphere in Eastern Europe.  In addition to the decline of great 
power competition that occurred at the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a steady 
erosion of the former Soviet security sphere as the states that comprised it were 
assimilated into NATO.  Broadly, there were three waves of NATO expansion following 
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the Cold War.  Alliances were hypothesized to have a large a positive effect of the 
volume of arms traded; this was substantiated in the previous quantitative analysis.  This 
chapter allows a closer look at how joining an alliance exerts its effect in the overall 
process of expanding the arms trade.  
In the following section, the nature of the arms trade in Eastern Europe at the end 
of the Cold War will be examined.  One state, Poland, will be looked at in depth to 
investigate how the effects of great power and alliances impacted the volume of arms 
they imported and whom they imported them from.  After the general contours of the 
operational effects of great power competition and alliances are derived from an in depth 
look at Poland, the study will be expanded to look at the aggregate effect in Eastern 
Europe, and further expanded to look at the effects across the three waves of NATO 
expansion.  This chapter will show that of the two main variables identified in the 
quantitative analysis, great power competition exerts a more pronounced effect in this 
subset than alliance membership.   
Case Selection  
 
The abrupt end of the Cold War in 1989 shifted the distribution of international 
power decisively toward the United States.  For states previously allied with the U.S.S.R., 
this made decisions about whom to trade arms with possible and created new alliance 
opportunities.  Though the end of the Cold War represents only one case of how the 
decline of a great power affects arms trading behavior, within the case variation can be 
generated by disaggregating the unit of analysis to the state level.  Through 
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disaggregation, and even in spite of restricting the analysis to Europe, this generates 
separate examples of alliance shifts, alliance formations, or lack of alliance for the states 
that came into existence following the Soviet collapse such as Albania, Belarus, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
the Ukraine.  These states make excellent data points for developing a linkage between 
the role of great power competition, alliances, democratization, and regime similarity in 
the ensuing pattern and volume of arms trade.  Many of these states were formerly 
members of the Warsaw Pact and subsequently became members of NATO.  
Additionally, some of these states also shifted their primary economic partnerships from 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) to the European Union.  
One limitation to this case is that it exclusively focuses on the changes to the 
pattern of arms trade to Eastern Europe as a result of the expansion of the U.S.  Thus, 
care must be taken when expanding the conclusions of this case study beyond the U.S. to 
great powers generally.  It is possible and even probable, that other great powers would 
have separate and distinguishable grand strategies, and would therefore use arms trade to 
achieve different aims.  Nevertheless, the concentration of power necessary to be a great 
power and the structural conditions of the international system should engender 
behavioral trends that, while differing in the details, presumably share certain features.  
Given that the end of the Cold War was not precipitated through outright conflict 
but was rather the result of a limited opening of economic markets under Soviet reforms, 
Eastern Europe’s desire to realign with the West may primarily be a function of its’ 
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desire to have greater access to the western model of economic success.  Because the 
scope of the Soviet decline was unknown at the time, accession to the NATO alliance 
would also serve as a hedge against the possibility of a re-emergence of coercive Russian 
power.  For the U.S. however, adding additional alliance commitments for the collective 
defense of Eastern European countries entailed accepting significant uncertainty.  
Although increasing the number of members in NATO could serve as a useful hedge 
against a resurgence of Russian power, it was also true that expanding the alliance 
increased the risk of being pulled into a conflict if Russia decided to reassert itself.  In the 
following section, Poland’s arms trade behavior will be process traced by examining the 
effects of great power competition and alliance realignment through examination of the 
available archival documentation to infer why the steps occurred in the order they did.  
Subsequently, using the information provided by the examination of Poland, arms trade 
behavior to other European nations will be considered based on either their respective 
date of NATO accession or lack of NATO accession.  
 Poland was selected from the set of states mentioned above because it represents 
the most likely case of a state looking to realign its security sphere following the 
conclusion of the Cold War for three reasons.  First, its geographic position on the 
boarder of Germany made it especially valuable to the West.  Through an alliance with 
Poland, the geographic space between the majority of NATO and Russia was increased.  
Adding Poland to NATO would help the alliance solve its perennial geostrategic problem 
of conventional force imbalances against Russia in the east.  Specifically, in the event of 
a Russian attack, adding Poland and thereby increasing the distance between the core of 
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Europe and Russia would allow NATO to trade space for time while the U.S mobilized 
and deployed the bulk of its forces across the Atlantic.69  The value of Poland’s strategic 
geographic position partly explains why major powers would want to add Poland as an 
ally.  
Second, Poland provides the depth of data needed for drawing inferences about 
the central features of the arms trade under study in this dissertation.  As shown below in 
Table 6, Poland has had the highest levels of weapons trade in Eastern Europe since the 
conclusion of the Second World War.  Certainly, Poland’s high levels of trade are 
reflective of its role, via its geographic position, as a buffer between Russia and Western 
Europe, but they are also indicative of an existing level of military capacity.  In Poland 
the question was not whether to constitute a military and equip it with technologically 
sophisticated weapons, but rather how to best alter the existing military apparatus and 
subsequently procure the requisite equipment.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 The reconciliation between East Germany and West Germany played a similar 
geographic role, but is significantly different in character.  In Germany the alliance shift 
can be explained as East German integration into the existing alliance structure of West 
Germany rather than of choosing to seek new alliances with former adversaries. 
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 China France Germany Italy Russia U.K. U.S. Total 
Albania 27 1 2 2 34 0 0 66 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 11 
Bosnia 2 0 0 0 1 0 4 7 
Bulgaria 0 2 0 2 177 0 4 185 
Croatia 0 0 3 2 3 0 6 14 
Czech Republic 0 0 2 5 3 1 7 18 
Estonia 0 4 7 0 0 2 4 17 
Georgia 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 5 
Hungary 0 1 3 2 118 0 7 131 
Latvia 0 0 6 1 1 2 4 14 
Lithuania 0 1 7 1 5 1 6 21 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 0 2 18 4 179 2 24 229 
Romania 5 6 2 2 134 6 13 168 
Slovakia 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 6 
Slovenia 0 3 2 0 4 0 5 14 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Total 34 20 53 22 676 15 89 909 
Table 6: Showing the Total Number of Trades Between the Major Powers and Eastern 
European Countries from 1947-201570 
 Third, as shown in Table 7 below, Poland is the wealthiest of the states under 
consideration.  And, as shown in Table 8, in recent years Poland has habitually allocated 
a higher percentage of its resources on defense expenditures then other Eastern European 
countries.  Both Poland’s financial health and its willingness to allocate its financial 
resources to security make it a likely importing state. 
 
 
                                                 
70 The abbreviations in the top row are for Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  
Japan, India, and Brazil are omitted as exporters because they have no trades to any 
of these countries during this time period.  
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 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Albania 2.4 3.6 8.2 11.9 11.4 
Belarus 13.9 12.7 30.2 57.2 56.4 
Bosnia 1.8 5.5 11.2 17.1 16.2 
Bulgaria 13.1 13.1 29.8 50.6 50.2 
Croatia 22.4 21.8 45.4 59.7 48.7 
Czech R. 59.5 61.5 136 207 185.2 
Estonia 4.4 5.7 14 19.5 22.5 
Georgia 2.7 3 6.4 11.6 14 
Hungary 46.3 47.2 112.6 103.3 121.7 
Latvia 5.8 7.9 16.9 23.8 27 
Lithuania 7.9 11.5 26.1 37.1 41.2 
Moldova 1.8 1.3 2.9 5.8 6.5 
Montenegro No Data 0.98 2.1 4.1 4 
Poland 142.1 171.9 306.1 479.3 477.1 
Romania 37.7 37.4 99.7 168 178 
Slovakia 25.7 29.1 62.7 89.5 87.3 
Slovenia 21.3 20.3 36.3 48 42.8 
Ukraine 48.2 31.2 86.1 136 91 
Table 7: Showing GDP Billion U.S. Dollars71 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 AVG 
Albania 1.56 1.53 1.49 1.41 1.35 1.16 1.42 
Bulgaria 1.67 1.33 1.35 1.46 1.32 1.20 1.39 
Croatia 1.54 1.60 1.53 1.47 1.41 1.38 1.49 
Czech R. 1.29 1.07 1.06 1.03 0.96 0.97 1.06 
Estonia 1.70 1.68 1.89 1.90 1.93 2.04 1.86 
Hungary 1.04 1.05 1.04 0.95 0.87 0.85 0.97 
Latvia 1.06 1.02 0.89 0.93 0.94 1.06 0.98 
Lithuania 0.88 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.88 1.14 0.87 
Poland 1.77 1.72 1.74 1.72 1.85 2.18 1.83 
Romania 1.24 1.28 1.22 1.28 1.35 1.44 1.30 
Slovakia 1.27 1.09 1.10 0.99 0.99 1.12 1.09 
Slovenia 1.61 1.30 1.18 1.06 0.98 0.95 1.18 
AVG 1.39 1.29 1.27 1.25 1.24 1.29 1.29 
Table 8: Showing Defense Expenditure for NATO members as a Percentage of GDP72 
                                                 
71 The World Bank, "World Databank,"  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP
.CD&country=EST. 
72 Poland allocates just less of its GDP, on average, than Estonia.  Both Estonia and 
Poland are higher than the European average of 1.52 over the same time period, and 
none of the countries in NATO except the U.S., the U.K., and Greece routinely meet 
the 2% GDP expenditure on defense the alliance agreed to in 2006.  NATO, "Defence 
Expenditures of NATO Countries (2008-2015)," news release, 28 Jan, 2016, 
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Geographic position, a preexisting and relatively modern military (though initially 
Soviet in organizational structure and equipment), and financial resources explain why 
Poland is the most likely case at the end of the Cold War of a state looking to reorient 
their security position through alliances and arms trade.  Strategic geographic position 
explains Poland’s value as an ally and explains why the U.S. and NATO would extend 
collective security to them.  Poland’s established military institutions increase the 
likelihood of arms trade and its relatively high defense expenditure provides the means to 
purchase weapons.  All of these factors contribute toward making Poland a likely case of 
a state that will seek to extend its security commitments by seeking arms from a major 
power.  While using one specific country affords greater attention to detail, there is a 
trade off in the degree of generalization afforded by the case.  To offset this the other 
Eastern European countries will be discussed based on the year they entered the NATO 
alliance.  This will broadly create four cohorts: The first cohort consists of the states that 
were admitted to NATO in 1999 and includes Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.  
The general contours and bureaucratic process developed during these early post-Cold 
War accessions shaped the future of alliance’s expansion by generating detailed 
membership requirements.  The second major cohort, in 2004, was the largest and 
included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  The 
third cohort accessed in 2009 and included Albania, and Croatia.  Finally, a fourth cohort 
of similar Eastern European nations that have not joined NATO will be looked at to see 
                                                 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160129_1601
28-pr-2016-11-eng.pdf.   
 
 
 
64
what the patterns of great power trade look like in the absence of joining a formal 
alliance.  This final cohort includes Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, and Ukraine.73  Looking across these cohorts will allow a 
determination about whether the general features present in Poland are broadly 
extendable, or whether they differ in ways that provide evidence against the findings.  
Poland 
Following WWII, the world existed in an international system defined by the 
bipolar great powers competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  Balancing was a 
direct implication of the United States’ articulated policy—often expressed as 
containment—starting in 1950 by the Truman administration in NSC 68.  The NATO 
alliance played a crucial role in formalizing the collective defense alliance commitments 
between member countries.  At Yalta in February 1945, the post war strategy was 
decided among the allies.  Poland, and Eastern Europe generally, was positioned in the 
Soviet’s sphere of influence.74  At the Potsdam conference in July and August of the 
same year, further work was done defining post war Europe—although in an environment 
marked by increasing tension between the Soviet Union and the rest of the allies.  
Specifically, the borders of Poland were redefined to make up for territory ceded in the 
east by adding territory in the west.  Both of these realignments essentially shifted the 
                                                 
73 Montenegro assessed to NATO in June 2017, but the data used in this study ends 
in 2015 so for the purposes of this analysis Montenegro is grouped with other 
Eastern European non-NATO countries.  
74 U.S. Government, "The Yalta Conference, 1945,"  
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf. 
 
 
 
65
Polish state west, causing large-scale population realignments, as Germans were actively 
deported out of the new Polish territory.75  More importantly, as the Cold War progressed 
and the post-war alliances became more pronounced, this border shift increased Poland’s 
dependence on the U.S.S.R. as a bulwark against irredentist German claims.  In spite of 
this reliance however, by the early 1980s there were indications that there were politically 
viable factions within Poland that were interested in moving out of Russia’s sphere of 
influence.  Poland’s Solidarity movement (a non-communist labor union) was rapidly 
expanding its membership and gaining political influence.  The Solidarity movement’s 
successful strike, which precipitated its existence, posed a direct threat to Moscow’s 
political control and serves as an early indicator of the unrest growing within the Soviet 
sphere of influence in the 1980s.76  Although the Solidarity movement was repressed by 
the imposition of martial law by the pro-soviet Polish military commander, General 
Jaruzelski, its leaders would eventually reemerge at the end to the Cold War and assume 
leadership of the country.  By the early 1980s there were already clear signs that there 
were a substantial number of Poles amenable to western political ideals. 
As the Cold War reached its culmination in the late 1980s, another indication of 
the waning influence of the Soviet Union was immediately apparent in Poland’s election 
of a non-communist government in 1989.77  In December of the same year, shortly 
                                                 
75 Andrew A. Michta, America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
in NATO (Seattle ; London: University of Washington Press, 1999), 42. 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/potsdam-conf 
76 Vojtech Mastny, "The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of 
the Cold War," Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 2 (1999): 191. 
77 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 408. 
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following the fall of the Berlin Wall, President George H.W. Bush met with Chairman 
Mikhail Gorbachev to discuss the end of the Cold War at Malta.  In President Bush’s 
briefing book (a collection of short summary positions and talking points) on U.S. policy 
toward Eastern Europe, there is encouragement for the continuation of Soviet policies of 
perestroika and glasnost, a commitment to a reunified Germany, and an 
acknowledgement of support for Poland and Hungary’s “difficult structural economic 
reforms and support [for] their transition to democracy.”78  However, much of the 
briefing points indicate an overarching concern with altering the security calculus of the 
region.  The U.S. wanted “[t]o redress the conventional force imbalance, to enhance 
stability and create a more secure military situation.”79  And more explicitly, “[t]o reduce 
Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe and thereby encourage more democratic, liberal 
Eastern European regimes.”80   
The Soviet transcripts of the same meeting between Bush and Gorbachev provide 
a more in-depth look at how Bush translated his briefing points into actual actions, and 
again show the interplay between economic inducements and security concessions.  
Specifically, Bush informed Gorbachev that he intended to support the suspension of the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment and repealing the Stevenson and Baird amendments which 
                                                 
78 U.S. Government, "The President's Meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev," ed. 
Department of State (1989). 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%209.pdf (accessed 18 
April 2016) 
79 Ibid. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%209.pdf 
(accessed 18 April 2016) 
80 Ibid. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%209.pdf 
(accessed 18 April 2016) 
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were preventing the Soviet Union from obtaining Most Favored Nation (MFN) status and 
obtaining credit respectively.81  Additionally, Bush informed Gorbachev that he would 
support granting the Soviet Union observer status in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT).82  This economic discussion took place early on the 2nd of December 
before attention was turned to the changing security relationships in Eastern Europe.  On 
the second day of the conference, Gorbachev talks specifically about the changing 
security dynamics of Europe.  Starting with an assurance that “the Soviet Union will not 
under any circumstances initiate a war,” Gorbachev details the scope of the Soviet’s 
adoption of a defensive doctrinal concept of operations and discusses the numerous 
military reductions in Eastern Europe while questioning why similar doctrinal and force 
posture changes have not been forthcoming from NATO.83   
Bush avoids a direct discussion, indicates that he has directed the military to 
initiate an analysis of military expenditure, and turns the conversation to a discussion of 
the reunification of Germany and U.S. involvement in Poland.  Both leaders address the 
needs for arms control in chemical weapons, strategic weapons, and the balance of 
conventional forces.  Care is clearly taken by both leaders to address the changing 
dynamics of Europe with an eye toward the domestic ramifications of the decisions they 
                                                 
81 Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Fond 1. Opis 1.  Excerpts published in: M.S. 
Gorbachev, Gody Trudnykh Reshenii, 1985-1992 [Years of Difficult Decisions], 
(Moscow: Alfa-print, 1993), pp. 173-185. Translated by Vladislav Zubok and 
Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive. 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%2010.pdf (accessed 
16 April 16) 
82 Ibid. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%2010.pdf 
(accessed 16 April 16) 
83 Ibid 
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were making.84  Although the Soviet transcript, which was released in 1993, may have 
been edited to put Gorbachev and the Soviet Union in the best possible light, a National 
Security Council (NSC) memo from the 5th of December clearly captures President 
Bush’s level of commitment to the Malta agenda and verifies the general veracity of the 
Soviet account.   
In this memorandum, the NSC is informed of President Bush’s commitment to 
extend Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union by 1990, support observer 
status in the GATT, and extend support for Soviet economic initiatives.85  After the 
preliminary comments about Soviet economic inclusion, the NSC memo outlines an 
aggressive arms control agenda accelerating the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START), chemical munitions reduction, and the balance of Conventional Forces in 
Europe.86  The overall import of the discussions reflects the concern each leader felt to 
correctly navigate the reorientation of power in Europe.  At this moment in history the 
extent of Soviet decline was unclear in the West, thus these initial negotiations proceeded 
carefully with close attention paid by both sides to the prestige and domestic political 
concerns of the other.  The global pattern of arms trade and the regionally specific 
information about trading behavior during great power realignments is a critical step 
toward understanding the relationship between arms and allies. 
                                                 
84 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
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85 U.S. Government, "National Security Council Meeting: 5 December 1989," ed. 
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At Malta the U.S. had incomplete information about the scope and rapidity of the 
Soviet economic decline, and was prudently cautious in pushing an agenda for the 
westernization of former Soviet client states in Eastern Europe.  These initial diplomatic 
steps indicate a complex interaction between economic inducements and security 
reforms.  Based on the evidence from these initial discussions, the U.S. had an 
advantageous position relative to the Soviet Union economically.  Accordingly, the U.S. 
was able to use economic incentives to garner security concessions.  In this case, the 
waning of Soviet power in Eastern Europe created opportunities for former Soviet allies 
to pursue new alliances.  Prior to any extension of alliances within the former Soviet 
sphere, however, the U.S. needed more information about the relative standing of their 
former adversary.  Information about Russian power vis-à-vis the United States would 
naturally increase over time—making alliance overtures and weapons trade to Poland and 
the rest of Eastern Europe possible by the mid 1990s.  Poland’s arms trade (shown in 
Table 9 below) between the unification of Germany in 1990 and the formal study on 
NATO enlargement in 1995 was minimal.  The majority of the trade consisted of 300 
Italian diesel engines.  The other trades were relatively innocuous light aircraft and 
combat helicopters and a few ostensibly combat oriented aircraft from Germany.  Given 
the makes and model of the German trades it is likely that they were a divestiture of East 
Germany’s Soviet era military equipment. 
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Year Exporter Designation Description Quantity 
1990 Russia Mi-14PL ASW Helicopter 1 
1991 Germany MiG-23M Fighter Aircraft 2 
1991 Germany Su-22 FGA Aircraft 2 
1991 United States Bell-206/OH-58 Light Helicopter 2 
1992 Russia M28B Bryza-1R MP Aircraft 10 
1993 Russia An-28TD Bryza-1TD Light Aircraft 4 
1994 United States PA-34 Seneca Light Aircraft 2 
1995 Germany Mi-24D/Mi-25 Combat Helicopter 18 
1995 Italy Cursor Diesel Engine 300 
Table 9: Showing Poland’s Arms Trade Between the Reunification of Germany 
and the NATO study on Enlargement. 
 
By 1995 NATO was officially considering NATO enlargement, and had prepared 
a formal study.  This study makes it clear that while “Russia has raised concerns with 
respect to the enlargement process of the Alliance,” NATO considered expansion a key 
step toward “enhancing security and stability for all.”87  Russia features prominently in 
the analysis, but in spite of the concerns, it is clear that the enlargement would go 
forward.  Additionally, the study highlights the interconnectedness of the NATO alliance 
and membership in the European Union.  While allowing that membership in NATO and 
the EU were independent of each other, it also makes it clear that “the Alliance views its 
own enlargement and that of the EU as mutually supportive and parallel processes which 
together will make a significant contribution to strengthening Europe's security 
structure.”88  Interestingly, though the NATO study goes in depth about the autonomy of 
the NATO and EU accession process, it also notes that EU “members are committed to a 
                                                 
87 NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement,"  
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Common Foreign and Security Policy.”89  However, in the majority of cases accession to 
NATO preceded joining the EU.  While this sequence is suggestive of a primacy for 
security concerns over increasing economic interdependence, it is limited evidence.  It is, 
however, clear that NATO was actively seeking to lower the institutional barriers to 
entry.  In 1994 the NATO member nations created the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program.   
Activities on offer under the PfP programme touch on virtually every field 
of NATO activity, including defence-related work, defence reform, 
defence policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and 
training, military-to-military cooperation and exercises, civil emergency 
planning and disaster response, and cooperation on science and 
environmental issues.90 
 
A Study on NATO Enlargement followed the creation of the PfP initiative by a year and 
the language of the study implies that the PfP was intended to play a major role in 
assisting aspirant member in making the military reforms necessary for NATO 
membership.  Through the PfP, Poland enacted many military reforms in preparation for 
NATO accession.  These reforms broadly included achieving normative goals commonly 
associated with liberal democracies such as increased civilian control of the military, 
professionalization of the Non-Commissioned Officer Corps, and a reduction in the end 
strength of the officer corps (in Poland’s case this was generally accomplished by retiring 
Soviet-era officers).91  Separate pragmatic reforms aimed at ensuring interoperability 
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within NATO such as, establishing modern air traffic control procedures, and specifying 
equipment modernization standards.92   
Through the specification of modernization standards, NATO was exercising 
some degree of influence over demand in aspiring member states for new weapons.  This 
indicates a potential causal pathway for the linkage demonstrated in the quantitative 
analysis between alliance and trade arm trade.  In this case, potential alliance members 
facing modernization and interoperability specifications were faced with a choice to 
develop their own internal capacity to produce weapons in-line with NATO 
specifications, or to purchase weapons from states that already possessed the capacity.  
Partially generating demand by specifying interoperability or modernization requirements 
suggest a limited economic underpinning for alliance expansion.  There were critics at the 
time that questioned the role the U.S. arms industry was playing—through their lobbying 
activity—in NATO’s expansion agenda.93  Undeniably the arms industry stood to profit.  
Poland, for example, was projected to need between 100 and 150 fighter planes to replace 
its aging Soviet era air force at an estimated cost of 20 to 60 million apiece (depending on 
the specific variant selected).94  However, against the alternative explanation that the 
military modernization program was actually intended to bring potential NATO members 
to martial parity, this account of military-industrial machination falls flat.  Clearly the 
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weapons industry stood to profit, but that does not constitute compelling evidence against 
an alternative account of the military necessity for inter-alliance interoperability.  The 
gravity of NATO’s Article 5—collective defense—obligates members of the alliance to 
consider an attack against one an attack against all.  By definition adding alliance 
members necessarily increases the probability of an invocation of Article 5 because it 
increases the number of states in the alliance that could invoke collective defense.  For 
NATO states considering whether to admit new alliance partners, the long-term 
commitments and implications of collective defense surely outweighed the gains in 
defense sector profitability.   
Furthermore, the pattern of U.S. trade to Poland cuts against accounts that posit 
profit as the primary motivator.  Equipment modernization occurred in Poland after their 
accession to the alliance.  Empirically, the U.S. started trading weapons with Poland in 
1991 with two OH-58 helicopters, and in 1994 for two PA-34s—a light transport aircraft.  
These two relatively insignificant trades, which were worth roughly $15 million in 2003 
dollars, do not constitute a serious attempt at modernization.  Starting in 1999—the year 
Poland joins NATO—the volume and type of trade changes.  In 1999, Poland purchased 
100 Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMS), and two Frigates, and, by 2003, Poland was 
purchasing 48 F-16s worth 3.5 billion to replace its aging fleet of MIGs.   
The role great power competition plays in arms trade behavior is apparent in 
Poland in two ways.  First, there is notably no trade from the U.S. to Poland prior to 
1991, which suggests that a loss of Russian standing was a necessary condition for the 
U.S. to begin arms trade with Poland.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that higher levels of great 
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power competition will increase the demand for weapons.  The U.S. expansion of its 
arms trade into Poland, however, seems at odd with this prediction.  Globally during the 
early 1990s there was a decrease in the level of great power competition between the U.S. 
and Russia, which had defined regional tension since the conclusion of the Second World 
War.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that the volume of arms traded is a function of the level of 
great power competition in the international system, and, at the end of the Cold War, 
there is a noticeable decrease in the overall volume of the arms trade.  As shown in Table 
10 below, for Poland this general decrease accompanies a switch to NATO allies as a 
primary trading partner.   
    Cold War Ended 
    No Yes 
    Poland in NATO Poland in NATO 
    No Yes No Yes 
Exporter 
Russia 37203 . 91 86 
NATO Allies 129 . 101 3157 
Table 10:  Showing the Change in Trade Volume (TIV) as a result of the End of 
the Cold War and as a Function of Alliance Shift.95 
 
Thus, for Poland, as great power competition decreased at the end of the Cold War, there 
was both a significant reduction in the total volume of arms traded, and a shift in the 
alignment of great power security spheres.   
The post-Cold War arms trade to Poland captures the difference in the total arms 
trade volume predicted as the international system shifted from the strict competition 
                                                 
95 An equality test of the mean TIVs before and after the end of the Cold War and as a 
function of joining NATO generates a T-Score of 5.53 and 4.43 respectively indicating 
that both variables have a are statistically distinguishable effect on the arms trade. 
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predicted under bipolarity to the less intense competition of unipolarity.  Specifically, 
Russia—although at a reduced volume—continued to trade military equipment with 
Poland as shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
 Figure 3: Showing U.S. and Russia’s Total TIV per year to Poland. 
Second, while entering into the NATO alliance was not a prerequisite for the U.S. to 
begin arms trade with Poland, alliance membership does seem to be related to the type of 
weapons a great power (in this case the U.S.) is willing to trade.  The iterative process 
between NATO accession requirements, Polish military reforms, and arms trade offers 
more information about the effects of democratization and alliance membership.  
Hypothesis 7 predicts that democratization will precede arms trade, while hypothesis 6 
predicts that regime congruity will increase the volume of arms trade.  In broad-brush 
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strokes, the process of adopting democratic reform in Poland began in the 1980s with 
protests and strikes organized by the Solidarity labor movement founded in 1980.96   
In June of 1989, following reforms decided in the Round Table Talks, Poland 
held a partially free election where the political arm of the Solidarity movement won 99 
of 100 seats in the newly re-established Senate.97  Finally, in the December 1990 general 
election, former Solidarity activist Lech Walesa was elected president, paving the way for 
a series of political and economic reforms.98  Unlike the active suppression in the early 
1980s, by 1990 Russia was no longer exerting its power in Poland against these reforms.  
In Poland, following Russia’s decline, there are some clear initial steps towards 
democratization prior to the first Western trades in 1991—providing support for 
hypothesis 7.   
Russia’s decline presumably created room both for the U.S. to begin trading 
weapons with Poland and for Poland to begin making internal domestic democratic 
reforms.  More information about the relative impact of democratization is available as 
the example is extended temporally through the military and market reforms enacted by 
Poland to join NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004.  The reforms necessary to meet 
admission requirements in these institutions further consolidated Poland’s democracy, 
increased the levels of regime similarity between Poland and the west, and decreased 
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regime similarity between Poland and Russia.  Looking at the pattern of arms trade to 
Poland using NATO accession as a benchmark of regime similarity supports the 
prediction in hypothesis 6 that regime congruity will increase arms trade.  Specifically, 
trade from Russia declines and trade from NATO affiliated western countries increases as 
shown in Table 11.  
 Exporting Country  
NATO Membership France Germany Italy Russia U.K. U.S. Total 
No 0 4 1 176 0 2 183 
Yes 2 14 3 3 2 22 45 
Table 11: Showing Arms Trade Patterns to Poland before and after their NATO 
accession. 
Of the total 228 trade deals to Poland from major power states between 1949-
2010, 176 were between Russia and Poland prior to their accession to NATO.  Through 
these trades, which often included the cutting-edge variants of MiG aircraft and T-series 
tanks—Russia essentially built and maintained Poland’s military throughout the Cold 
War.99  After Poland’s accession to NATO, trade from Russia drops to three relatively 
insignificant trade deals between 1999 and 2010 consisting of 12 transport helicopters 
and 12 light transport aircraft.  Among NATO allies, a similar pattern emerges.  Prior to 
1999 there are only seven trades (described earlier) from a NATO power to Poland.   
The arms trade pattern in Table 11 above shows how increasing regime congruity with 
the West through the democratization steps required for NATO accession affected where 
Poland’s weapons were imported from.  Understanding arms trade behavior is not solely 
                                                 
99 Over the years, (across many makes and models), these trades amounted to: 702 
Air defense systems, 3,728 aircraft, 9,843 armored vehicles, 1,356 artillery pieces, 
57,086 missiles, 164 sensors, and 73 ships.  
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about how many weapons are traded by which countries, but also about what type of 
arms a country is willing to trade under different conditions.  In addition to changes in 
how much and from whom, there were significant changes to the types of equipment 
traded—noticeably contingent on Poland’s alliance membership.  Table 12 looks at the 
differences in the categories of weapons traded between Poland and other members of the 
NATO alliance or Russia to better highlight the changing nature of arms trade behavior 
contingent on Poland’s NATO membership. 
 Poland NATO Member  
 No Yes  
Trade From 
NATO 
Allies 
Russia NATO Allies Russia Total 
Air Defense System 0 702 0 0 702 
Aircraft 26 3704 87 24 3841 
Armored Vehicle 0 9843 461 0 10304 
Artillery 0 1356 8 0 1364 
Engines 300 359 10 0 669 
Missiles 0 57086 1880 0 58966 
Naval Weapons 0 6 0 0 6 
 Other 0 0 313 0 313 
Sensors 0 164 66 0 230 
Ships 3 73 2 0 78 
Total 329 73293 2827 24 76473 
Table 12: Showing Change in Trade as a Result of Alliance Membership.100 
The numbers in Table 12 represent the total number of equipment pieces traded by 
armament category.  Furthermore, these armament categories are fairly broad, for 
example the 24 aircraft traded from Russia to Poland after Poland joins NATO are all 
relatively innocuous light transport airplanes and helicopters versus the 87 aircraft from 
                                                 
100 Although they remained closely politically affiliated with the West and continued 
to militarily support NATO operations, France is excluded in the analysis as a NATO 
ally over the time period between 1966 and 2009 when they technically withdrew 
from the formal alliance. 
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NATO allies, which included some cargo aircraft but also fighter jets, anti-submarine 
helicopters, and UAVs.101  Table 12 highlights in more detail the general effect of 
alliance membership.  The relatively few cross-alliance trades are mostly non-combat 
specific while the intra-alliance trades generally entail more combat-oriented equipment.   
Of all the deals to Poland following the end of the Cold War, the 2003 trade of 48 
F-16s best captures the political calculus inherent in arms trades.  Through participation 
in the PfP, Poland had undertaken numerous civil-military and military reforms in 
preparation for accession to NATO.  Further, NATO specific reforms were undertaken 
following the official invitation to join the alliance in 1997.102   Equipment modernization 
and interoperability requirements became more salient as the bulk of the domestic 
political and military personnel reforms were accomplished.  Following Poland’s 
accession in 1999, and especially apparent during the initial stages of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), their ability to fully participate in alliance operations was lessened by 
their lack of modern equipment.  Although equipment deficiencies were present in all 
areas, the Polish Air Force was especially inadequately equipped to meet the air power 
heavy demands of NATO operations.  Poland’s combat aircraft, which in 2001 consisted 
                                                 
101 Poland’s post-NATO aircraft purchases are as follows: In 2001 Russia traded 12 
An-28TD Bryza-1TDs (a light cargo plane that can be used for close in patrolling and 
reconnaissance).  In two separate deals in 2006 and 2010 Russia traded a total of 12 
Mi-17s (a utility helicopter that can be used for personnel and equipment transport, 
medical evacuation, and, with extensive modification, as a gunship platform).  The 8 
U.S. trades were comprised of 7 C-130s (a medium duty cargo airplane) over two 
deals in 2004 and 2009, 48 F-16s (a fourth generation fighter aircraft) in 2003, 4 
SH-2Gs (an anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare helicopter) in 2001, and two 
separate deals in 2010 amounting to 12 Scan Eagles (a small UAV). 
102 Andrew A. Michta, "Modernizing the Polish Miitary," Defence Studies 2, no. 9 
(2002): 43. 
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of 98 Su-22s, 70 MiG-21s, and 22 MiG-29s, was predominately a Soviet era legacy 
force—only the MiG-29s were remotely modern—and all were in need of expensive 
modernization upgrades.103  Domestic aeronautical production—a casualty of the Soviet 
breakup—had recently failed to deliver a modernized Iryda in 1999 and was incapable of 
manufacturing a fourth generation aircraft that would meet NATO interoperability 
requirements.104  Against competing bids, Poland eventually decided on the U.S. 
Lockheed Martin F-16, but there were competing bids from France (Dassault Mirage 
200-5 Mk II) and Sweden (JAS-39 Gripen).105  While the F-16 received the highest rating 
overall in the Polish test, both the Mirage and the Gripen outperformed it in some 
categories.106  In short, the differences between these three aircraft are marginal.107  
While capability played a role in the final decision, the performance similarities between 
the aircraft were enough that economic and political considerations were able to exert 
considerable influence on the final selection.  Given the importance to understanding how 
great power alliances shape arms trade formation, an in-depth examination at the political 
and procedural process Poland used to select F-16s from among the alternative options is 
warranted. 
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Economically, the three airframes were comparatively priced; the totals in each of 
the contracts were within $500 million of each other.108  Airframe price point parity 
meant that other types of economic inducements—financing and offset agreements—
would play a greater role in Poland’s purchase decision.  All three countries offered 
financing.  The French and Swedish both offered government-backed low-interest 
loans.109  In contrast, the U.S. offer required the Bush administration to work around 
legislation that prevented the Export—Import Board from financing military sales to 
developing countries.110  The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), who 
oversees the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, was able to borrow the money from 
the U.S. Treasury through Section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act.111  Ultimately, this 
enabled the U.S. to make a competitive proposal that offered a fixed rate 13 year loan, an 
estimated 5% interest rate, deferral of payments for eight years, a reduction of exposure 
fees, and the ability to pay down the loan early.112  These economic sweeteners made the 
financing offered for all three airframes comparable; thus, competition turned to 
economic offsets.  All three companies offered various offset agreements, which are 
common in international defense deals; however, in 1999 Poland was unique in that their 
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109 Peter C Evans, "Appendix 13e. The Financing Factor in Arms Sales: The Role of 
Official Export Credits and Guarantees," Military Spending and Armaments  (2002): 
539 Footnote 3. 
110 Ibid., 549. 
111 Ibid., 541. 
112 Seguin, "Why Did Poland Choose the F-16?," 16; Evans, "Appendix 13e. The 
Financing Factor in Arms Sales: The Role of Official Export Credits and Guarantees," 
541-42. 
 
 
 
82
law required offsets to amount to a minimum of 100% of the value of the purchase.113  
The offsets offered by both Dassault and Saab/BAE seemingly met this requirement, but 
because the Polish government independently assesses offset offers using a non-
transparent system of multipliers their offers were assessed as being less valuable than 
Lockheed’s.114  Eventually the economic offsets offered by Lockheed totaled $6.3 billion 
dollars, included a variety of other U.S. industries, and prompted the U.S. ambassador to 
proclaim that, for Poland, it was “the deal of the century.”115  The use of multipliers 
makes strict economic analysis of the role offsets played in Poland’s decision making 
complicated—a point tacitly acknowledged at the time by Saab/BAE.116  All three firms 
had their estimated offset packages devalued, but it is unclear exactly what metrics 
Poland used to calculate the devaluation.  It is easy to speculate that Poland’s political 
motivation to ally itself with the U.S. played an outsized role in the final choice. 
Another indication that Poland was courting the U.S. as a strategic ally at the 
expense of some of its closer European neighbors occurred nearly contemporaneously 
with the signing of this deal when Poland sided with the U.S. in the Iraq war.  This was a 
bold move considering that Poland needed to retain some European political capital as it 
continued to negotiate its entry into the EU.  France and Germany, the dominate 
European power players, clearly opposed the war as evident by the colorful statement by 
French President Chirac’s that “[t]hese countries have been not very well behaved and 
                                                 
113 Michta, "Modernizing the Polish Miitary." 
114 Seguin, "Why Did Poland Choose the F-16?," 21-22. 
115 John Tagliabue, "Lockheed Wins Huge Sale to Poland with Complex Deal," The 
New York Times, April 19th 2003. 
116 Seguin, "Why Did Poland Choose the F-16?," 22, 25. 
 
 
 
83
rather reckless of the danger of aligning themselves too rapidly with the American 
position," and that "[t]hey missed a great opportunity to shut up."117  The selection of the 
F-16 against European competitors and near simultaneous support for the Iraq war firmly 
aligned Poland with the U.S. for the foreseeable future.  To be clear, there is no publicly 
available evidence that supports a tacit or explicit quid pro quo arrangement between the 
U.S. and Poland that the planes were contingent on support for the war in Iraq.  Rather 
both events serve as separate evidence that Poland was trying to put itself in the United 
States security sphere over a more European-centric one.  Although it was unclear at the 
time that the war in Iraq would continue for the next decade, it was exceedingly clear that 
the decision to procure the F-16 (and the investment in Polish industry that accompanied 
it) would link the two countries for decades.  For the Poles, choosing to align with the 
U.S. over their more immediate neighbors through long-term arms procurement may 
have partially reflected their historical experience of relying on European powers (France 
and Britain) for their security in the 1930s.118  
Poland’s decision to more visibly link their security to the U.S. through the F-16 
purchase and the inter-industry trade and investment that accompanied it, highlights a 
way that alliance membership can differ from arms trade in defining security spheres of 
influence.  Specifically, arms trading (especially the large-scale sale of modern major 
weapons systems) more tightly binds countries to the security sphere of the major power 
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they purchase from.  In this case, joining the NATO alliance occurred prior to the F-16 
trade, which suggests that qualitative difference exists between the types of weapons sold 
within in an alliance and outside an alliance.  However, while alliance membership may 
be a necessary condition to be eligible for major weapon systems trade, it does not 
account for either demand or selection.  Demand in Poland was driven by the 
interoperability requirements to participate as a member nation in joint NATO operations.  
This requirement exacerbated the enduring maintenance and performance issues of 
Poland’s existing Soviet era Air Force, and given their lack of an internal aerospace 
industry, made their decision to procure a fourth-generation fighter aircraft through trade 
more likely.  Selecting a suitable airframe among competitors proved a buyer’s market.  
Any of the three airframes would have met the requirements for interoperability, all were 
competitively priced, each included a comparable financing package, and all met the 
specification of Polish law that offsets total 100% of the purchase price.  The near parity 
of offers accentuated Poland’s ability to shape the decision by weighting the desired 
performance characteristics and proposed offset packages.  Both areas allowed political 
calculus to influence the procurement decision, but choosing the U.S. plane would “bring 
an economic and technological stimulus for Poland and strengthen our links with the 
United States.”119  When considering the long-term security implications of the contract, 
Poland’s decision reflected, in part, signaling their preference of security sphere 
alignment.  
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Thus, in Poland and for the greater area of Eastern Europe the decline of great 
power competition that followed Russia’s decline at the conclusion of the Cold War 
created room for new alliance possibilities between Russia’s former security sphere of 
influence and the West.  Democratization and arms trade followed, but democratization 
preceded arms trade from democratic regimes—supporting hypothesis 7.  Poland’s desire 
to participate in the NATO alliance provided further impetus for a series of civil-military 
and interoperability reforms that further increased the levels of regime similarity between 
Poland and the west while decreasing the level of regime similarity between Poland and 
Russia.120  As Poland consolidated its democracy and accordingly, joined NATO and the 
EU, the pattern of weapons trade shifts demonstrably in both who its’ trading partners are 
and what type of equipment is being traded.  In Poland, which for the geographic reasons 
mentioned above is a most likely case, there is strong support for an account of arms 
trade as determined by great power competition and primarily conducted by states with 
similarly aligned domestic regimes and joint alliance memberships.    
NATO Expansion and Arms Trade in the Rest of Eastern Europe 
 
 Looking in depth at the effects of waning great power competition and alliance 
reorientation in Poland demonstrated that decreasing great power competition increased 
the probability of new trade patterns across formerly aligned security spheres prior to a 
formal alliance shift.  Furthermore, the opening of trade preceded an alliance shift, but 
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short lived. 
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the types of equipment traded were qualitatively different contingent on entering into a 
formal alliance.  This suggest that great power competition exerts more of an effect on 
defining trade relationships than alliance membership, but that alliance membership plays 
an important role in defining what is available for trading.  In order to gain more 
information about the changes in trade behavior following the end of the Cold War, and 
to see if the information gained from looking in depth at Poland is broadly generalizable, 
the remainder of Eastern Europe provides a set of cases.  While the end of the Cold War 
was a single event, the alliance realignment of NATO’s post-Cold War expansion 
occurred in four waves.  Finally, there remains a set of states (Belarus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) that are regionally proximate members of 
the former Soviet security sphere who have not accessed to NATO.  By looking at the 
trade behavior across these waves and comparing it to the information gained by looking 
closely at Poland, and also contrasting it against the trade behavior in the states that have 
not joined the NATO alliance, stronger determinations about the relative role of great 
power competition and alliances on the arms trade will be possible.   
The first wave of NATO expansion added the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland in 1999.  The second, in 2004, was considerably larger and added Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.  The third wave in 2009 
added Albania and Croatia.  Finally, Montenegro was admitted in 2017.  There are also 
five countries that are not in NATO though as of late 2018 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Ukraine are in open negotiations with 
the alliance for membership.  The table below compares the change in arms trade 
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behavior to Eastern European states as a result of the end of the Cold War and as a 
function of accession to NATO.  By looking at the mean volume of trade represented in 
TIV and comparing it across both conditions a relative determination about the role of 
great power competition and alliances on the arms trade is possible.   
    Cold War Ended 
    No Yes 
    Importer in NATO Importer in NATO 
    No Yes No Yes 
Exporter 
Russia 44870 . 2923 357 
NATO Allies 903 . 1640 1092 
Table 13: Showing the Change in Trade Volume (TIV) as a result of the End of 
the Cold War and as a Function of Alliance Shift.121 
 
From the data in the table above a couple of conclusions are possible.  While the end of 
the Cold War was a necessary condition for Eastern European states to shift alliances, 
neither the decline of bipolar great power competition at the end of the Cold War nor an 
alliance shift was a necessary condition for arms trades.  In spite of heightened great 
power competition during periods when the Cold War was active, NATO allies traded 
into Eastern European States despite their position within the Russian sphere, and, 
moreover, Russia continued to trade with its former allies after they joined NATO.  The 
table shows that, similarly with the quantitative results presented in the earlier chapter, 
that there was an overall reduction in the volume of the arms trade following the decline 
of the competition of the Cold War.  In Eastern Europe, in line with what was shown by 
                                                 
121 Poland is excluded from these totals to allow the comparison and prevent Poland 
from affecting the analysis. An equality test of the mean TIVs between the U.S. and 
Russian exports to Eastern Europe as a result of the end of the Cold War and as a 
function of joining NATO generates T-Scores of 9.47 and 8.98 indicating that both 
variables have statistically distinguishable effects. 
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the in-depth analysis of Poland, there is a significant change in the volume of arms 
traded.  For example, Russia’s trade during the Cold War totaled 44,870 TIV whereas 
their post-Cold War trade amounted to 3,280 TIV—the majority of which (2,923) was 
traded prior to an alliance shift by the importing state.  Looking at the trade from the pre-
existing major power NATO members as exporters, there is an increase in total arms 
trade contingent on the end of the Cold War but, unlike in Poland, where there was a 
significant increase in the volume of trade following Poland’s accession to NATO, in the 
aggregate there is a slight decrease in the amount of total trade following NATO 
accession.122   
Moving away from the aggregate data to take a closer look at the effect of joining 
NATO is useful to determine if, as seen in Poland, there is a qualitative difference in the 
type of weapons traded between allies.  The series of tables below shows how the nature 
of trade changed over the waves of NATO expansion.  In the first wave there is a 
pronounced effect on trade behavior as a result of joining NATO.  Specifically, Russia’s 
trade declines dramatically and trade from the NATO allied major powers increases.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 For Poland the post-Cold War trade from NATO members amounted to 101 TIV.  
Following Poland’s NATO membership, there was a significant increase to 3,157 TIV. 
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First Wave post-Cold War NATO Member 
expansion 1999 (Poland, Hungary, and Czech 
Republic)  
 
 Before NATO After NATO  
Trade From Russia 
NATO 
Allies 
Russia 
NATO 
Allies 
Total 
Air Defense System 5413 0 0 0 5413 
Aircraft 25799 159 345 1771 28074 
Armored Vehicle 10646 0 0 497 11143 
Artillery 1357 0 0 10 1367 
Engines 70 105 50 85 310 
Missiles 3900 18 0 405 4323 
Naval Weapons 17 0 0 0 17 
 Other 0 0 0 219 219 
Sensors 510 110 0 167 787 
Ships 2285 129 0 240 2654 
Total 49997 521 395 3394 54307 
Table 14: Showing Trade Patterns by Armament Category in the First Wave of 
NATO Expansion. 
 
In the second and third waves (shown in Tables 15 and 16 below), NATO had 
learned from the process of admitting the first wave of countries, and formalized 
procedures.  In 1999, shortly after admitting Poland, Hungry, and the Czech Republic, 
NATO created the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to institutionalize the lessons it had 
learned.  All subsequent states participated in the MAP. 
Countries participating in the MAP submit individual annual national 
programmes on their preparations for possible future membership. These 
cover political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects. 
The MAP process provides a focused and candid feedback mechanism on 
aspirant countries' progress on their programmes. This includes both 
political and technical advice, as well as annual meetings between all 
NATO members and individual aspirants at the level of the North Atlantic 
Council to assess progress, on the basis of an annual progress report.123 
 
                                                 
123 NATO, "Membership Action Plan (Map),” 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm.(Accessed 22 December 
2016) 
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Each of the areas mentioned (political, economic, defense, resource, security, and 
legal issues) has specific sub-points that serve to broadly further liberal democratic 
principles.  The goals for aspiring members are followed by implementation guidance.  
The defense goals include consideration for “[t]he ability of aspiring countries to 
contribute militarily to collective defence and to the Alliance's new missions and their 
willingness to commit to gradual improvements in their military capabilities”, and “to 
pursue standardization and/or interoperability.” 124  Accordingly, in the second wave, the 
pattern of trade shows the same decline from Russia following NATO accession, but for 
trade with allied nations, the increase occurred prior to joining NATO, presumably in 
preparation to meeting the interoperability requirements.  Likewise, in the third wave, 
trade from Russia ceases contingent on accession to NATO, and there is a decrease in 
allied trading.  Furthermore, a third (21.64 TIV) of the allied trading is in the form of the 
U.S. exporting 212 various armored vehicle variants to Croatia—presumably for their use 
in support of Croatia’s ongoing support to the NATO effort in Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
124 "Press Release Nac-S(99) 066: Membership Action Plan (Map)," news release, 
1999, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
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Second Wave post-Cold War NATO Member 
expansion 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia)  
 
 Before NATO After NATO  
Trade From Russia 
NATO 
Allies 
Russia 
NATO 
Allies 
Total 
Air Defense System 2883 237 0 0 3120 
Aircraft 15863 865 0 359 17087 
Armored Vehicle 7337 23 0 42 7402 
Artillery 1016 9 0 3 1028 
Engines 40 184 0 40 264 
Missiles 2808 39 22 13 2882 
Naval Weapons 87 5 0 0 92 
 Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Sensors 620 157 0 176 953 
Ships 3008 499 25 149 3681 
Total 33662 2018 47 782 36509 
Table 15: Showing Trade Patterns by Armament Category in the Second Wave of 
NATO Expansion. 
 
 
Third Wave post-Cold War NATO Member 
expansion 2009 (Albania and Croatia)  
 
 Before NATO After NATO  
Trade From Russia 
NATO 
Allies 
Russia 
NATO 
Allies 
Total 
Air Defense System 14 0 0 0 14 
Aircraft 340 21 0 35 396 
Armored Vehicle 51 1 0 21 73 
Artillery 105 0 0 10 115 
Engines 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 
Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 
Naval Weapons 0 0 0 0 0 
 Other 0 0 0 0 0 
Sensors 6 59 0 0 65 
Ships 230 0 0 0 230 
Total 76 81.25 0 66 893.25 
Table 16: Showing Trade Patterns by Armament Category in the Third Wave of 
NATO Expansion. 
 
In the Eastern European states that have not joined NATO, Russia’s volume of 
trade exceeds the NATO allies.  Looking at a finer level of detail shows that Russia’s 
trade has been almost exclusively focused on building Belarus’s air defense network.  Of 
the eleven trades, valued at 638.16 TIV, from Russia to this subset of Eastern European 
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states, eight are to Belarus.  Together they consist of 500 assorted Surface to Air Missiles 
(SAM) and 16 SAM systems such as the S-300 and the SA-15.125  Russia’s other three 
trades to this block of states were all in the 1990s and consisted of one Mi-34 (a light 
helicopter) to Bosnia, five T-72 Tanks to Georgia, and four Mi-17 transport helicopters to 
Macedonia.  Among the NATO allied nations, 60% of the trade volume occurred 
between the United States and Bosnia in the two years following the end of the Bosnian 
conflict in 1995.  The remainder was spread in small trades across Macedonia, Georgia, 
and Ukraine—there were no trades by either Russia or a NATO ally to either Moldova or 
Montenegro.   
 
Non-NATO East European States (Belarus, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, 
Montenegro126 and Ukraine) 
 
Trade From Russia NATO Allies Total 
Air Defense System 342 0 342 
Aircraft 140 27 167 
Armored Vehicle 4 74 78 
Artillery 0 31 31 
Engines 0 5 5 
Missiles 183 0.25 183.25 
Naval Weapons 0 0 0 
 Other 0 0 0 
Sensors 0 3 3 
Ships 0 4 4 
Total 669 144.25 813.25 
Table 17: Showing Trade Patterns by Armament Category for Eastern European 
States not in NATO. 
 
                                                 
125 The S-300 is a relatively large air defense system designed for long range interdiction 
of enemy aircraft and cruise missiles to defend fixed site facilities, while the SA-15 is a 
shorter range system designed to protect against a wider array of tactical and operational 
air threats such as helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and short range ballistic missile 
threats. 
126 Montenegro joined NATO in June of 2017, but, given the scope of the data present in 
this study and the recency of its accession, it is being considered with the other Non-
NATO Eastern European countries. 
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Looking at the data across the waves of NATO membership makes it clear that 
joining NATO is neither necessary nor sufficient to trade arms.  However, the actions 
taken by potential members to gain membership indicates both a willingness to enact 
domestic policies in concord with liberal democratic norms, and to modernize 
(westernize) the states military—including pursuing interoperability requirements.  In the 
case of Eastern Europe, the effect of joining the NATO alliance does not manifest itself 
as an increase in the volume of trade a new NATO member receives, but rather, in the 
loss of Russia as a arms trading partner.  The patterns of trade do not seem to be as 
rigidly tied to alliance membership as they are contingent on the reorientation of great 
power competition that occurred as a result of Russia’s decline.  Unlike Poland where 
there were relatively few trades across security spheres, the tables above show that in the 
aggregate cross alliance trade occurred frequently though Russia’s trade declined 
precipitously as alliances shifted.  The difference in trade patterns as a result of the wane 
of Russian power at the conclusion of the Cold War is more reminiscent of the pattern 
observed in Poland where there are relatively few trades from the NATO allies into 
Russia’s security sphere prior to 1991. 
Contrasting the effects on trade patterns between alliance membership and great 
power indicates that the potential effect of great power competition is greater.  During the 
Cold War, under bipolarity, arms trade patterns in Eastern Europe were solidly defined 
by great power alignment.  Trade between the NATO allies into Eastern Europe prior to 
the end to the Cold War was restricted to a handful of trades consisting of light or 
transport helicopters and engines.  As the competition of the Cold War ended, trade 
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between NATO allies into the former Soviet security sphere increased.  Russia did not 
cease to be a trading partner after the Cold War but their role as the primary provider of 
combat equipment diminished.  Furthermore, as the former members of its security 
sphere joined NATO Russia’s trade to them further declined.  Among NATO members, 
there is an increase in trade behavior following the reduction of the competition of the 
Cold War.  And in contrast to Poland, there is a slight reduction of trade behavior 
following NATO accession.  This features prominently in the data for states in the second 
and third waves of NATO accession outlined above due to interoperability requirements 
specified as a condition in the Membership Action Plan.  
Conclusion   
 
 In this chapter, I used the end of the Cold War to look directly at how arms 
trading behavior change when there is a decline in great power competition.  A great 
powers’ decline creates new possibilities for trade and also creates new alliance 
opportunities—both of which have hypothesized impacts on the volume of arms traded.  
Opportunities for alliance reorientation are relatively rare because of the stability of great 
powers in the international system.  The expansion of the West’s security sphere into 
former Soviet client states provided a case to look at the effects on arms trade from a 
great powers’ decline and test whether the effect was based more on the impact of 
lessening competition or through alliance expansion.  In both Poland and the rest of 
Eastern Europe, there was a noticeable decrease in the volume of trade following the 
decline of competition between the U.S and the Soviet Union that characterized the Cold 
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War.  As time passed, information about the magnitude of the Russian decline increased, 
creating an opportunity for the U.S. and NATO to begin pursuing alliance expansion.  By 
creating the PfP (and later developing the MAP), NATO clearly signaled its intention to 
expand the alliance into Russia’s former security sphere, as well as, communicating the 
scope of the reforms necessary to potential new members.  Enacting the reforms specified 
by NATO demonstrated commitment to western norms of civil-military relations; it also 
created demand for interoperable weapons and equipment.  Although new markets were 
created under the requirements from modernization, gaining access to these markets can 
be eliminated as the primary motivation for alliance reorientation because of the gravity 
of collective defense.  The change in great power competition precipitated both 
expansions of arms markets into Eastern Europe and new alliance memberships.  The 
evidence supports the hypothesis that the level of great power competition is more 
impactful to the arms trade across the international system than alliances.  In this case, 
the decrease of great power competition decreased the volume of the arms trade overall.  
Alliance reorientation (also made possible through great power realignment) provided 
NATO the opportunity to specify and elicit the adoption of Western norms in the former 
Soviet security sphere.  This increased the levels of regime contiguity and 
democratization.  As predicted, regime contiguity and democratization affected the 
patterns of trade.  In Poland, the types of weapons systems traded to allies were 
qualitatively different.  Poland, whose geographic position made it especially attractive 
for alliance inclusion, was an exceptionally valuable new ally, which may explain why 
this difference is present.  For the majority of Eastern Europe however, the allies traded a 
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higher volume of arms to perspective NATO members before they were formally in the 
alliance.  In part, this can be attributed to the institutionalization of new member 
accession that occurred in the second and third wave of post-Cold War NATO expansion.  
After admitting Poland, Hungry, and the Czech Republic NATO formalized the 
democratic, military, and societal reforms required to join the alliance.  Participating in 
the Membership Action Plan directed interoperability requirements, which presumably 
led to the increase in the volume of trade observed in the data to aspiring members.  Also, 
driving the overall reduction in the volume of the arms trade was the very noticeable 
decrease in Russia’s exporting behavior to newly admitted NATO members. 
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CHAPTER 4: Arab Israeli Conflict 
 
Introduction 
 
On the 6th of October 1973, the observance of Yom Kippur was broken across 
Israel by the sounds of U.S. built McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantoms streaking 
overhead.127  The planes would staunch the attack by Soviet T-62s and T-54s of the 
Syrian and Egyptian armies in the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula.  Between the 6th 
and 24th of October, the weapons technology from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would clash 
repeatedly, causing both superpowers to deepen their commitment to their proxies while 
avoiding direct confrontation with each other.   
In the time period between 1945 and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Middle East 
moved from being a relatively minor front in the old colonial great game to a front in the 
Cold War competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.  Tracing the development 
of the great power alignments in the region presents a story about how arms trade 
relationships arise, and why great powers choose to trade their arms.  The emergent great 
power alignments and the ensuing arms trade relationships in the Middle East during the 
Cold War present a compelling account of the relationship between great power 
competition, alliance formations, and arms trade behavior.  Upon the creation of Israel in 
1948, it was not clear that their eventual great power benefactor would be the U.S.  At the 
start of the time period under consideration, Israel had little to offer, and received 
                                                 
127 Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli 
Defense Force, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 224. 
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minimal military equipment consisting of mostly small arms and WWII surplus.128  
Israel, under constant threat in invasion, had to find ways to make itself valuable as an 
ally to engender their access to the weapons they needed for national defense.  Former 
regional powers such as France and England were reticent to inflame tensions in the 
region that could potentially threaten some of their former colonial holdings by flooding 
Israel with arms.   
Unlike Israel, which had little to offer, the geostrategic nature of the Suez Canal 
enhanced the value of an alliance with Egypt for the Soviet Union, whose naval strategy 
eschewed aircraft carriers in favor of terrestrial basing.  Egypt’s geographic position 
between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea decidedly amplified its value to the 
Soviet Union thereby increasing the likelihood of an arms trading relationship.  
Unsurprisingly, a tacit quid-pro-quo relationship between arms and access developed.  In 
1955, a significant arms deal was struck between Czechoslovakia and Egypt; this was 
followed by Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956.  Both events had strategic 
significance in the region.  The former increased the pressure on Israel to find a source of 
weapons, and the latter increased the stakes for Western aligned powers.   
While the last chapter evaluated the effects of great power competition on arms 
trade when one of the great powers is in decline, this chapter expands the scope of the 
analysis by looking at the arms trade under a period of relative great power parity.  In this 
chapter, the enduring conflict in the Middle East between Israel and its Arab neighbors 
                                                 
128 Notably from Czechoslovakia in 1948 
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will be considered to investigate how major powers exert influence within their security 
spheres through arms trade and military assistance during periods of relative great power 
parity.  Although the historical roots of this conflict extend far into the past, the 
emergence of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as great powers following the Second World 
War created new alliance opportunities in the Middle East and the ensuing competition 
between them is a backdrop for studying the relationship between alliances, great power 
competition, and the arms trade. 
While one of the central features of the arms trade is that it predominately occurs 
within existing alliance relationships, it is also a function of the level of great power 
competition occurring within the international system.  Looking at the Middle East after 
the Second World War offers an excellent case to examine the interplay of many of the 
relationships at work in this study.  The central argument operating in this chapter is that 
arms trade with great powers follows from deliberate efforts by subordinate states to 
model regime similarity to either engender an alliance formation or to strengthen an 
existing alliance.  Additionally, that the threshold for great powers to trade their weapons 
with a subordinate or proxy power is raised or lowered by their perceived stakes in the 
great power competition taking place because of the perceived strategic advantage to be 
gained from their alliances.  This case is useful theoretically because it showcases arms 
trading behavior in a strategically important region during a time period of heightened 
great power competition where the long-standing colonial alliance structures were failing 
and new alliances were possible.   
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Case Selection 
 
Looking at the arms trade in the Middle East is useful as a case for three reasons.  
First, on the supply side both the United States and the U.S.S.R. had geostrategic interests 
in the region due to the abundance of oil reserves and the sea lines of communication 
afforded by the Suez Canal.  Additionally, at least early on, both great powers had a vast 
surplus of weapons from the Second World War.  Furthermore, the Middle East, unlike 
the contestations occurring in Europe and Latin America, was not geographically 
proximate to either power, making the dispute less existential for the superpowers.  
Second, many of the states within the region generally had both high revenue from oil 
sales and a high demand for military equipment.  Lacking wealth and resources prior to 
the relatively late discovery of oil, the region was late to industrialize.  New wealth and 
little organic industry combined with decolonization and a persistent conflict with Israel 
created a steady demand for imported arms.  Third, there is substantial variation in 
domestic political regimes in the region.129  Accordingly, this variation allows a close 
examination of the effects of regime similarity on arms trade relationships.   
The primary hypothesis of this study is that the volume of the international arms 
trade will increase as a function of the competition between great powers.  Over the Cold 
War, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. supported actors in the Middle East with arms, and, 
in the Soviet instance, military advisors.  To assist with isolating the effects of great 
power competition, this case is restricted along the following lines.  First, this case is 
                                                 
129 Some of the variation in regime occurred as a result of clandestine involvement 
from the U.S.   
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temporally restricted from 1955 through 1978.  The selection of dates is always 
debatable.  Starting in 1955 is warranted because: it eliminates any immediate effect of 
the expiration of the British mandate in Palestine; starts after the recognition of the state 
of Israel and the first iteration of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and follows the initial regime 
changes in Syria, Egypt, and Iran.  Ending the case with the Camp David Accords in 
1978 captures much of the competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., includes the 
Yom Kippur war, and provides a convenient historic stopping point.  Ending with the 
Camp David Accords is prudent because the patterns of great power alignment were 
fairly fixed by this stage of the Cold War.  Furthermore, stopping the analysis in 1978 
eliminates the possible effects of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, and early 
attempts at reforming the Communist party.  Second, to mitigate the effect of formal 
alliances, Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, is omitted from the case.  Finally, 
although Iran received the highest volume of trade within the region from the U.S. (the 
CIA’s machinations from the coup d’état in 1953 through the Shah’s ouster in the 1979 
Iranian Revolution explains the majority of this trade), it is omitted from this case study.  
This deliberately focuses this case on the effects of great power competition on the arms 
trade through the lens of the Arab Israeli conflict rather than providing a regional case.  
Background 
 
During the First World War, Britain and France made plans for the post-war 
partition of the Ottoman Empire through the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916).  
Though the boundaries were not as set at the time as they are today, this agreement 
generally established British Mandates in Palestine, Iraq, and Jordan, and a French 
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Mandate in Syria and Lebanon—Egypt, Kuwait, and Qatar were British Protectorates.  
Simultaneously to the reigning European great powers’ decisions regarding how to split 
former Ottoman holdings, the First World War was also providing the impetus and 
opportunity for a resurgence of Arab Nationalism.130  British policy at different times 
encouraged both Jewish and Arab factions to vie for a nation state.  For example, British 
army officer Sir Henry McMahon assured Hussein bin Ali of Arab independence as an 
implicit quid-pro-quo following the First World War in exchange for Arab support 
against the Turks.131  Ultimately Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration 
(Nov 1917) provided official recognition and encouragement from Britain for Jewish 
settlement in Palestine.  The British reversal on Arab independence and their support for 
Zionism in Palestine created grievances that were exacerbated during the reordering of 
international power in the wake of the Second World War.  
Following the Second World War, the Middle East was disrupted through 
decolonization and an influx of Jewish migration.  Guilt among the Western powers over 
the persecution of Jews during the Second World War provided a unique political 
opportunity for the creation of a Jewish home state, which occurred simultaneously with 
the expiration of the British mandate in Palestine on 14 May 1948.  Following the 
creation of the Jewish state of Israel, the Middle East erupted into nearly a continual state 
of conflict between Israel and an Arab bloc predominately comprised of Egypt, Syria, 
                                                 
130 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace : The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Creation of the Modern Middle East, 1st Owl Books ed. (New York: H. Holt, 2001), 
176-79. 
131 Ibid., 173-87. 
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Iraq, Jordan, and Libya.  The latter were unified by a wave of Arab nationalism following 
decolonization, and were aligned within the Soviet sphere of influence.  This alignment 
provided them access to Soviet weapons technologies at reduced rates and especially in 
Egypt, a robust advisory network of Soviet military personnel to assist in their defense.  
Furthermore, the Soviet Union advocated on their behalf through international 
institutions such as the United Nations, buffering them to some degree from the 
international action by Western powers.   
Colonial British and French interests, which had been prevalent in the region for 
decades but were on the decline, were at times at odds with the developing approaches to 
the region by the United States and the Soviet Union.  The former British Mandates in 
Palestine and Transjordan became the battleground for a Jewish homeland.  This placed 
British commitments to allies in the region such as King Abdullah directly at odds with 
their stated support of a Jewish homeland in the Balfour Declaration.  Transjordan’s Arab 
Legion for example was commanded by British officers and paid for with British 
Pounds.132  As Transjordan gained its independence in 1946 and began to assert territorial 
rights to parts of Palestine (another British Mandate), there were obvious conflicts of 
interest for Britain as the day-to-day fighting between Jews and Arabs increased.  
Between 1946, when Transjordan gained its independence, and 1948 when the Mandate 
in Palestine expired, British field forces found themselves on both sides of the nascent 
                                                 
132 Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense 
Force, 67. 
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conflict that would erupt into the First Arab-Israeli War upon Israel’s declaration of 
independence in 1948.   
The First and Second World Wars had left the region with an admixture of 
weaponry and, given many of the Arab armies long standing colonial relationships, most 
of these weapons were in Arab hands.  Estimates put the combined arms of Egypt, Iraq, 
Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon at around 128 artillery pieces, 140 armored cars, 15 tanks, 
and 37 aircraft.133  Israel, on the other hand, initially struggled to acquire arms.  The 
United States, flexing its post-war muscle, enacted and enforced an arms embargo on the 
region that prevented many Western nations from exporting weapons in support of either 
side of the conflict.  Thus, the emerging Israeli army was initially equipped with a variety 
of homemade armored cars, light mortars, and smuggled or stolen equipment.  In May of 
1948, Czechoslovakia, recently coming under Soviet rule and not under the sway of the 
U.S. embargo exported, a variety of small arms including 5,200 machine guns of various 
caliber, 24,500 rifles, and 52,540,000 rounds of ammunition and 25 Messerschmitt 109 
aircraft to Israel.134  Although Israel never gained parity, this infusion of weapons, 
combined with captured equipment and numerous small-scale acquisitions, was enough 
to close the gap. 
At the local level, the enduring conflict between the Arab coalition and Israel 
defined the region.  During the time period under consideration, there are numerous 
historical moments such as the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948, the Six Day War in 1967, 
                                                 
133 Ibid., 78. 
134 Ibid. 
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and the Yom Kippur War in 1973 where the level of hostility rose to a level of an outright 
war.  While these engagements are more widely known, the entire time frame was fraught 
with cross border raids, territorial dispute, irredentist opposition, and military activity.  
Israel’s success in the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948 secured the territorial gains granted 
under the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 and also much of surrounding area that 
had been initially set-aside for Palestinian Arabs.  In the immediate time period following 
the 1948 war, the region underwent a massive demographic transition as Palestinians left 
or were displaced and Jewish settlers immigrated from around the region to Israel.  
Further, more contentious territorial acquisitions followed the 1967 Six Day War.  In this 
conflict, Israel gained territory from Egypt (the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula), 
Jordan (the West Bank), and Syria (the Golan Heights).   
Israel’s decisive victory in 1967 destroyed much of the conventional combat 
capabilities of the Arab coalition—particularly Egypt—forcing them to employ new 
strategies.  Furthermore, Israel’s capture of the entirety of the Sinai Peninsula was 
humiliating for Egypt.  Almost immediately, Egypt began a employing an attrition 
strategy against Israeli forces who had dug into defensive positions (the Bar Lev Line) 
along the Eastern coast of the Suez Canal.  The War of Attrition mostly consisted of a 
combination of artillery and mortar attacks, small arms exchanges, commando raids, and 
limited aerial engagements that allowed Egypt to put steady pressure on the Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF).  As Egypt regained martial capacity, through a steady infusion of 
Soviet weapons and advisors, their audacity increased.  In a particularly active period 
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during the spring of 1969, Egypt launched 475 attacks in April and another 231 in May 
resulting in 43 killed and 103 wounded.135   
The cross-border back-and-forth between Egypt and Israel continued until the 
Yom Kippur War in October of 1973.  In this iteration of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt, 
catching Israel by surprise on the most holy day of the Jewish year, was able to make 
some early territorial gains crossing the Suez and penetrating the Bar Lev line.  Nearly 
simultaneously, Syria attacked near simultaneously in the Golan Heights placing Israel in 
a double envelopment.  Israel, however, was able to rapidly mobilize their reserves and 
successfully counterattacked.  By the end of October, the Israeli army had pushed the 
Syrians out of the Golan Heights and was actively shelling Damascus; and, on the 
Egyptian front, the IDF had encircled the 3rd Egyptian Army.136  Following a trend that 
started when Sadat ended the Soviet advisory effort in 1972, the Yom Kippur War 
punctuated a general decline of Soviet influence in the region.  Additionally, as the 1970s 
progressed, there were increased indications that Israel had developed nuclear capability, 
which also changed regional dynamics.  By the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egypt was 
willing to negotiate directly with Israel.  Israel in turn, ceded the Sinai Peninsula back to 
Egypt reestablishing their pre-1967 borders and paving the way for The Egypt–Israel 
Peace Treaty in 1979. 
The shifting nature of great power politics following the Second World War was 
evident in the Suez crisis in 1956, which brought together an alliance of former regional 
                                                 
135 Ibid., 212. 
136 Ibid., 236. 
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powers France and Britain with Israel.  These former colonial powers however, were past 
their prime.  Israel wanted a great power backer to compete against an Arab faction 
backed by the Soviet Union.  Given the Soviet backing of the Arab states and the absence 
of another superpower capable of countering the U.S.S.R., and, given the Soviet backing 
of the Arab states, Israel was predisposed toward pursuing a relationship with the U.S. by 
the nature of the bipolar international system.  Although the U.S. was preoccupied with 
other global commitments—notably the Vietnam War—the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
forged an enduring relationship between the U.S. and Israel.137  Israel had sought to 
increase its importation of U.S. arms during the 1960s and the U.S. had traded a limited 
amount of arms with Israel prior to 1967; the 1967 war shifted Israel’s primary source of 
weapons from France to the United States.138   
Following the 1967 war, during the War of Attrition (1969-1970), both the Arab 
coalition and Israel deepened their dependence on their great power benefactor for 
weapons, and, particularly in the Arab case, for direct military assistance.  The enduring 
low-grade conflict on the Sinai Peninsula and Suez Canal created a steady demand for 
weapons.  Also, in the Egyptian case, their massive equipment losses in the 1967 conflict 
necessitated rearmament.  Weapons alone were not enough.  In response to Israel’s nearly 
unopposed air superiority, Egypt’s security relationship with the Soviet Union went 
beyond weapons.  Sophisticated Soviet air defense technology, in some cases manned by 
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an active Soviet advisory effort, appeared in the Suez Canal region by 1970.139  In all, the 
Soviet Union would deploy 32,000 soldiers to help their beleaguered Egyptian ally 
during the period between the Six Day War and the end of their advisory efforts in 1972. 
140  Further, the Egyptian experience fighting the Israeli Air Force during the War of 
Attrition would enable their initial tactical success in the Yom Kippur War (1973).   
In contrast to the decisive Israeli victory of the Six Day War, the outcome of Yom 
Kippur War (6-25 October, 1973) was more ambiguous.  The initial phases of the war 
largely caught the Israelis by surprise.  The Egyptians were able to successfully cross the 
Suez Canal, overrun Israeli defensive positions, and impose massive equipment losses.141  
Furthermore, unlike the previous iterations of the conflict, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) 
faced formidable air defense batteries that employed a combination of Soviet SAM-2, 
SAM-3, and SAM-6 systems.142  In addition to the modern equipment, these batteries 
were manned by Soviet trained crews and had the benefit of their recent operational 
experience against the IAF during the War of Attrition.  Israel’s initial efforts to 
counterattack with an armored force were thwarted by dismounted infantry employing 
shoulder fired anti-tank missiles.143  Similarly on the Golan front against the Syrians, the 
Israelis, facing a combination of helicopter mobile commando raids, armored forces 
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employing the venerable Soviet T-62 tank, and dismounted infantry employing tank-
killing shoulder fired munitions, initially lost ground and suffered heavy losses before 
successfully mounting a counterattack.144  Nevertheless, by the cease fire at the end of 
October, Israel had recaptured the ground lost in the Golan Heights, had staunched the 
penetration across the Suez in the Sinai, and was threatening destruction of the Egyptian 
3rd Army.145   
During the Yom Kippur War, great power commitment to their proxies’ security 
was evident.  Massive early equipment losses on both sides prompted resupply efforts. 
Both great powers resupplied their respective proxy sending a clear political signal 
regarding their resolve to their allies as the United Nations sought to impose a cease-fire.  
The outcome of the Yom Kippur War in retrospect foreshadowed changes to the great 
power relationships across the region that in some ways had already begun.  Prior to the 
war in 1972, Soviet reluctance to furnish Egypt with offensive weapons had prompted 
Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat to ask the Soviet Union to withdraw its extensive 
advisory effort.146  Following the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, Sadat had also 
indicated a willingness to work more closely with the United States towards a peaceful 
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resolution with Israel.147  Unfortunately, these negotiations were unable to prevent the 
outbreak of the 1973 hostilities.  The high wartime losses, combined with the 
deterioration of Egypt-Soviet relations, did create increased diplomatic space for a more 
active U.S. involvement in the peace process.  In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger actively sought to facilitate negotiations between the 
combatants.148  This would lead to a series of peace negotiations between Israel and 
Egypt that eventually returned the Sinai to Egypt, split Egypt from the Arab coalition, 
and garnered the first recognition of the state of Israel from an Arab state.  Against the 
background of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, and with the 
lessening American commitment to the Vietnam War, the reduction of hostilities 
following the Yom Kippur War can be seen as part of a larger global waning of Cold War 
great power competition.   
Discussion 
 
Of the hypotheses under consideration in this case, some stand out more than 
others.  Specifically, this study’s primary hypothesis, that great power competition will 
increase the volume of arms sales is further expanded through the historical details 
provided in this case.  In the quantitative analysis, it was found that when the U.S. held a 
higher proportion of material power vis-à-vis their great power competitor, there was an 
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overall decrease on the volume of arms trade across the international system.149  In this 
case the enduring local conflict in the Middle Eastern region is squarely juxtaposed 
against the larger backdrop of the superpower competition of the Cold War.  In the 
Middle East during this period of increased great power competition, and with a 
persistent ongoing regional conflict, high levels of arms trade are expected.  Also, this 
case offers a closer look at how regime similarity, democratization, and alliances affect 
the volume of arms traded.  Earlier statistical analysis showed that both regime similarity 
(hypothesis 6), active conflict (hypothesis 4), and formal alliances (hypothesis 3) had 
positive and statistically significant effects on the volume of arms traded.  Clearly, these 
variables have a high degree of endogeneity—making conclusions about their exact 
effects on the basis of quantitative analysis alone difficult.  In this case however, it is 
possible to disaggregate some of the effects from these variables on the ensuing changes 
to the volume of arms traded.  This case will look extensively at the intertwined process 
of regime congruity and alliances on the volume of arms traded to clarify the effects 
found in the earlier analysis.    
Second, on the surface, the prediction that arms trade will be highest between 
major powers and mid-range powers (hypothesis 2), appears to be operating in this case.  
Given the lack of strong support for this hypothesis in the quantitative analysis however, 
this support must be discounted.  The specific narrowing of the time period and countries 
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under study within this case requires us to consider the support for hypothesis 2 as merely 
anecdotal.  Accordingly, hypothesis 2 is not considered in depth.  
Table 18 below shows that trade across the region was extensive over the time 
period from 1955-1978.  As expected by the history outlined above, U.S.S.R. and the 
United States are the predominant exporters and their primary recipients are their 
respective regional proxies.  Between 1955 and 1978, Israel accounted for approximately 
6% of the total TIV of U.S. arms export which was 25% of the total U.S. arms trade 
within the Middle Eastern region.150  During the same time period, 8% of the total TIV of 
the Soviet Union’s arms exports went to Egypt, 9% to Syria, and 6% to Iraq, and, 
between the three, accounted for 34% of the total value of Russia’s arms exports 
globally.151  
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Table 18: Showing the trade across the Middle East Region from 1955 to 1978. 
As predicted by hypothesis 6, regime congruity strongly predicts trade 
relationships.  In many of the Arab states during the time period under consideration, 
regime similarity is particularly heightened by their relatively recent overthrow of 
colonial rule.  The Soviet Union offered a source of arms that was free from colonial 
baggage; and furthermore, Arab socialism shared an ideological core with Soviet 
communism.152  Support to Israel is more difficult to pin down.  Israel’s democratic 
Knesset is ostensibly aligned with western democratic norms, but at least in the early 
years, the United States favored diplomatic resolutions over arming the Jewish state.153   
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By the Yom Kippur war, Prime Minister Meir clearly understood that trade with 
the U.S. was partly a function of adhering to democratic norms as evidenced by her 
election not to launch a preemptive strike in spite of increasing evidence of another round 
of Arab hostilities.154  While regime congruity explains some of the patterns on arms 
trade in the region, the prevailing explanation for the volume is the level of great power 
competition.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that great power competition will create increased 
volume in armament trade.  The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were in an intense global 
competition during the time under consideration (1955-1978).  While Europe figured 
more prominently in this competition, the Middle East played an important role for a 
variety of reasons.   
Geographically the region occupied a strategically important position on the 
southern flank of the U.S.S.R., and could affect access to the Suez Canal.  Second, the 
abundant oil reserves increased the importance of the region as a strategic ally.  The first 
reason was of greater concern to the Soviets then to the U.S; they were more affected by 
the geostrategic considerations.  The region is closer to them in terms of proximity.  Also, 
the Soviet navy’s failure to adopt aircraft carriers compelled them to seek land bases that 
could counter the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.155 For the 
Soviets, countering U.S. influence in the region generated a requirement for basing, and 
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the requirement for basing in turn created a Soviet dependency in the region for terrestrial 
access, which ultimately led them to exchange armament and general military support.   
Understanding the role of great power competition in the United States’ 
relationship with Israel is less straightforward.  Unlike other states in the region, Israel 
lacked abundant oil reserves.  The United States’ supported the plan outlined in U.N. 
Resolution 181 for the partition of the former British mandate in Palestine into separate 
Arab and Jewish entities—with an internationally controlled Jerusalem.156  However, 
recognition of the state of Israel was a decision fraught with great power political 
implications.  In a memorandum urging an early recognition from President Truman of 
the Jewish State dated May 9th, 1948, “take[ing] this action before the Russians” is 
directly mentioned in order to avoid the “diplomatic defeat” of the Russians going first.157  
Although recognition of Israel in advance of the expiration of the British mandate in 
Palestine would not be forthcoming, President Truman wasted no time following its 
cessation.  On the same day the mandate concluded (May 14th, 1948), the United States 
recognized the provisional state of Israel.158  On the 15th of May, the Arab states of 
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Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Egypt declared war on Israel.  In an effort to 
promote peace, the United States enacted an arms embargo on the region.159  Israel 
needed weapons, and Czechoslovakia—a recent Soviet satellite state—filled the void 
with a large quantity of WWII surplus weapons.  This early trade highlights that the 
eventual alignment between Israel and the West was not a forgone conclusion at the 
outset.  Furthermore, the use of Czechoslovakia as proxy for the Soviet Unions’ 
machinations in the region would be repeated in a massive arms deal to Egypt in 1955.  
The changing nature of great power alignments make this case all the more useful for 
drawing conclusions about the role of regime similarity, alliances, and great power 
completion on arms trade behaviors. 
Israel survived the initial attack on its sovereignty, and for a time was able to 
cautiously court both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as great power benefactors.160  
Surrounded on all sides by hostile neighbors, Israel’s immediate focus was local, and 
maintaining relations with both powers was a foreign policy that maximized possible 
sources and options for both military and domestic support.  Ultimately the structural 
features of bipolarity sharpened the competition between great powers during the Cold 
War and made this position untenable in the long run.  Both Israel and its Arab neighbors 
looked to great powers in their attempts to rearm following the open hostilities of the 
1948 Arab-Israeli War.  As noted by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a letter to 
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Representative Jacob K. Javits, when the Security Council lifted the arms embargo in 
August 1949, Britain resumed fulfilling its preexisting treaty obligations to supply 
weapons for security requirements to many of its former (Arab) colonial holdings 
alarming Israel.161  However, Acheson also noted that “[a]t the time the Security Council 
arms embargo was lifted, the United States and Great Britain stated that they did not wish 
to see an arms race develop in the Middle East.”162  Shortly after this letter was penned, 
in a joint effort between the old and upcoming bastions of western power, the United 
States, France, and Britain issued the Tripartite Declaration on the 25th of May 1950 to 
limit the burgeoning arms race and recognize borders in the region.163   
For the outside powers, the overarching purpose of the declaration was to try and 
frame their arms sales into the region as in support of the status quo, and accordingly, in a 
manner such that neither the Arab nor the Israeli side would be alienated and further 
ingratiate itself within the Soviet sphere.164  For Israel the status quo was untenable.  The 
Israelis needed an advantage in technologically sophisticated weapons to offset their 
numerical weakness—their days of pragmatically occupying the middle ground between 
the Soviet and U.S. sphere of influence had come to an end.   
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The Korean War heightened the growing competition of the Cold War and 
provided a pretense for Israel to signal its preference for western alignment, and, on July 
4th, 1950, the Knesset voted for a resolution condemning North Korea.165  This 
represented a decisive step away from the pragmatic policy of working with both 
superpowers.  On July 31st, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, in an impromptu meeting with 
the U.S. Ambassador James McDonald and relayed to Dean Acheson by Telegram, 
explicitly discussed his desire to build an Israeli army armed with U.S. weapons that 
would be willing to aid the U.S. and its western allies in opposing Russian bellicosity.166  
Israel’s pro-western overtures did not immediately yield the results they hoped for—
namely access to U.S. offensive armaments.  Part of the problem lay in Israel’s informal 
policy of reprisals.  The U.S. was on the verge of initiating an arms deal with Israel in 
December 1955 when the Israelis launched a reprisal raid into Syria killing 50.167  In a 
cable to the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, James Moose Jr. the U.S. Ambassador 
to Syria recommended a “(1) public statement in Washington condemning Israeli 
aggression, (2) full US support for unequivocal Security Council resolution condemning 
Israeli attack, (3) disapproval of sale of US arms to Israel and (4) effective reduction US 
bilateral aid to Israel.”168  Furthermore, Moose cautioned that the sale of arms to Israel 
would cause resentment “so profound that for all practical purposes Syria can thereafter 
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be considered and unfriendly country, whether the Communist take over or not.”169  As a 
consequence, the deal was canceled and the U.S. continued a cautious policy of arms 
trade into the region, and especially to Israel to prevent pushing the Arab states into 
Soviet hands.   
The Israelis had decided to cast their lot with the West but by the early 1950s, had 
not been able to establish the trade relationships they wanted with the U.S. for weapons.  
Meanwhile, the overall competition of the Cold War was increasing, and the U.S., 
Britain, and France were battling Russia for influence among the Arab countries.  Pro-
Western overtures to assure regional interests, such as Plan Alpha and the Baghdad Pact, 
were constructed to court Arab regimes, leaving Israel uncertain of its security.  Further, 
part of the problem Israel had in arranging access to weapons was self-inflicted.  Israel’s 
strategy of retaliatory raids was contested domestically, condemned internationally in the 
United Nations, and limited the willingness of Western powers to engage in arms trade.  
Additionally, these raids also effectively pushed Egypt to seek further armaments.   
The Suez crisis in 1956 foreshadowed the trajectory of regional alignments.  As 
predicted by hypothesis 6, regime congruity increases the likelihood of arms trade.  In 
this case, following a series of particularly devastating retaliatory raids along the Gaza 
Strip in 1954-1955, Nasser formalized Egypt’s relations with the U.S.S.R. and signed an 
arms trade deal with Czechoslovakia (a Soviet proxy) for an unprecedented volume of 
armaments.170  Given that both great powers were working with Egypt and supplying 
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them with weapons up until this point, this decision represented a deliberate choice by 
Nasser to ally with the Soviet Union—a choice made easier by the alignment of political 
regimes.  Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, though legal, was 
financially a move against longstanding investments by the West—specifically Britain 
and France.171  Furthermore, Egypt’s receipt of $250 millions worth of arms from the 
Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia in 1955 was another indicator of emerging alliance 
patterns.172  Because of the dichotomous features of alliance alignment patterns under 
bipolarity, Egypt’s political actions during the Suez crisis alienating the West and 
aligning with the U.S.S.R., and their hostile relationship with Israel, Israel’s western 
orientation was ensured.  
Israel wanted a great power alliance that would in part assure its security through 
the provision of weapons; the U.S. was reluctant, so Israel started to look elsewhere.  
France’s growing Algeria problem provided a pretext for Israeli overtures, but Nasser’s 
federalization of the Suez Company in 1956 provided Israel an international crisis to 
leverage as a signal of their Western alignment in pursuit of their grand strategy of 
obtaining a great power arms trading partner.  Against the competition of the Cold War, 
the Suez Crisis further polarized the emergent relationships in the region between a 
Western supported Israel and a Soviet sponsored Arab alliance (comprised predominantly 
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of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq).  The regional competition between these factions was an outlet 
for the larger pattern of great power competition, and resulted in a nearly constant state of 
warfare.  In a series of vignettes presented below, specific features of the arms trade will 
be explored in depth to highlight the interaction between the Cold War competition of the 
superpowers and the regional tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors.   
Israel-France and the Suez Crisis  
 
 By the middle of the 1950s, cross boarder skirmishing was common between 
Egyptian and Israeli forces stationed on the Gaza Strip, military operations were 
escalating in their audacity, and there were competing factions within the Israeli 
government regarding the strategy Israel needed to ensure its security.173  The election of 
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in 1955 was a referendum in support of a more militarized 
strategy.174  Nearly simultaneously to the election and following the withdrawal of British 
forces from the Canal Zone, pressure was increasing on Israel to find a Great Power 
alliance that would bolster its security.  Egypt, facing similar pressure, secured the tacit 
backing of Russia when Czechoslovakia infused its military with a massive supply of 
armaments.  More important than the material gains though, was that this trade firmly 
entrenched Egypt in the Soviet security sphere, and from the standpoint of great power 
competition, established a Soviet foothold into the Middle East.  Israel found itself in a 
political space where lacking the security assurances of a great power benefactor, its 
survival as an independent state was continuously threatened.  Israel’s immediate strategy 
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(security through tit-for-tat small-scale offensive raids and border security) required 
weapons, and its grand strategy (solidifying their existence as a Jewish state in the 
region) required a great power benefactor.   
 Prime Minister Ben-Gurion made procuring arms a centerpiece of his 
administration.  Balance of power politics would predict that, given the Soviet alliance 
with Egypt and the emerging bipolarity of the international environment, Israel’s alliance 
possibilities would be oriented to the West.  The history, in this case, vindicates the 
prediction.  By the mid-1950s, Israel was rapidly trying to right the imbalance of power 
caused by the Soviet arms deal to Egypt by courting western powers—namely Britain, 
France, and the United States.  Ironically, Israel’s arms in their war for independence had 
been acquired primarily through Czechoslovakia with the same tacit support of the 
U.S.S.R. that Egypt was now experiencing.  Israel also had a robust population of eastern 
European Jews with ties to their former homeland.  In other words, Israel’s alliance with 
the West was not a forgone conclusion; nevertheless, in spite of these features, once 
Egypt became the benefactor of Soviet arms, the parliament in Israel eschewed Russia as 
a source for further armaments.   
Britain, as a vestige of its former colonial standing in the region, had broad 
interests in both Egypt (through its investments in the Suez Canal), in the territory it 
formerly administered (Palestine now Israel), and in Jordan.  Ernest Bevin, who served as 
Britain’s Foreign Secretary from 1945-1951, pursued a non-interventionist strategy in the 
 
 
 
123
Middle East, to preserve what was left of the British Empire.175  In practice this meant 
retaining a financial and managerial stake in Middle Eastern oil fields and refineries, and 
preserving to the greatest extent possible, the network of military bases in the region.176  
British bases (Suez in particular) stretched throughout the region controlling the 
Mediterranean and offering strategic airfields and land bases in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, 
and Transjordan.177  The British the grand strategy was to retain access by retaining Arab 
support; accordingly, they were reluctant to enter into arms trades with Israel.  The U.S., 
at this early stage in the Cold War, was more occupied on the emerging balance of 
nuclear power, and was still reeling from its recent foray into regional conflicts on the 
Korean peninsula.  
France, embroiled in a colonial conflict in Algeria, was suspicious of Nasser’s 
involvement there.  At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nasser, who at this time was 
seen as a leading figure within the Arab world, had overtly supported the independence 
of Algeria.178  Moreover, Ahmed Ben-Bella, an Algerian rebel leader, was being provided 
quarter in Cairo, and the French government suspected that this relatively benign support 
was being complemented by more direct support in the form of the provisioning of 
arms.179  France’s growing quagmire in Algeria and their growing suspicion of Nasser 
increased their willingness to negotiate arms trade with Israel.  Maintaining control of 
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French Algeria constituted France’s main interest in the region at this point.  Unlike 
Britain, whose population in the Middle East was mostly comprised of soldiers and 
bureaucrats, France had a significant population of French citizens living in Algeria, and 
Algeria was considered a part of France.  The Algerian War (1954-1962) was thus the 
focal point of France’s Middle Eastern policy, and Israeli leaders knew that in the minds 
of the French, there was a direct link between Nasser and the Algerian rebels.  Shimon 
Peres, the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, put a fine point on the 
issue to Ben-Gurion, which was latter recorded in his diary, that for the French “failure in 
the Suez is tantamount to failure in Algeria.”180   
In the spring of 1956, Israel and France had entered into an agreement that would 
deliver new Mystère jets and AMX-13 tanks in return for intelligence sharing and 
possible participation in military action in support of French efforts in Algeria.181  
France’s decision to initiate arms sales to Israel is this case provides support to 
hypotheses 4.  Hypothesis 4 stipulates that arms trade from major powers to subordinate 
powers will increase during periods of conflict when the subordinate power is involved as 
an ally in that conflict.  In this case, decision to was to start trading arms as an implicit 
quid pro quo for support in the major powers regional campaign.  The Algerian crisis 
created a common enemy for France and Israel.  Egypt was overtly aggressive towards 
Israel, and France saw Nasser as providing direct support to the Algerian rebels.  Israel’s 
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leaders saw the benefit of a common enemy and deliberately framed their involvement in 
French operations as a way to gain increased access to French armaments.  
This vignette highlights an especially important feature of arms trade behavior 
because except for the degree of involvement in a regional conflict, France mirrored 
Britain.  Both were major powers with comparable military-industrial complexes, both 
were former powers in the region that had seen a loss of their influence in the region 
following the Second World War, and both were similar in their domestic political 
regimes.  Britain’s dual strategy of trying to maintain its financial and military interest in 
the region by transitioning from colonial power to Arab partner limited their ability to 
side with Israel, and their relationship with the U.S. (the U.S. had withdrawn its funding 
from the Aswan dam prompting Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal in the first place), 
prevented them from fully supporting the Arabs.  For France, the Algerian crisis served to 
lower barriers against trading with Israel because the immediate need for alliance 
reassurances exceeded the potential consequences of exacerbating Arab Israeli tensions.  
Additionally, this vignette occurs early in the historical period under study—at a point 
when the great power competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was increasing.  
Accordingly, in support of hypothesis 1, as the level of great power competition 
increased, arms trade behavior increased.  Russia, whose interests in the region were 
driven by their need for basing, moved to supply Egypt (among others) with a variety of 
weapons technology.  This influx of weapons created an existential crisis for Israel who 
looked abroad for a trading partner.  Israel’s possible trading partners were constrained to 
some degree by the emerging bipolarity on the Cold War, which provides additional 
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clarity into the process behind hypothesis 6.  This hypothesis stipulates a positive 
relationship between regime congruity and the volume of arms trade.  In this vignette, 
there is evidence of a clear interaction between the structure of the international system—
and the balancing behavior it predicts—and the relationship between regime congruity 
and arms trade relationships.   
Specifically, regime congruity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to 
trade arms, but is often correlated with arms trade relationships because of the 
competitive implications of balancing behavior.  As competition increases, the impetus 
for balancing through the proliferation of arm increases but is to some degree constrained 
to similar minded political regimes.  The level of competition between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. had not yet risen to a level where the U.S. or Britain was willing to signal its 
alliance preference for Israel through arms trade.  In this vignette, France was trying to 
maintain control of Algeria, and assumed that Nasser was working in support of Algerian 
rebels.182  To further its intelligence collection and operational reach, France sought to 
further its alliances in the region by supplying arms to Israel.  Active involvement in the 
Algerian conflict lowered barriers to arms trade for France, whose direct interest in the 
region made them more politically salient then either Britain or the United States.  As 
competition increased over the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia arms trade within their 
respective security spheres increased.  
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The June 1967 Six Day War 
 
 In contrast to the situation during the Suez crisis, by the outset of the Six Day War 
in 1967, the alignment between the superpowers and the participants in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was clearly defined.  The Soviet Union had established alliances among many of 
the Arab nations within the Middle East—and notably with Israel’s most pressing threats, 
Egypt and Syria.  Furthermore, Russia was also consolidating its regional influence by 
favoring the creation of subordinate alliances such as the Egypt-Syria Defense 
Agreement in 1966.183  In other words, the Soviet strategy of establishing a security 
sphere in the Middle East through arms sales remained the status quo.  Israel however 
was faced with a mounting problem.  Since their partnership in the Suez crisis, France 
had become Israel’s leading source of high-end military armaments, including 72 Mirage 
IIICs.184  The loss of Algeria in 1962 changed France’s foreign policy aims in the region.  
De Gaulle’s France resumed its diplomatic relations with the larger Arab Middle East 
while continuing delivery (including a clutch shipment of repair parts on June 7th) of 
already purchased military goods.185  With Algeria gone, France’s stakes in the region 
were lessened, and rather than siding with Israel at the risk alienating the Arabs, France 
began perusing a broader, ostensibly more neutral strategy in the  Middle East.  Although 
France’s arms trade relationship with Israel did not end in 1962, their unwillingness to 
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take Israel’s side in a crisis was clear—France would advocate neutrality during the Six 
Day War.  Critically, this policy left Israel uncertain of future weapons trades, and also, 
without a great power alliance to stanch the Soviets regional hegemonic ambitions.   
Access to arms was always a pressing issue to Israel for two interrelated reasons.  
First, Israel is undermanned in comparison to their Arab rivals.  To mitigate this at the 
national level, Israel mandated military service, effectively employed a tiered reserve 
system that made full use of the population, and maximized the advantages of interior 
lines to distribute personnel and resources in a mutually supportive defensive scheme.  
However, given the continual influx of Soviet equipment into their Arab neighbors, 
Israel, without a continued source of advanced artillery, airplanes, and mechanization 
would increasingly become disadvantaged in their ability to employ large-scale offensive 
maneuver warfare.  Israel’s position in the Middle East—surrounded on all sides by 
hostile countries—implied continual beleaguerment and the balance of forces favored the 
Arab coalition.  At the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967 for example, Israel could 
muster between 250,000 and 275,000 soldiers (180,000 to 200,000 of which were 
reservist).186  But the differences in manpower were not staggering, Arab forces, in 
comparison, numbered 22,000 Iraqis, 56,000 Jordanians, 65,000 Syrians, and between 
100,000-130,000 Egyptians.187  In terms of equipment however, the Arabs had an 
                                                 
186 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle 
East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 168, 71. Van Creveld, The Sword and 
the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force, 176. 
187 Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 180-
81. Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense 
Force, 137. 
 
 
 
129
advantage.  Israel fielded 1,100 tanks, 756 artillery systems, and 250 planes as opposed to 
the Arab coalitions’ 1,400 tanks, 1,350 artillery systems, and over 400 airplanes.188   
 At this point in the Cold War, Israel’s choices for a great power alliance and a 
source of weapons that could counter the Soviet technology flowing into their 
adversaries’ hands were constrained to one.  In the spring of 1967, as Nasser’s 
machinations pointed toward war, the Israeli government sought assurances from the U.S.  
The Johnson administration’s position was vague.  Both President Johnson and Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk made it clear in May that Israel should not take preemptive action 
against Egypt, and should give diplomacy some time to resolve the mounting crisis.  
Furthermore, the Western powers were actively working to find a diplomatic or limited 
use of force action to reopen the Straits of Tiran.  In the Israeli General Staff however, a 
Schlieffen plan type of logic was at work.  Egypt was rapidly moving war material and 
forces into the Sinai—every day that passed in negotiations strengthened Egypt’s 
position.  In their second entreaty to the U.S. in June, Israel sent the director of Mossad 
Meir Amit to confer with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara instead of sending a 
diplomat to the State Department.189 Critically, Israel wanted assurances that America 
would provide diplomatic support in the United Nations, that the U.S. would back Israel 
in the event the Soviets intervened on behalf of the Arabs, and that the U.S. would 
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increase its weapons trade to replenish Israel’s arsenal.190  Amit was not seeking and did 
not receive a direct assurance, but based on his recollection of the conversation, and 
verified subsequently in a telephone conversation between Prime Minister Eshkol and 
President Johnson, it was clear that the U.S., at least tacitly, supported military action by 
Israel.191   
While the counterfactual is unknowable, it is quite plausible that Israel would not 
have proceeded in its preemptive air campaign, which utterly destroyed the Egyptian Air 
force and is widely credited for winning the war, without the backing of the U.S.  In 
many respects, Egypt had already forced their hand; however, the implicit backing of the 
U.S. lowered the inherent risk of military action.  What is clear, is that the obliteration of 
the Egyptian Air Force, in spite of their seemingly formidable Soviet supplied air defense 
capabilities, was the critical element of what became an unequivocal Israeli victory.  It is 
also clear that the 1967 war changed the pattern of arms trade between the U.S. and 
Israel.  As shown in Figure 4 below, prior to the 1967 war, France primarily provided 
Israel’s armaments.  Following the 1967 war, France essentially ceases to supply Israel 
with weapons, and the U.S. becomes Israel’s primary supplier of arms.  Also, evident in 
Figure 4, is that the overall volume of trade increases dramatically following 1967.  
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 5 this trend was also occurring within the Soviet’s Arab 
security sphere.  Taken together these graphs provide some evidence of a causal pathway 
operating behind the predication of hypothesis 1.  
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Figure 4: Showing Armament Trade to Israel from the U.S. and France from 1954 to 
1976.   
 
 
Figure 5:  Showing Armament Trade to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq from the U.S.S.R. from 
1954 to 1976.   
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The behavior of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R and their respective security 
spheres in the Middle East during the period surrounding the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
shows a way that increased great power competition causes an increase in arms trade.  
When great power competition is high, as predicted under bipolarity, the stakes for the 
great powers in regional contests are higher because the loss of a regional ally or the loss 
of a regional war increases the power of the great power rival.  Under multipolar 
conditions, the ebb and flow of power from a regional loss would be more diffuse across 
the various great power rivalries.  Furthermore, the increased great power competition 
occurring under bipolarity in 1967 created an environment that favored mid-range 
conflict.  Subordinate states under the security hierarchy of a great power benefactor such 
as Israel or Egypt could increase their levels of hostility vis-à-vis one another without 
risking complete defeat.  Accordingly, great powers are willing to enter into regional 
conflict through proxies as part of their strategy to strengthen their bloc, and regional 
powers are able to leverage the rivalry to enhance their security position through arms 
trades and security assurances.   
There is however, a potential cost for great powers involved in regional conflicts.  
In this case, the 1967 war increased both powers’ arms trade and activity in the region.  
The Soviets essentially rebuilt the Arab (and in particular the Egyptian) military after the 
war.  As shown in Figure 5 above, Soviet trades to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in 1967 neared 
10,000 TIV, a nearly five-fold increase from their prewar baseline of approximately 
2,000.  Furthermore, Soviet prestige was on the line—their allies, using their weapons, 
had been resoundingly defeated.  Nasser too found himself with limited options—the 
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costs of increased Soviet weapons were a reduction in Egypt’s independence from Soviet 
political involvement.  The Soviets, who as a result of their basing strategy were more 
reliant on their relationships in the region than the United States, found themselves 
militarily committed in terms of equipment and an advisory effort.  
The War of Attrition (1967-1970) and The Yom Kippur War (1973) 
 
 In the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Arab alliance was soundly defeated.  Egypt, in 
particular, had lost almost the entirety of its Air Forces and had lost both land and 
prestige.  The failure of the war to destroy Israel in a bold decisive campaign in 1967 
gave way to a strategy of attrition and ultimately another round of open warfare in the 
Yom Kippur War.  The Egyptians’ objective loss—in what amounted to a rout—was also 
problematic for the Soviet Union.  The Soviets were the primary supplier of weapons to 
the Arab coalition.  Their military investment in the region from 1955-1975 totaled 
62,014 TIV, of which nearly a third went to Egypt.  In other words, Egypt’s loss was also 
a black mark for the reputation of Soviet military equipment—and by extension the 
Soviet Union itself.   
The primary hypothesis in this study—that increased great power competition 
increases the volume of arms sales—can partially be explained by the role of reputation.  
In this case in particular, the reputational cost for great powers was further magnified in 
two ways.  At the macro level, the conflict occurred during a time of marked great power 
competition.  At the micro level, the conflict directly placed Western and Soviet 
technology against each other.  Since the former makes the latter more likely, it is 
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presumably safe to infer that in periods of heightened great power competition it is more 
likely that a great powers’ weapons performance characteristics vis-à-vis its great power 
competitor will be known across the international audience.  Objectively in this case, 
Egypt’s poor military performance had less to do with the Soviet weapons and more with 
abroad failure to adequately integrate the Soviet equipment into a coherent set of 
concepts of operations reinforced through professionalized military training exercises.192  
However, this is perhaps clearer in hindsight than it was at the time.   
At the time, what was clear was that Israel, armed with Western planes, had 
unopposed air superiority over the Egyptians’ Soviet supplied air defenses.  Equipment 
losses during the war were dramatically lopsided.  Egypt, in particular was eviscerated; 
total losses are estimated at $2 billion.193  Critically this included the utter destruction of 
Arab air assets.  In total, over 450 Arab airplanes had been destroyed to a mere 36 lost by 
Israel.194  Again Egypt bore the majority of the cost—in the opening attack alone Egypt 
lost 286 airplanes. 195 Moreover, hundreds of tanks, artillery pieces, SAMs batteries, and 
miscellaneous combat vehicles were captured by Israeli forces.196  As shown in the 
Figure 6 below, the dramatic loss of military equipment in the 1967 war generated an 
exponential increase in the volume of arms trade from the Soviets to their Arab allies, 
whereas the U.S. trade to Israel proceeded at a lower volume in a more linear trajectory.   
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Figure 6:  Showing Armament Trade Between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt, Syria, and Iraq 
and the U.S. and Israel from 1954 to 1980.   
 
The most straightforward explanation for this variance is that the massive 
equipment losses suffered on the Arab side generated greater demand. The relative value 
of the trade by category is informative, but additional information about the nature of 
great power involvement in regional competition is garnered from looking more closely 
at the specific nature of the trade during this period.  The combat losses of the Six Day 
War, and the almost immediate resumption of low scale hostilities by Egypt (later 
designated the War of Attrition 1967-1970), created steady demand on both sides for 
armament.  As indicated in Figure 6, Russia started almost immediately rearming Iraq, 
Syria, and Egypt.  Egypt’s massive losses generated an exponential increase in the 
volume of Soviet military equipment that they imported.  The U.S. was slower to respond 
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to Israel’s rearmament needs, nevertheless a steadily increasing supply of weapons 
(particularly aircraft) was traded to Israel over this period.   
Additionally, the standard operational constructs being employed by Egypt and 
Israel, which predominately involved artillery strikes and small-scale special operations 
raids by the Egyptian forces and retaliatory airstrikes by the Israelis, drove their 
acquisition programs as shown below in Figure 8.  In this graph, the relative value of 
weapons exports measured in TIV is shown by weapon category.  Russia’s trade to Egypt 
(particularly in the Air Defense and Missiles categories) reflects Egypt’s attempt to 
increase the survivability of their interior from Israel’s aerial penetration.  Meanwhile 
Israel’s continued demand for aircraft reflects their desire to have a deep strike capability 
vis-à-vis their Arab neighbors. 
 
Figure 8:  Showing Arms Trade Indicator Values by Weapons Category between the 
U.S.S.R. and Egypt and the U.S. and Israel from 1967 to 1974. 
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 Putting aside the relative value of the trade and looking more closely at the 
numbers of systems delivered by category provides further insight into the concepts of 
operations being employed during the War of Attrition and sets the stage equipment wise 
for the Yom Kippur War.  As shown below in Table 19, Russia focused on replacing the 
massive vehicle and aircraft losses of the 1967 War, and, as shown by the numbers of air 
defense systems and missiles, placed considerable emphasis on increasing Egypt’s 
survivability against aerial attack.  In 1967 alone, Russia made deals to deliver 150 MiG 
Fighter Aircraft (50 MiG-19s and 100 of the more advanced MiG- 21F-13), 140 Su-7B 
Fighter-bombers, and 1,350 tanks (800 T-54s and 550 T-55s).  And, in 1968, Russia laid 
the foundation to deliver over 10,000 of their newly developed man portable SA-7s anti-
aircraft missiles. 
 
Table 19:  Showing the Number of Arms Traded by Weapons Category between 
the U.S.S.R. and Egypt and the U.S. and Israel from 1967 to 1974. 
 
 In the aftermath of the 1967 victory, the U.S arms trade to Israel proceeded in a 
more gradual linear fashion (as shown previously in Table 19 above), and contained 
fewer overall trades.  In terms of armament category, Israel imported a comparable 
though slightly lesser number of air defense systems, aircraft, and missiles while 
importing considerably more artillery pieces, and significantly less armored vehicles.  
The focus of both coalitions on the acquisition of aircraft and the means to defeat them 
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was in part due to the outsized role aircraft had played in the decisiveness of the Israeli 
victory and the desire by both factions to penetrate over the hardened lines at the Suez 
Canal into the interior of the other country.  Israel’s focus on artillery is also directly 
related to their hardening of the defensive positions around the Suez line, while Egypt’s 
outsized procurement of armored vehicles reflect their need to replace their damaged and 
captured vehicles from the recent war.  
 Israel’s arms trade in 1967 and 1968 is dominated by the acquisition of the 
artillery they needed to shell Egyptian positions on and beyond the opposing bank of the 
Suez Canal during the protracted war of attrition that punctuates the time period between 
the 1967 Arab Israeli conflict and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  Over these two years, 
Israel procured 340 artillery systems of various calibers from the U.S.  The majority 
(240) of the acquisition were the smaller tactical 105MM and 155MM towed artillery 
systems useful for supporting infantry maneuver and capable of ranges between 11 to 
15KM.  The remaining 100 systems were the larger self-propelled 175MM and 203MM 
systems capable of ranges out to 40KM and usually employed by an operational 
headquarters for counter battery fire and suppression of enemy air defense systems.   
 Israel also needed to sustain its advantage in airpower.  As the War of Attrition 
wore on, and Egypt’s relationship with the Soviet Union deepened in to a full-fledged 
advisory effort, the U.S. steadily supplied Israel with upgraded aviation platforms.  
Between 1971 and 1973, the United States traded 121 A4-E Skyhawks, 117 A-4M 
Skyhawk-2s, and 166 F-4E Phantom-2s.  These aircraft were fully modernized with 
 
 
 
139
upgrades over their predecessors, played a major role in the upcoming Yom Kippur War, 
and were only retired from service in 2015.197   
The trade interaction occurring during this time period supports three of the 
hypotheses in this study.  First, as expected from the previous historical discussion, 
regime congruity is strongly predictive of increased arms trade.  Specifically, during this 
period Egypt’s ties with Russia deepened and arms trade increased.  The failure of the 
Arab coalition was acutely felt by Egypt president Nasser, whose loss of face exacerbated 
inter-Arab rivalries and lessened the degree of pan-Arab nationalism that had maintained 
coalition bonds.198  The loss of support from his close Arab allies prompted Nasser to 
deepen his ties with the Soviets.  Nasser would support the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and went to the Soviet Union directly in January 1970 to request 
additional air defenses to help staunch Israel’s air campaign during the War of 
Attrition.199  Ultimately, the Soviet Union would supply massive amounts of air defense 
equipment, and would also deploy 32,000 soldiers and airmen to advise and 
surreptitiously participate as armed combatants against Israeli forces.200   
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A second hypothesis in this study, namely that arms trade from major powers to 
subordinate powers will increase during times when the subordinate power is involved in 
a conflict, is also operating in this case.  The tit-for-tat nature of the combat between 
Israel and Egypt following the 1967 war highlights how proxy wars between subordinate 
states generate increased arms trade from major powers.  In this case, Egypt combat 
losses generated an immediate demand to replace damaged and destroyed equipment and 
to upgrade their existing equipment to more modern variants.  Furthermore, Egypt’s 
rearmament affected the other side of the equation and generated an increased demand 
for more and more modern weapons in Israel—setting the conditions for increased arms 
trade by both great powers to their regional proxies.  The demand function is easy to 
explain in this case based on the protracted consumption of war material expected during 
an enduring conflict.  The supply however is less clear.  Assuming the benefits of 
stability for both parties why did the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. continue to provide weapons 
to their regional allies?   
While regime congruity continues to correlate with arms trade relationships, it is 
not the main variable at work in explaining the increased trade that occurred between 
Egypt and Israel following the 1967 war.  The major hypothesis under investigation in 
this study provides some insight into this question.  Increased great power competition is 
expected to increase the total volume of arms sales across the international system.  The 
demands of great power competition increase the necessity to create security spheres, and 
to challenge their rivals for influence in various regions.  In this case, the great power 
competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was reaching its zenith in a Cold War 
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between these two states.  At the level of grand strategy, the Soviets were still reeling 
from their strategic loss to achieve parity with the U.S. in terms of forward staging 
nuclear forces in Cuba.201  Although it seemed that initially the U.S. nuclear strategy of 
massive retaliation had advantages over the Soviets in the areas of submarine-launched 
nuclear missiles, forward positioned medium range missiles, and strategic bombing 
capability. 202  It was becoming clear as the Cold War progressed, that there were 
problems with the logic of massive retaliation and the U.S. was adopting a more involved 
strategy in the third world.  At the time however, from the Russian perspective, the U.S. 
Sixth Fleets’ operations in the Mediterranean posed a direct threat that had to be 
countered by increased alliances and forward basing in the Middle East and primarily in 
Egypt.  The usefulness of Egypt to the Soviets in terms of the larger strategic competition 
explains Russia’s willingness to expand their trade in support of Egypt’s local conflict, 
thus solidifying their alliance and securing Soviet access to the region to counter the U.S.  
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine Russia’s increased and enduring level of support to the 
region and specifically Egypt in the absence of their great power competition against the 
United States.   
Conclusion 
 
Just months prior to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Israeli celebrated its 
Independence Day in with a parade.  On display was their American military acquisitions 
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consisting of F-4A Phantoms, mechanized artillery, troop carriers, and tanks.203  
Meanwhile the Arab coalition was preparing to make good on the late Nasser’s promise 
concerning the captured territories in the Sinai and the Golan Heights “which was taken 
by force will be returned by force.”204  In the immediate period before the outbreak of the 
war, Israel’s intelligence apparatus noticed both the increased shipments of Soviet arms 
and the Egyptian preparations along the Suez line.205  Credible reporting concerning 
Egypt and Syria’s intention to start a major offensive were directly relayed to Prime 
Minister Golda Meir and the members of her cabinet on the 4th of October.  Although 
Meir mobilized the entirety of the IDF reserves, she also concluded that a preemptive 
airstrike was not in Israel’s best strategic interest.  Given the decisive role that the 
preemptive airstrike played in the 1967 war, this decision is an informative reflection of 
the role Israel’s reliance on the continual supply of U.S. arms played in shaping their 
behavior as a subordinate state in the U.S. security sphere.   
This chapter compliments and expands some of the key findings about the role of 
great power competition, regime similarity, alliances, and conflict in arms trade behavior 
demonstrated in the earlier chapters.  Specifically, this chapter directly explores the 
relationship between great power competition and the arms trade. The case presented 
above was deliberately narrowed to look specifically at arms trade behavior during a 
period of heightened great power competition in a region where there was a long-
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standing iterative conflict.  During the period presented in this case, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union were seeking to expand their influence regionally in the 
Middle East as one part of their broader global competition.  The winnowing of great 
power alliance possibilities predicated under a bipolar international system narrowed the 
options for the states in the region.   
The stakes of increased great power competition served to, in effect, lower the 
barriers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union for access to their armaments.  This was clearer 
for the Soviet Union whose requirement for land bases in the Middle East made it 
especially likely to maintain its arms trade commitments in spite of subordinate state 
misbehavior.  For importing states, Israel, Egypt, Syria and others, directly made political 
decisions that took into account their reliance on either the U.S. or the Soviet Union for 
arms in such a way that signaled their regime similarity and alliance commitments.  In 
effect, access to arms, as presented in this case served as a tool for great powers to 
exercise their influence via proxies in a contested region during a period of larger global 
competition.  And, for importing states the access to arms presented an opportunity for 
them to pursue their interest in the region within the limits and constraints of their 
respective great powers policy agenda and norms. 
This chapter compliments the earlier quantitative work by operationalizing the 
process at work for the variables under study, and expanding the analysis to periods of 
heightened great power competition.  Previous qualitative work looked at arms trade 
behavior at the conclusion of the Cold War when the United States enjoyed a period of 
unprecedented international hegemony.  This chapter provides additional clues about 
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arms trade behavior during a period of great power parity.  Going forward it is important 
to consider and make some predictions about the expected global impacts to arms trade 
behavior as China emerges as a peer global power, and Russia continues its revanchist 
resurgence.    
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
Introduction 
 
Throughout the previous chapters the relationship between power, arms, and 
alliances was explored using a mixed methods approach that looked holistically at arms 
trade in the aggregate through a multivariate regression, and then used a case study 
approach to look historically at arms trade behavior during periods of great power 
fluctuation.  In this chapter, the major findings of this study will be restated and evaluated 
against the original hypotheses, current arms trade behavior will be surveyed against the 
findings in this study, the contribution of this research will be evaluated, implications for 
policy explored, and future research areas identified.   
Summary of Findings 
 
 The central question in this project concerns the relationship between great power 
competition and arms trade behavior.  To look at this relationship a series of hypotheses 
were developed, and given the examination of these hypotheses in the previous chapters, 
some intermediate conclusions were made about their effects.  In this section, the 
evidence collected from the quantitative section and from each of the cases will be 
evaluated as a whole against the initial hypotheses to see what conclusions can be drawn.   
H1:  Great power competition will create increased volume in armament trade across the 
international system. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that great power competition would increase the volume 
of the arms trade.  Support for this hypothesis was found in the quantitative analysis and 
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further exemplified in the qualitative case studies.  For the majority of the time period 
analyzed, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were the two great power competitors in the 
international system.  However, at various points throughout the bipolar Cold War the 
intensity of the competition differed.  The quantitative results showed that when the U.S. 
held the preponderance of the power, or alternatively, when the U.S. faced less 
competition from a rival great power, there was a reduction in the overall volume of arms 
traded across the international system.   
Historically, the U.S. held a dominant position vis-à-vis its great power rival 
during the Cold War at two points: at the beginning, because the U.S. industrial base and 
infrastructure were spared from the destruction of the Second World War and, at the end, 
following the collapse of the Soviet economy throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
The variation in the amount of great power competition generated two historical case 
studies.  The first, looked at U.S. and Soviet arms trading behavior at the end of the Cold 
War when the level of great power competition was decreasing.  This case study showed 
the interplay between decreasing great power competition, arms trade, and alliance shifts.  
In keeping with the prediction that there is a linear relationship between the level of great 
power competition and the volume of arms sales and despite the United States’ steadily 
expanding arms trade into the former Soviet security sphere, the total volume of arms 
trade was reduced.  In other words, the increase in U.S. arms sales did not match the 
decrease in Soviet arms sales because the demand for weapons across the region was 
altered by the decreasing amount of great power competition.   
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The second case study looked at the Arab-Israeli wars (which spanned the height 
of the Cold war) iteratively when the level of great power competition was high.  In this 
case study, the steady demand for weapons between competing regional actors to achieve 
their political objectives interacted with the great power competition between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union.  This case showed one way that the level of great power 
competition causes the observed relationship to the arms trade.  Namely, when great 
power competition is high there is an increased likelihood of proxy wars, which stimulate 
the demand for arms.  The long duration of the regional proxy war stimulated an arms 
race between Israel and the Arab coalition.  The employment of weapons can increase the 
stakes of the competition for great powers by generating reputational risk for the 
performance of their weapons systems.  The Soviet Union doubled down in Egypt 
following their loss in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, in part because their technology had 
been beaten so resolutely.   
H2:  Trade will be highest between major powers and mid-range powers. 
 In contrast to the original hypothetical relationship, which postulated that trade 
patterns would non-linear—with mid-range powers importing more than major powers—
the quantitative analysis showed fairly strong evidence of a linear relationship between 
the level of the importing states material power and the volume of arms trade.  Indeed, of 
all the measures, importing state material power, as captured by CINC scores, had the 
highest impact on the volume of weapons traded.   
H3:  Alliances will increase arms trade. 
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There is strong evidence of a positive relationship between alliances and arms 
trade volume.  Alliances were shown to have the second largest impact on the volume of 
arms traded following the importing states’ CINC score.  Further analysis in subsequent 
models comparing behavior between major powers, showed a dramatic difference in the 
effects of alliances on the arms trade behaviors of the U.S. and Russia.  When analyzed 
independently, an alliance with the U.S. was shown to have a positive and fairly large 
effect on arms trade, but the results did not did not reach the same levels of statistical 
significance as the main effects models where all major powers were considered together.  
In the Russia only specification the results of an alliance were slightly greater than three 
times the size of the U.S.-only model and were highly statistically significant.  The 
difference in the level of statistical confidence between these two results suggest that 
there was more variance in the underlying U.S. behavior.  In other words, having an 
alliance with the U.S. was not as strong a predictor as having an alliance with Russia on 
increases to arms trade.   
Subsequent qualitative work expanded the account of relationship between 
alliances and the arms trade.  The first case looked at the end of the Cold War when the 
great power shifts in the international system created new alliance opportunities.  This 
case looked directly at the formation of alliances and the initiation of arms trade to 
further explain the quantitative relationship identified earlier.  Here alliances, while 
predictive of arms trade, were shown not to be necessary nor sufficient for the initiation 
of arms trade.  Furthermore, the impact of great power competition proved to be a greater 
factor in explaining the arms trading behavior than alliance formation, primarily because 
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much of the arms trades from the west occurred after the Soviet collapse but prior to 
NATO accession.  
During the second case study, when great power competition was at its height, the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union competed against each other through proxies in the Middle 
East.  While both great powers traded arms to the region, their behaviors were different.  
The U.S. approached its arms trade relationship with Israel cautiously; preferring to stay 
out of the conflict, the U.S. was reluctant to provide arms to Israel.  U.S. arms sales were 
also implicitly conditioned on how they were used in a way that Soviet sales to Egypt 
were not.  Thus, the Knesset actively considered maintaining their access to U.S. 
weapons when they choose not to launch a preemptive attack on Egypt in 1973—despite 
having credible intelligence that Egypt was preparing an offensive campaign. 
Despite Israel’s determination to engender and maintain access to U.S. arms, the 
volume of arms traded to Israel by the U.S. never approached the level the Soviet Union 
was delivering to its Arab neighbors.  Trade within alliance security spheres, in this case, 
interacted with the strategic needs of the competing great powers.  Simply put, Russia’s 
stakes in the region were higher because of their grand strategic requirements for land 
basing to counter U.S. sea power in the Mediterranean and Red Seas.  For Russia, the 
regional stakes were higher than they were for the United States.  The importance of the 
ally network for Russia increased their willingness to provide arms and other direct 
military support to the Arab coalition despite their losses and international condemnation.   
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H4:  Arms trade from major powers to subordinate powers will increase during when the 
subordinate power is involved in a conflict 
The results demonstrated a positive relationship between the volume of arms trade 
and the importing state’s involvement in an interstate conflict.  Conflict inevitably creates 
a demand for weapons, and one of the ways great powers compete is through proxy wars.  
The type of conflict was disaggregated in the quantitative analysis to gain additional 
information whether there were different arms trading behaviors for interstate versus 
intrastate conflicts.  Presumably great powers are more interested in competing with each 
other through their alliances in interstate conflict than supporting one faction or the other 
in an intrastate conflict.  As predicted, trade volumes are higher when the importing state 
is involved in an interstate conflict, but not meaningfully higher when the importing state 
is involved in an intrastate conflict.  The Arab-Israeli case study also shed light on the 
mechanisms of great power arms trading behavior in support of their proxies during an 
interstate war.  Egypt’s massive equipment losses in the 1967 war prompted Russia to 
export vast amounts of weaponry.  Russia also increased its mil-to-mil advisory effort, 
and their clandestine participation in the conflict.  In this case, the head-to-head clash of 
Soviet and U.S. technology increased the reputational costs for the great powers because 
the failure of their proxy was also indicative of a failure of their equipment.  The Soviet 
Union in particular doubled down in their transfer of anti-aircraft artillery and the 
associated sensor array to detect incoming aircraft to Egypt following the 1967 war to 
shore up their reputation. 
H5:  Nuclear powers will have higher volume of weapons trade. 
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This hypothesis was not supported. 
H6:  Regime congruity will increase arms trade. 
Based on the evidence, there is more trade between states having similar regimes.  
This result provides a more nuanced finding about the roles of similar regimes and 
alliances, which are both theoretically designed to answer the question about which states 
great powers trade their weapons to.  The result for regime similarity is smaller than it is 
for alliances.  Understanding that both regime similarity and alliances positively affect 
the volume of weapons traded provides a greater range for talking about arms trade 
behaviors.  When possible, states prefer to trade within their alliances.  Short of a formal 
alliance, states having a similar regime type receive a greater volume of arms.   
H7:  Democratization precedes arms trade from democratic regimes. 
Regime similarity is not fixed in time.  In both of the case studies, states engaged 
in behavior that increased their level of democratization.  The deliberate steps noted in 
the overview of NATO’s Membership Action Plan in the earlier analysis of the 
realignment of Eastern Europe were clearly oriented towards democratizing former 
Soviet States.  To some degree NATO institutionalized democratization as a requirement 
for joining the alliance, and through that same process, the arms trade to prospective 
members generally increased supporting Hypothesis 7.  However, it would be too bold to 
say that democratization is necessary for arms trade.  It is clear from the evidence that as 
states take steps to change their political landscape, they receive more arms.  Though it 
was not specifically investigated in this project, a logical area for future research would 
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be to look at the behavior of states moving toward increased autocracy and see if there is 
a similar relationship to arms trade among autocratic security spheres of influence.    
Taken together the findings above answer the question: Why do great powers 
trade arms in the following ways?  Great powers trade weapons to increase their security 
assurances.  When competition between great powers is high, the arms trade increases 
because great powers in essence lower their threshold about who they are willing to trade 
with.   
Contribution to the Discipline 
 The work in this dissertation broadly contributes to the field of international 
relations in the following ways.  First, it expands the understanding of the politics behind 
arms trade decision making.  The main finding—that a great powers’ willingness to trade 
its weapons is in part contingent on the level of great power competition they are 
experiencing in the international system—is useful for explaining some of the variation in 
arms trade behavior.  The level of competition affects great power arms trading behavior 
by changing the decision-making framework.  When the threat of peer or near peer 
competitor presents itself, the other great powers seek to solidify or expand their security 
spheres of influence to compete against the perceived rival lowering barriers to arms 
trading.  For example, there has been a steady increase in arms trade volume around the 
globe since a low point in the early 2000s, which in line with the findings in this project, 
is being driven by the rising level of great power competition between the U.S. and 
China, and the U.S. and Russia.   
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Since the rise of Vladimir Putin in the early 2000s, Russia has increasingly 
inserted itself as a player in the great power game.  The Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil 
War, and their active manipulation of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, among other 
things, are consistent with Russia’s strategic objectives.  Whether Russia really has the 
economic capacity to operate as a great power or if they are more of a spoiler is 
debatable, but their actions toward their strategic objectives of regaining a buffer zone in 
Eastern Europe, undermining the NATO alliance, and generally impugning the western 
world order without question will engender a competitive response.  Elements of this 
resuming competition are already present in the U.S. and Russia’s recent arms trade 
activity.  Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict has increased their arms exportation 
to the region by 19% from 2014-2018 over the 2009-2013 timeframe with Egypt and Iraq 
both increasing their importation of Russian weapons.206   
Similarly, North Africa, China, Russia, and the U.S. are positioning themselves 
for access to the Mediterranean Sea through their arms sales.  Russia, is using arms sales 
to Algeria to ensure its access to the Mediterranean Sea in support of their strategic 
objective of destabilizing Europe.  The U.S., seeking to counter Russia, is actively 
competing by arming Morocco.  China, France, and Germany are also selling arms in 
what has become a very important region geostrategically due to the seaports of 
debarkation for migration into Europe, and control of the sea lines of communications 
through the Mediterranean.  The recent competition in this region between major powers 
                                                 
206 Wezeman et al., "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018". 4. 
 
 
 
154
has led to a 20% increase in the volume of arms trade to North Africa over the 2009-2013 
levels; North Africa accounts for 75% of all arms traded to Africa.207   
While the competition with Russia has increased in recent years and has generated 
a competitive response from the U.S. and its Western allies—including increases to the 
volume and expansion in the distribution of arms—Russia’s limited economic potential 
will constrain their great power ambition.  China, on the other hand, has risen both 
economically and militarily and is start to exhibit some signs that it is pursuing a long-
term strategy of regional hegemony and global competition.  China’s expansion of their 
island defense chain in the South China Sea, their economic expansion and exploitation 
in Africa (through a combination of infrastructure development and natural resource 
extraction), their belt and road initiative, and their continued economic influence have 
increased the salience of a U.S.-China competition over the last decade.   
Commensurate with their economic growth, the Chinese military-industrial 
complex has grown in size and capability.  As expected, based on the effects of 
increasing great power competition, Chinese weapons exports have grown nearly 200% 
since 2000.208  The majority (70%) of China’s weapons trade occurs regionally within 
Asia, but they are facing limited export markets because as predicted, based on alliance 
and regime effects, India, Australia, South Korea and Vietnam do not import Chinese 
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weapons.209  China’s extension of their security sphere of influence in Asia has increased 
pressure within the U.S. for a competitive response.   
Under the Obama administration, the U.S. deliberately pursued a strategy oriented 
on engagement in the Pacific.  Australia, whose longstanding alliance and high degree of 
regime similarity with the U.S. make it the most likely trading partner, is unsurprisingly 
the primary importer of U.S. armaments in the region.  Indeed from 2014-2018, 60% of 
Australia’s total imported arms originate in the U.S., which accounts for 7.7% of the total 
U.S. arms exports—making Australia the second largest importer of U.S. arms behind 
Saudi Arabia.210  Other major importers in the region include South Korea, Japan, and 
Taiwan.   
The types of equipment the U.S. is exporting to the region is also of interest from 
a great power competition perspective.  There is a growing realization among U.S. 
strategists that recent Chinese acquisitions of anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) 
technology and the development of a comprehensive strategy for its employment, will 
threaten the United States’ ability to project power in the region.211  Accordingly, the 
U.S. began transferring the types of weapons it would need to fight its way into a Pacific 
theater of operations to its regional allies.  In 2018, Japan moved to acquire 105 F35s––a 
fifth-generation stealth multirole aircraft designed to defeat air-to-ground defensive 
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arrays.212  Further sales to counter A2/AD systems include ship and land-based AEGIS 
combat systems to Japan, as well as Patriot air-to-ground missile defense systems to 
South Korea and Taiwan.213   
Despite the rhetoric about rebalancing to the Pacific to counter China, and taking 
into account the U.S. trading activity listed above, Asia has not overtaken the Middle 
East as the primary destination of U.S. arms exports.  Foreign military sales to the Middle 
East increased 134% since the 2009-2013 data, and accounts for 52% of total U.S. arms 
exports; Saudi Arabia alone comprises 22% of the total U.S. arms trade.214  Demand 
within the Middle Eastern region is clearly being driven by the ongoing conflicts in Syria 
and Yemen, as well as the perennial conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.  Many of the 
United States’ western allies have also increased their trade into the Middle East.  Great 
power involvement in the region and in those conflicts further explains the trend.  
Second, these findings contribute and extend some of the existing literature in 
international relations.  Understanding the way that power competition affects the arms 
trading behavior of major powers gives Waltz’s insight about internal and external 
balancing more depth.  Waltz is primarily focused on how the structure of the 
international system affects stability; great power behavior varies under different 
arrangements of great powers.  Bipolar systems are presumed to be more competitive 
because the powers are so clearly defined that the stakes approach a zero-sum logic.215  In 
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a multipolar arrangement, there is a diffusion of responsibility because the interests and 
the stakes of the competition for the various great powers are less clear.216  In terms of 
alliances however, the dynamics of competition are reversed.  In a bipolar system, the 
competition for alliances is less important because the smaller states that comprise the 
remainder of the international system are not powerful enough to change the balance of 
power by shifting their alliances.217  In a multipolar system, the management of alliances 
is paramount because defections can upend the existing balance; the formation and 
maintenance of alliances will be more contested.218  However, Waltz’s account of the 
relationship between the number of great powers in the international system and the value 
of alliances is focused on the alliances between great powers.   
Multipolar systems, unlike bipolar systems, make it possible for blocks of great 
powers to ally with each other against other great powers, dramatically affecting power 
concentrations.  Moving past structural arguments to one that looks at competition may 
be more helpful to explain great power behavior.  Great powers are in competition to 
extend their global reach and influence.  More powers in the system is presumed to 
increase the competition, because buyers will have more options, which will compel great 
powers to lower their barriers for sales.  Increased competition makes attracting and 
maintaining alliances a primary concern.  One method is through the creation of 
alliances.  Given the relationship between arms sales and alliances, it seems likely that 
arms sales serve more as a tool to maintain alliances than to attract new alliance 
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members.  When great powers transfer their military equipment, they are making their 
alliance network resilient to defection because over the life span of the equipment, the 
requirements for upgrades, repair parts, and maintenance will tie the two countries 
together.   
These findings roughly compliment and extend Stephen Walt’s early work on 
alliance formation.  Specifically, Walt’s finding that foreign aid does little to create 
alliances is similar to the conclusions found in the relationship between arms trade and 
alliances found here.219  There are a couple of ways that the findings about the 
relationship between the arms trade and alliances examined here need to contextualized.  
First, unlike Walt, in this study arms sales are disaggregated from the general category of 
foreign aid and considered independently, which makes the information drawn from their 
analysis more specific to arms.  Walt’s primary independent variable that predicts the 
creation of an alliance is the balance of threat, which expands the logic of balance of 
power by stipulating that states balance against states perceived to be the biggest threat, 
and there is not necessarily a relationship between presenting the biggest threat and being 
the most powerful.220   
In this study, great power competition is the primary variable investigated to look 
at the resulting changes to the volume of arms traded.  Arms trades can and often do 
occur between states that are not allies, but when states are allied there is an increase in 
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the volume of arms traded.  Because Walt’s analysis and this one specifies different 
dependent variables, there are some differences in the interpretation of the results even 
though both studies are talking about competition, alliances, regime similarity, and arms 
trade (foreign aid).  The effect of increased great power competition is felt within the 
governments of the great powers and serves to change the political calculus of the 
transfers of arms.  This finding is analogous to Walt’s in that as the level of threat rises 
the importance of ideological similarity lowers for alliance building.221  Unlike balance of 
threat, the level of great power competition is somewhat agnostic about how it is 
perceived outside of the great powers themselves.  Arms trade can be undertaken absent 
an alliance (or a desire for an alliance) by a great power seeking to complicate, disrupt, or 
foil a competing great power’s agenda.  Russia’s deal in 2019 to sell Turkey S-400 anti-
aircraft missiles is a potential example of this.  The decision to trade weapons and the 
decision to form alliances are different though they can overlap under certain conditions.  
Second, in Walt’s original analysis, which occurred prior to the end of the Cold 
War, there was a shortage of available data on the arms sales of many of the regimes in 
the former Soviet security sphere.  As the data from the Cold War has improved, and by 
looking closely at the post-Cold War patterns of alliance formation and arms trading 
patterns, the conclusions here are more robust.  Walt’s finding that the provision of 
foreign aid, which is identified as a type of balancing behavior, is only marginally 
impactful for alliance formation can be updated to take into account the data from Eastern 
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Europe following the Cold War.222  Already in Walt’s account there is some internal 
tension in his case analysis on the Middle East regarding the behavior of Israel who “the 
United States has been able to extract significant concessions from.”223  As NATO 
expanded following the conclusion of the Cold War, the NATO alliance was able to 
purposely influence the domestic political and economic development of perspective 
member states through the specification of the Partnership for Peace and the Membership 
Action Plan.  In spite of the relative decline of the Russian threat, the majority of Eastern 
Europe sought an alliance with NATO.  Rearmament through the provision of western 
and predominately U.S., arms was a paramount feature of that realignment.   
Understanding how the level of great power competition affects state decisions to 
import and export weapons helps explains Caverley and Kapstein’s finding that show a 
declining market share for the U.S.224  As the U.S. continued to develop and produce 
weapons for the use of the United States’ military, states that did not feel a sense of 
responsibility for policing the global commons required different armaments than the 
types of high-end expensive weapons that the U.S. produced.225  Operationally, this 
describes much of the arms market dynamic as the threat of the Soviet Union waned.  
During that time, NATO expanded into Eastern Europe as described in Chapter 3.  
Simultaneously, many NATO members recouped a peace dividend in high-tech 
armament procurement while simultaneously supporting military operations that required 
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less sophisticated operations in Afghanistan.  As this study has shown, when great power 
competition is lower the volume of arms traded is reduced because states are more likely 
to trade within their alliances or to other states with similar regimes because the demands 
to maintain a security sphere oriented against a peer threat is reduced.  Conversely, as the 
level of great power competition increases and the need to orient an alliance network 
towards a high-end threat becomes manifest, the volume of trade will rise.   
Policy Implications  
 
United States’ policy makers are becoming increasingly oriented on the potential 
for a new era of great power competition.  Although this is a global competition, there are 
some regions that are more contested than others.  Specifically, the Pacific, the Middle 
East, Africa, and Europe.  The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly asserts a 
doctrine of “principled realism” and mentions China and Russia multiple times by name 
as competing against American power.226  Given this conceptualization of the 
international environment by the United States, it is likely that the recent trends observed 
above will continue.  There is already some tension about the potential role that the arms 
trade plays at work in U.S. foreign policy.  One the one hand, the growing level of great 
power competition should serve to lower barriers and facilitate a higher degree of trade.  
On the other hand, there is concern about the types of regimes the U.S. is trading to.  
Clearly, U.S. politicians should be concerned about funneling weapons into regimes that 
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could potentially use them towards nefarious ends, but there should also be concern over 
great power balances in contested regions.   
This tension is currently operating most clearly in the Middle East in Saudi Arabi 
and Turkey.  The U.S. debate over arms sales to Saudi Arabia has revolved around 
normative arguments to cease arms sales to induce behavioral changes.  The Trump 
administration and other governments have faced pressure to alter their arms trade 
agreements with Saudi Arabia following the death of Jamal Khashoggi, and to staunch 
Saudi Arabia’s use of these weapons in their campaign against Yemen.227  While some 
Saudi Arabia’s lesser trading partners such as Demark and Finland ceased their trade, 
Germany is the only major power of Saudi Arabia’s four leading exporters to do so.228  
The other three major exporters to Saudi Arabia—the U.S., the U.K., and France have not 
suspended their arms sales in spite of political pressure.229   
In the current state of the international system where there is increasing 
competition between the U.S. and China, and the U.S. and Russia, the role of normative 
arguments (at least in this limited anecdote) appear not to outweigh the fear of losing 
ground in great power competition.  While the continued sale of Arms to Saudi Arabia is 
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being debated, and there are factions of the legislative branch that oppose continued 
sales, the Trump administration in particular has been overtly opposed to ceasing U.S. 
sales to Saudi Arabia.  The Trump administration cities Saudi Arabia’s role keeping Iran 
in check through a proxy war in Yemen, their continued support of the fight against 
Radical Islamic Terrorism, the revenue gained by U.S. corporations through arms sales, 
and the concern that if the U.S. ceased its arms sales, its great power competitors would 
rapidly fill the void.230  Given the specific concern about Russia and China benefiting 
from the U.S. cancelling its contracts with Saudi Arabi, it seems clear that the Trump 
administration views the U.S. arms trade as a frontier of great power competition.  Other 
members of the U.S. government do not necessarily share the executive branch’s view.  
Highlighting the role of two-level games in arms trade policy, the current polarized state 
of U.S. politics makes it hard to disentangle the elements of foreign policy being pursued 
in support of a U.S. grand strategy from the domestic political benefits each party is 
getting from opposing the other.   
In terms of the variables examined in this dissertation it is likely that the U.S. 
arms trade to Saudi Arabia will continue in the long run.  Specifically, Saudi Arabia has a 
modern military and a strong economy, they are involved in a regional war, and they 
have a long-standing relationship with the U.S.  In addition to its significant oil reserves, 
Saudi Arabia commands a geostrategic position in the Persian Gulf and serves as a 
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regional balancer to Iran.  Moreover the U.S. is currently concerned about a growing 
level of great power competition, much of which is taking place in the Middle East where 
the U.S. has relatively few allies.  While the regime similarity between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia is low, the levels of the predictive variables mentioned above suggests that 
the arms trade relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia will continue—though 
there may be a short-term decline as the U.S. seeks to compel behavioral changes within 
the Saudi regime.   
From a policy perspective though the U.S. should be cautious about how much 
force it tries to exert against the Saudis through a series of blocked or contingent arms 
sales.  If the U.S. overplays its hand, then it is likely that Russia would insert itself as a 
supplier of arms—expanding their presence in the Middle East.  With Russia already 
complicating U.S. ground actions in Syria, consolidating their position along the sea lines 
of communication through the Mediterranean in North Africa, and seeking to extend their 
relationship with Turkey, the great power stakes are increasing in the region at a time 
when U.S. Iranian relations are at a low point.  Iran remains the primary threat in the 
region for the U.S., and countering them will require a cohesive alliance network that 
includes Saudi Arabia.  Given these considerations, the better course for U.S. policy with 
Saudi Arabia is to continue to fulfill outstanding contacts and work to improve regime 
behavior through diplomatic channels.   
The United States relationship with Turkey has also experienced some turbulence 
over arms sales as a result of a 2019 Russian arms deal for S-400 missile-defense 
systems.  This is a highly unusual move of a long-term NATO ally seeking advanced 
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military technology outside of the NATO framework.  Turkey’s willingness to accept an 
arms trade deal from Russia is clearly a response to the declining relationship between 
them, the U.S., and the West generally.  Turkey’s grievances are over the conduct of the 
war in Syria, the perceived involvement of the United States in the 2016 coup attempt, 
and the criticism of the increasing autocracy of the Turkish government.  Already the 
U.S. has cut off the delivery of the fifth generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighters pending 
Turkey’s withdrawal from the Russian deal.231  Additionally, Turkish pilots and aviation 
maintenance personnel currently training on the airframe in the United States have been 
removed from training but allowed to remain in the U.S. while the dispute is resolved.232  
Ostensibly the central concern for the U.S. is that Turkey’s use of the Russian S-400s 
while being used in conjunction with “friendly force” F-35s would capture information 
about the stealth capabilities and radar signature of the F-35s that Russia would gain 
access to and proliferate.233  Ultimately if Turkey chooses Russia there could be 
ramifications for Turkey’s continued participation in the NATO alliance, which plays 
directly into Russia’s hand of fracturing the Western liberal order.  The U.S. has already 
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offered to sell Patriot Missile Systems—a comparable and NATO interoperable system—
to Turkey.234  The brinksmanship between the U.S. and Turkey, is fundamentally a 
question of arms and alliances.  Turkey is far from an ideal ally, however, the potential 
damage to the reputation and solidarity of NATO if they leave the alliance to align with 
Russia, would not benefit U.S. interests in the long run and would embolden Russia to 
further erode the alliance.  U.S. policy makers simply cannot accept the possible 
compromise of the F-35’s technology, and Turkey is seemingly unwilling to renege on 
the Russian deal.  Policy makers would be better served by offering Turkey better ways 
to enhance their missile defense systems with a subsidized trade of U.S. systems.  Failing 
to entice Turkey through subsidized missile defense sales, the U.S. should suspend the F-
35 indefinitely while continuing to sell arms that do not run the risk of compromise while 
increasing efforts to engage in diplomatic and mil-to-mil cooperation.  In the majority of 
the possible scenarios, Russia is the winner in this exchange—the U.S. needs to relook its 
arms trade strategy vis-à-vis Russia to prevent further erosion of its alliance networks.    
While Russia’s recent revanchist activities in the Middle East warrant a measured 
response from the U.S., the growing great power competition with China is likely to be 
more significant.  Like other historical great power contests, the emerging contest 
between the U.S. and China will take place on a global scale and will require a cohesive 
strategy from across all of the elements of national power to be effective.  Already, in the 
early stages of this contest, two regions have emerged where U.S. and Chinese interest 
                                                 
234 Lara Seligman, "U.S., Turkey Take Key Step toward Patriot Missile Deal," Foreign 
Policy December 19, 2018.  https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/19/us-turkey-take-
key-step-toward-patriot-missile-deal-raytheon-nato-russia/ 
 
 
 
167
are in opposition—the Indo-Pacific and Africa.  In the Pacific, China seems intent on 
pursuing a strategy of regional military hegemony.235  To date this has mostly taken the 
form of establishing a perimeter of forward bases throughout the South China Sea.  
Strategically, this perimeter dominates the sea lines of communication through the 
region, and creates a depth of terrestrial basing for anti-access / area denial weapon 
systems for a theater defense of the mainland.236  Much of China’s actions in claiming or 
creating islands along the Nine-Dash line is contested by other countries in the region, 
but ultimately, they lack the power to contest China in any meaningful way.  China has 
also been increasing its military capacity to project power into Taiwan and to conduct 
expeditionary campaigning more generally.237   
The U.S. has identified three lines of effort in its Indo-Pacific strategy: 
Preparedness, Partnership, and promoting a Networked Region.238  In part this strategy 
relies on forward posturing combat-credible forces in conjunction with regional allies and 
partners to limit competitors from seizing their objectives before the U.S. can mobilize 
from the continental United States.239  The focus on interoperable alliances and “offering 
financing and sales of cutting-edge U.S. defense equipment to security partners” ensures that 
the sale of U.S. weapons will be a prevalent feature of this strategy.240  Already specified 
                                                 
235 U.S. Government, "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and 
Promoting a Networked Region," ed. Department of Defense (Washington D.C.2019), 
8. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid., 8-9. 
238 Ibid., 17. 
239 Ibid., 18. 
240 Ibid., 21. 
 
 
 
168
are the sale of interoperable missile defense systems to Japan and Australia, which 
follows the patterns observed in Europe as the NATO alliance expanded where more 
capable and stable allies received greater access to advanced weapons.  From a policy 
perspective, the sale of weapons and the increased focus on partnerships, is at risk of 
being hollow without a larger organizing principle.   
As China amasses military and economic power in the region and, depending on 
the degree to which they attempt to coerce their neighbors, it may be time to revisit the 
idea of a mutual defense treaty similar to the defunct Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty (SEATO).  Other associations in the region, such as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Tran-Pacific Partnership (TPP), focus primarily on 
economic relationships.  A collective defense treaty on the other hand, would aim to 
create an interoperable military alliance.  It would be a mistake to blindly apply lessons 
from the U.S. experience in the Cold War against the Soviet Union to China in the 21st 
century; nevertheless, the creation of a formalized defense alliance in the Pacific could 
consolidate the alliances the United States already has in the region.  Specifically, the 
United States could leverage the longstanding relationships it has with many countries in 
the regions like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, S. Korea, the Philippines, among others, 
into a cohesive whole oriented on maintaining freedom of navigation throughout the 
region and addressing regional security concerns.  Drawing from NATO, the benefits of a 
formalized regional alliance versus the collection of separate bilateral and multilateral 
alliances currently in existence, would be the establishment of guidelines and a pathway 
to membership (similar to the Membership Action Plan).  The U.S. is already promoting 
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democratization, selling weapons, and engaging in mil-to-mil partnerships; creating a 
formalized collective regional mutual defense alliance would extend the actions already 
being undertaken and serve to balance China’s growth in the region.  
On a more global scale, China’s Belt and Road Initiative represents a 
comprehensive strategy of economic and infrastructure investment to advance its position 
as a global economic superpower in the 21st century.  Not all of China’s activities in 
pursuit of this agenda are being well received, and some of their actions are creating 
competitive space for the U.S. to provide an alternative partnership.  For example, in 
Africa, China and the U.S. (among others) are competing for market share in a large 
underdeveloped economic market.  While it is a mistake to think of a continent the size of 
Africa monolithically, the stakes in the region are high.  Stated U.S. interests are broadly 
aimed at improving access to economic markets, increasing the political stability, and 
countering violent extremist organizations operating in ungoverned or weakly governed 
spaces.241  Unlike in the Pacific, where there are a series of long-term stable U.S. allies, 
policy in Africa is more uncertain and involves greater risk.  Policy wise there are few 
opportunities for increased arms trade and alliance formations.  Russia has a dominant 
position in Algeria, and the U.S. is aligned with Morocco, which represents the only 
African countries in the top 40 list of arms importing states.242  That both countries are in 
North Africa is not surprising given the geostrategic position along the Mediterranean 
Sea and feeding into the back door of Europe.  And in sub-Saharan Africa, China is the 
                                                 
241 Government, "National Security Strategy," 52-53. 
242 Wezeman et al., "Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018". 6. 
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second leading arms exporter behind Russia and ahead of the U.S.  The U.S. and China 
both have military bases in Djibouti whose port is theater strategic logistics asset, and 
there is rightly concern that if Djibouti defaults on its Chinese owned debt, the port will 
be “leased” to China similarly to what happened to Sri Lanka in 2017.243  This pattern 
would follow what has emerged as the “debt-trap diplomacy” criticism of Chinese heavy 
investment in relatively risky African Infrastructure projects in support of their theater 
dominant Belt and Road Initiative.  This line of criticism creates some strategic space for 
the U.S. to compete for soft power influence, which should include continuing and 
expanding the already existing mil-to-mil relationships, and looking for opportunities to 
expand its arms trade into the region in support of forging alliances.   
Limitations and Future Research 
 
 There are many limitations to the research presented in this study; there are three 
that deserve specific discussion.  First, there is an outsized representation of the Cold War 
in the data that generated the quantitative analysis, and the historical cases.  At a 
minimum this implies that the results should be considered cautiously, and at worst, it 
implies that the results cannot be extended past the historical period that generated them.  
Inferentially though, focusing more on the logic of competition instead of the structure of 
the international system makes the results valid under any arrangement of great powers.  
                                                 
243 Arwa Damon and Brent Swails, "China and the United States Face Off in Djibouti 
as the World Powers Fight for Influence in Africa," CNN May 27, 2019.  
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/26/africa/china-belt-road-initiative-djibouti-
intl/index.html 
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The ways that great power balancing behavior unfolds in bipolar versus multipolar 
systems may differ but responses to competition are likely similar. 
 The second major limitation, is that the analysis presented is derived from data 
that look at the trade in conventional military weapons designed purposely for military 
use usually by corporations associated with a state’s military-industrial complex.  
However, there is a growing use of civilian off-the-self technology for military 
applications; the proliferation of civilian technologies with military application has 
several implications for this study.  First, to the degree that it is possible for states to 
attend to their security needs through civilian off-the-shelf technology, the role that the 
transfer of high-end technology plays in solidifying alliances will be reduced.  Second, 
the transfer of weapons is highly controlled while the availability of off-the-shelf 
technology can generally be assumed to occur in a more or less open market system.  
This implies that as civilian technology grows in its martial capacity, great powers will 
lose the ability to capitalize on their control of the arms market to shape their security 
spheres.   
 Third, this study did not explore the monetary inducements to the arms trade in 
depth.  While there is an economic component to CINC scores and GDP was considered 
when looking at which states represented major powers, the economic impacts of foreign 
sales and the potential political calculus involved in maximizing those effects was 
considered as secondary to great power competition.  Clearly there is a lot of money 
involved in foreign military sales, and given the powerful domestic effects of economic 
inducements as well as the considerable lobbying influence of military-industrial 
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corporations it is likely that economic considerations affect the political decision making 
for the sale of arms in a way that does not necessarily have to be tied to great power 
competition. 
 The limitations mentioned above offer some immediate areas of future research 
that supports a developing an arms trade research agenda.  As identified above, looking 
more closely at the role of civilian off-the-shelf technology is an important step to 
identifying whether the abilities of great powers to attract and maintain security spheres 
of influence through arms access is lessened.  Second, the nature of the ensuing U.S. 
competition with China is also an area that warrants future research.  There are many 
reasons to suspect that the way the competition between the U.S. and China unfolds will 
be different than the competition with Russia during the Cold War.  Extended 
interoperable alliances may have lost some of their panache given the interconnected 
nature of the global economy and the reduced ideological underpinning of the current 
competition.  Third, the economic considerations of arms trade decision making need to 
be considered more thoroughly as an additional hypothesis to great power competition so 
that their effects can be understood in relation to the other factors affecting arms trade 
decision making. 
Final Remarks 
 
Why do great powers trade their weapons?  Taken together, the evidence from 
this study suggests that powerful states attempt to leverage access to their armaments to 
engender and maintain their security sphere of influence.  As the level of great power 
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competition in the international system increases, great powers are more willing to extend 
arms trade access to states that are not allies, weak allies, or further away from them in 
political regime type.  Importing states of sufficient power, seek to align themselves 
through arms trades with great powers to enhance their regional security position and 
signal their commitments.  Because of the long-life spans, maintenance requirements, and 
life-cycle upgrades to major military end items, great powers are able to exert limited 
control over their subordinate arms trading partners who do not want to limit their access 
to arms.   
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APPENDIX A: CODE BOOK 
 
Variable Name Variable Description 
exstate   Exporting State’s Country Code 
exporter  Exporting State’s Name 
imstate   Importing State’s Country Code 
importer  Importing State’s Name 
year   Year of Observation 
excinc Exporting State’s Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 
Score from the National Material Capabilities NMC Dataset 
Version 4.0  
imcinc Importing State’s Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 
Score from the National Material Capabilities NMC Dataset 
Version 4.0 
imnuke Binary Variable coded 1 starting the year the importing state 
developed nuclear weapons 
exnuke Binary Variable coded 1 starting the year the exporting state 
developed nuclear weapons 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF IMPORTING STATES 
 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, German Democratic 
Republic, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kosovo, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Republic of Vietnam, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. 
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Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, 
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zanzibar, and Zimbabwe 
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APPENDIX C: ALTERNATIVE REGRESSION MODELS 
Main Effects Model with Casewise Deletion. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
U.S. Power -43.60* -39.18 -48.90* -53.19** 
 (23.35) (23.88) (26.14) (25.68) 
Unipolarity -
6.198*** 
-5.306** -2.601 -2.298 
 (1.688) (2.250) (2.078) (2.249) 
Exporter CINC 125.0 90.94 69.92 78.04 
 (90.20) (94.84) (114.0) (117.1) 
Importer CINC 1,127 487.2** 540.3** 527.9** 
 (817.9) (225.0) (246.4) (231.3) 
Importer CINC2 -2,151    
 (2,931)    
Exporter Regime  -0.278 -0.413 -0.428 
  (0.430) (0.410) (0.410) 
Importer Regime  -0.532** -0.559** -0.543** 
  (0.257) (0.244) (0.246) 
Similar Regimes  13.26*** 12.81*** 12.72*** 
  (4.210) (4.305) (4.226) 
Alliance   74.91*** 74.92*** 
   (26.94) (27.11) 
Exporter Interstate War   -4.078 -4.853 
   (3.432) (3.438) 
Importer Interstate War   24.56** 24.95** 
   (10.92) (10.77) 
Exporter Intrastate War   1.869 2.219 
   (2.868) (2.918) 
Importer Intrastate War   3.934 3.929 
   (3.639) (3.525) 
Exporter Nuclear    -4.182 
    (5.640) 
Importer Nuclear    10.37 
    (27.07) 
Nuclear Dyad    -2.202 
    (52.83) 
Constant 28.06** 29.04** 25.74* 29.34** 
 (13.13) (13.77) (14.70) (14.30) 
Observations 82,764 74,813 66,897 66,897 
Number of panel 1,950 1,660 1,660 1,660 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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 Regional Effects Model with Casewise Deletion. 
 
 All Africa Asia Europe Middle East N/S America 
       
U.S. Power -48.90* 30.18*** -20.44 62.51** -265.3* -52.88*** 
 (26.14) (10.98) (109.3) (28.93) (138.3) (17.72) 
Unipolarity -2.601 0.230 -5.045 -13.58** -1.008 -4.898 
 (2.078) (0.841) (5.218) (6.063) (9.300) (3.181) 
Exporter CINC 69.92 70.97** 414.2* 676.8** -364.4 96.30* 
 (114.0) (33.96) (249.8) (276.5) (470.2) (54.92) 
Importer CINC 540.3** -1,341 2,082 43.90 2,759 363.7 
 (246.4) (2,287) (1,617) (164.2) (4,608) (361.7) 
Exporter Regime -0.413 -0.00825 0.0552 -0.318 -2.865* 0.309 
 (0.410) (0.0663) (1.155) (1.267) (1.591) (0.284) 
Importer Regime -0.559** -0.0290 0.389 -0.805 -2.263 -0.299 
 (0.244) (0.0465) (0.336) (0.904) (1.541) (0.190) 
Similar Regimes 12.81*** 2.949** 9.948 26.01** 70.84** 2.306 
 (4.305) (1.494) (10.35) (11.18) (30.43) (2.388) 
Alliance 74.91*** 47.59* 61.47 50.93*** 271.9* 1.910 
 (26.94) (25.88) (42.89) (17.61) (138.5) (1.507) 
Ex. Interstate War -4.078 0.771 13.69* -8.313 -1.828 3.380 
 (3.432) (1.119) (7.767) (5.317) (20.26) (3.661) 
Im. Interstate War 24.56** 9.180 27.45 10.93 40.63 18.05 
 (10.92) (8.556) (23.16) (13.07) (28.91) (13.95) 
Ex. Intrastate War 1.869 1.268 2.903 4.407 -5.952 1.641 
 (2.868) (0.996) (9.033) (5.142) (12.18) (1.910) 
Im. Intrastate War 3.934 0.367 -0.130 -2.248 9.218 -6.357 
 (3.639) (1.987) (7.144) (7.195) (16.87) (7.998) 
Constant 25.74* 11.84*** 38.27 -64.94* 166.1** 24.70*** 
 (14.70) (4.036) (58.22) (34.70) (65.75) (5.840) 
       
Observations 66,897 17,399 13,056 14,919 8,652 12,871 
Number of panel 1,660 450 337 415 200 258 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Exporter Effects with Casewise Deletion 
         
 All No U.S. U.S. Only Russia  
Only 
China  
Only 
Russia and 
China 
U.S., 
Russia, 
China, 
France, 
Germany, 
U.K., and 
Italy 
Japan, 
India, and 
Brazil 
         
U.S. Power -48.90* -38.23 63.75 -132.2 -46.31** -122.4 -70.24* -0.606 
 (26.14) (25.50) (171.7) (192.9) (19.26) (114.4) (39.75) (2.274) 
Unipolarity -2.601 -0.971 -30.98** 37.80 3.324 15.74** -1.479 -0.327 
 (2.078) (1.716) (14.04) (23.21) (2.752) (7.651) (2.933) (0.311) 
Ex. CINC 69.92 242.8** -249.2 298.8 -156.1** -73.02 14.37 21.85 
 (114.0) (113.6) (321.1) (372.7) (73.10) (147.3) (150.7) (28.08) 
Im. CINC 540.3** 404.7* 2,566 1,907 36.70 659.1 852.5** -35.68 
 (246.4) (240.9) (2,369) (2,540) (43.70) (779.0) (373.9) (29.17) 
Ex. Regime -0.413 0.00640  -2.080 2.460 -4.489* -2.076 -0.0133 
 (0.410) (0.151)  (2.905) (2.053) (2.671) (1.748) (0.0187) 
Im. Regime -0.559** -0.589*** -0.696 0.246 0.217 0.834 -0.647** -0.00554 
 (0.244) (0.224) (1.813) (1.925) (0.285) (1.407) (0.318) (0.00936) 
Similar Regimes 12.81*** 10.77*** 30.29 40.68* 3.635 31.24* 15.58*** 0.108 
 (4.305) (4.084) (22.25) (23.64) (3.088) (18.24) (5.428) (0.202) 
Alliance 74.91*** 73.21*** 73.60 231.9*** -5.943 177.8*** 82.92*** 0.231 
 (26.94) (26.85) (89.28) (74.01) (5.684) (59.59) (29.98) (0.192) 
Ex. Interstate War -4.078 -0.950 -4.459 -23.43 -5.554** -3.472 -3.349 -0.0111 
 (3.432) (2.110) (12.26) (34.51) (2.355) (7.457) (4.180) (0.0237) 
Im. Interstate War 24.56** 31.29*** -32.69 216.5*** 32.58* 130.3*** 34.70** 0.377 
 (10.92) (11.26) (35.41) (78.45) (18.51) (43.84) (15.53) (0.613) 
Ex. Intrastate War 1.869 3.108* 3.954 10.69 1.011 7.772 3.798 -0.0368 
 (2.868) (1.855) (8.374) (12.72) (3.318) (6.816) (3.361) (0.107) 
Im. Intrastate War 3.934 2.954 11.77 42.02 -1.914 23.82 5.649 -0.285 
 (3.639) (3.536) (17.74) (28.51) (3.974) (14.55) (5.206) (0.318) 
Constant 25.74* 4.966 49.71 8.811 63.18** 42.70 50.10** 0.0397 
 (14.70) (11.80) (64.30) (90.14) (25.48) (56.25) (25.39) (1.990) 
         
Observations 66,897 60,154 6,743 6,741 6,741 13,482 46,819 20,078 
Number of panel 1,660 1,494 166 166 166 332 1,162 498 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Main Effects Model with Imputation 1950-2015. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
U.S. Power -37.46** -30.99* -32.66* -31.94* 
 (18.89) (18.26) (18.35) (17.39) 
Unipolarity -8.556*** -6.765*** -6.541*** -6.590*** 
 (1.814) (2.000) (2.000) (2.222) 
Exporter CINC 91.12** 70.14** 59.60* 58.29* 
 (37.13) (32.92) (32.61) (32.60) 
Importer CINC 418.8* 234.1** 190.6** 180.2** 
 (248.3) (98.77) (92.73) (88.49) 
Importer CINC2 -930.9    
 (1,369)    
Exporter Regime  -0.642 -0.642 -0.636 
  (0.430) (0.418) (0.424) 
Importer Regime  -0.429** -0.470** -0.471** 
  (0.205) (0.207) (0.207) 
Similar Regimes  10.81*** 9.778*** 9.770*** 
  (3.306) (3.181) (3.160) 
Alliance   45.49*** 45.35*** 
   (12.98) (13.03) 
Exporter Interstate War   -2.012 -2.005 
   (2.340) (2.333) 
Importer Interstate War   17.15** 17.15** 
   (7.483) (7.353) 
Exporter Intrastate War   1.331 1.311 
   (1.855) (1.870) 
Importer Intrastate War   2.432 2.443 
   (2.700) (2.570) 
Exporter Nuclear    1.256 
    (3.986) 
Importer Nuclear    10.99 
    (17.67) 
Nuclear Dyad    -19.52 
    (40.42) 
Constant 30.87*** 29.04*** 25.03*** 24.11** 
 (9.558) (9.696) (9.464) (10.05) 
     
Observations 98,558 98,558 98,558 98,558 
Number of panel 1,970 1,970 1,970 1,970 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Regional Effect Model with Imputation 1950-2015. 
 
 All Africa Asia Europe Middle East N/S America 
       
U.S. Power -32.66* -15.17* -57.09 62.19** -224.5*** -31.64*** 
 (18.35) (7.737) (65.74) (25.63) (78.84) (9.425) 
Unipolarity 6.541*** -0.987** -5.371 16.54*** -7.843 -4.588* 
 (2.000) (0.460) (6.296) (5.824) (5.417) (2.490) 
Exporter CINC 59.60* 14.70 -51.09 268.5*** -27.60 28.67 
 (32.61) (9.364) (62.38) (92.25) (140.3) (25.11) 
Importer CINC 190.6** -18.12 499.8* -46.02 -132.0 218.0 
 (92.73) (23.42) (294.9) (76.16) (218.1) (201.1) 
Exporter Regime -0.642 -0.264* 0.263 -1.439 -3.060** 0.285 
 (0.418) (0.160) (1.041) (1.390) (1.526) (0.396) 
Importer Regime -0.470** -0.0633 0.102 -1.056 -2.024** -0.251** 
 (0.207) (0.0404) (0.292) (0.751) (0.997) (0.120) 
Similar Regimes 9.778*** 1.658 3.359 24.35** 46.77** 2.334 
 (3.181) (1.108) (6.077) (10.16) (21.30) (1.974) 
Alliance 45.49*** 20.18* 42.60 39.92*** 185.1** 4.121** 
 (12.98) (12.18) (27.11) (8.888) (88.72) (1.995) 
Ex. Interstate War -2.012 0.549 -6.873 -3.602 -3.538 2.895 
 (2.340) (0.780) (5.375) (3.622) (14.72) (2.784) 
Im. Interstate War 17.15** 5.005 17.82 6.332 37.87 12.76 
 (7.483) (4.477) (15.33) (8.469) (23.39) (9.629) 
Ex. Intrastate War 1.331 0.736 7.331 -0.656 -3.656 0.220 
 (1.855) (0.630) (5.779) (2.776) (9.168) (1.284) 
Im. Intrastate War 2.432 1.363 -1.344 -1.435 13.93 -2.651 
 (2.700) (1.794) (5.661) (3.821) (12.73) (6.329) 
Constant 25.03*** 9.034*** 47.67 -27.69 143.1*** 17.88*** 
 (9.464) (3.479) (31.94) (18.83) (40.25) (4.541) 
       
Observations 98,558 24,234 20,282 22,707 11,501 19,834 
Number of panel 1,970 490 437 495 200 348 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
182 
 
Exporter Effects with Imputation 1950-2015. 
         
 All No U.S. U.S. Only Russia 
Only 
China 
Only 
Russia and 
China 
U.S., 
Russia, 
China, 
France, 
Germany, 
U.K., and 
Italy 
Japan, 
India, and 
Brazil 
         
U.S. Power -32.66* -28.40 -26.01 -144.8 -15.50 -105.6 -48.95* -1.333* 
 (18.35) (18.24) (69.84) (148.3) (12.30) (80.22) (26.59) (0.684) 
Unipolarity -6.541*** -3.007*** -37.24*** 21.18 -1.475 9.247** -7.254** -0.142 
 (2.000) (1.164) (13.82) (14.30) (2.017) (3.982) (2.849) (0.0914) 
Ex. CINC 59.60* 53.60** -35.98 -40.17 -10.49 -22.04 27.38 0.724 
 (32.61) (25.05) (97.36) (85.02) (10.59) (29.50) (38.52) (0.898) 
Im. CINC 190.6** 156.3 588.2 817.6 3.086 348.6 289.6** -2.321 
 (92.73) (95.01) (429.1) (695.1) (32.83) (325.9) (133.6) (2.267) 
Ex. Regime -0.642 -0.873**  -4.474*** 3.296 -3.871*** -2.041* -0.0130 
 (0.418) (0.348)  (1.698) (2.143) (1.376) (1.127) (0.0171) 
Im. Regime -0.470** -0.560*** 0.308 -0.937 -0.0542 -0.338 -0.541** -0.00321 
 (0.207) (0.202) (0.995) (1.119) (0.0909) (0.620) (0.264) (0.00625) 
Similar Regimes 9.778*** 9.871*** 10.07 33.28** 1.599 21.80** 11.04*** 0.0681 
 (3.181) (3.264) (9.677) (13.85) (1.370) (9.100) (3.743) (0.131) 
Alliance 45.49*** 39.37*** 75.21* 166.5*** -4.045 114.1*** 54.77*** 0.0561 
 (12.98) (12.91) (43.66) (52.74) (5.026) (38.24) (15.56) (0.0613) 
Ex. Interstate 
War 
-2.012 -1.029 -3.074 -13.12 -4.441** -4.597 -1.214 -0.00540 
 (2.340) (1.526) (9.365) (17.25) (2.166) (5.528) (2.882) (0.0742) 
Im. Interstate 
War 
17.15** 20.49*** -13.08 148.0*** 23.88* 88.54*** 24.28** 0.294 
 (7.483) (7.735) (26.50) (56.71) (13.15) (31.10) (10.59) (0.428) 
Ex. Intrastate 
War 
1.331 0.744 2.766 6.313 0.705 4.983 2.507 0.0128 
 (1.855) (1.608) (6.249) (7.417) (2.383) (5.210) (2.270) (0.0409) 
Im. Intrastate 
War 
2.432 2.058 5.347 25.46 -0.303 14.61 3.401 -0.120 
 (2.700) (2.606) (13.71) (20.17) (3.343) (10.30) (3.840) (0.174) 
Constant 25.03*** 19.63** 68.13 73.73 38.04** 41.81 45.98*** 0.972** 
 (9.464) (8.571) (41.65) (67.61) (17.59) (37.19) (15.61) (0.388) 
         
Observations 98,558 88,688 9,870 9,870 9,870 19,740 69,095 29,463 
Number of panel 1,970 1,773 197 197 197 394 1,379 591 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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